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CHAPTER I
ORIGINS OF AND PRECEDENTS FOR THE IDEA OF WORLD COURT
The Permanent Court of International Justice was
one of the major institutions established after the World
War to further the development of the peaceful settlement
of international disputes. It marked the culmination of
a long series of efforts to convert the idea of a world
court into a reality. It was no sudden or ill-considered
idea of the value of such a court that induced its inte-
gration into the framework of peace treaties. It was
rather the culmination of a long and continuous recognition
among many philosophers and some statesmen of the necessity
for such a tribunal that made the realization of the idea
possible.
The first definite plan for an international court,
as far as can be determined, was drawn up in the Middle
Ages(l306). The author of this plan was Pierre Dubois, a
French Jurist, who, like all cultured men of his day, want-
ed to unite the Christian world against the infidels.
Dubois believed that the unity of Christianity could best
be ensured if Justice rather than war were used to settle
international disputes. He proposed an alliance of all the
powers in the Christian world for the establishment of a
2permanent court of Arbitration through which to settle
differences arising among its members
.
1
Another attempt at unifying the states of the world
was put forth by Dante in his "De Monarchia"
,
written about
1309, but not published until 1559. In that work, he pro-
posed a "world state" under the guidance of a central court
of Justice which would serve to dispose of international
disputes. 2
About the middle of the fifteenth century came a
series of humanistic plans for the creation of tribunals
for the settlement of international disputes. King Podie-
brad of Bohemia negotiated for the formation of a "Federal
State made up of all existing Christian powers and held
together by a congress of ministers which was to be per-
"5
manent.
At the close of the period of the rise of European
monarchies and the break-up of feudalism, came the first
authoritative treatise on the Law of Nations. This treatise
was prepared by Hugo Grotius, commonly called the "Father
of International Law", a man of great learning, of long
1 Antonio S. De Bustamante, The World Court
, p. 8.
2 George A. Finch, The Sources of Modern Interna-
tional Law
, p. 11.
^ Ibid
. , p. 10.
- 3 -
experience in public affairs, and of uncommon knowledge
of Roman Law. His international law had two sources, the
law of nature, and the consent of all or most nations;
the law of nature furnished the legal basis for Grotius’
work and from it he derived his fundamental idea of the
equality and independence of sovereign states. States,
like men, were, according to him, controlled in their
actions and relations by the operation of a law of nature.
He believed that law constituted a standard by which the
conduct of states and individuals could finally be judged
and that Roman Law afforded an historical example of its
successful application in international affairs. This
theory of his has had to endure for centuries the incessant
attack ox criticism and test of practical experience but
still stands as a monument to the excellence of his work.^
Another plan was that of Henry IV of France, who
proposed to divide Europe equally among fifteen powers
and so do away with any possibility of jealousy over or
fear of a balance of power in Europe. The Catholic, Cal-
vinist, and Lutheran religions were to be formally recog-
nized; and any disputes arising between nations were to be
settled by representatives of each in a council which was
to be modelled after the Amphictyonic Council of ancient
4 George B. Davis, International Law
, pp. 17-18.
- 4 -
3reece. In 1596, Henry and Elizabeth of England signed
a treaty of alliance which was to have prepared for the
formation of such a league; but Elizabeth died, and Henry
was assassinated before any final plans were completed.
5
Perhaps the most famous plan of the period was that
of Emeric Cruce called "Le Nouveau Cynee" which came out
in 1623. The author in his plan advised the rulers of
Europe to avoid war and to settle their difficulties by
arbitration. He proposed a union not of Europe alone
(as had all the other writers on the subject) but of the
whole world.
^
•
Other schemes (most of them porposed in the eigh-
teenth century) which deserve mention are: "The European
Diet, Parliament or Estates" of William Perm, published
about 1694; the "Senate" of the Abbe Saint-Pierre, pre-
sented about 1712-13; "The Perpetual Peace" of Immanuel
Kant, published in 1795.
"The European Diet" proposed the establishing of a
body to convene at regular intervals where the rulers of
Europe could formulate rules of justice and could settle
all differences among themselves which could not be decided
by diplomacy. The decisions of this tribunal were, if
necessary, to be enforced by all its members. 7
5 Finch, op. cit.
, p. 10.
7 Idem
.
6 Ibid.
, ,p. 11.
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The Abbe Saint-Pierre's project was really only
an enlargement of the plan of Henry IV. It provided that
if any nation had a complaint to make against another, it
must present it before a "Senate" made up of twenty-four
representatives of the powers of Europe. The "Senate" was
to try to solve the problem by a commission of mediation;
but if no agreement could be reached, an arbitral decision
was to be given. This decision required a majority vote
on the preliminary questions and a three-fourths vote for
a final settlement. It provided that any government which
refused to carry out the decision as rendered was to be
declared an enemy of the other nations, which were to band
together to exterminate it. All costs were to be paid
by the rebellious state.
^
The philosopher Immanuel Kant, in "The Perpetual
Peace" published in 1795, stated that perpetual peace was
the prime purpose of international law. He proposed the
formation of a congress of nations which would be voluntary
and permanent and to which every nation was invited. He
believed that this congress of nations was the only way
that a public lav; for all nations could be established by
which differences could be determined in a civil method
9
and not by war."
0
De Bustamante, op. cit
.
. p. 10-11.
9^ Finch, op. cit
. ,
p. 12.
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Early In the nineteenth century the philosopher
Jeremy Bentham proposed a plan for perpetual peace, in
whicn he stated that the maintenance of peace could be
Greatly facilitated by the establishment of a court of
Justice for the settlement of International differences,
even though the court might not have the power to execute
its decisions.^ .
Although all of the proposals for ensuring perpetual
peace were perhaps too Utopian to be realized, nevertheless
they drew the public attention to the idea that relations
between states could be settled better by arbitration than
by war, and they prepared the way for the Court of Arbi-
tration, The Court of Arbitral Justice and the Central
American Court of Justice, which in turn were to serve as
precedents for the Permanent Court of International Justice.
The Hague Conference of 1899
In August, 1898, the youthful Emperor of Russia
surprised the world by sending to the diplomatic repre-
sentatives of the foreign nations, accredited to his Court,
his famous proposal for a World's Peace Conference.
^
Twenty-six nations were invited, and among them the United
States was invited. The purpose of the Conference was
De Bustamante, ojo. cit
. ,
p. 11.
11
» P. 3.
a consideration of the reduction of armaments as a poli-
tical method of preserving enduring peace. The delegates
soon realized, however, that a program for disarmament
was doomed to failure unless the causes of armament were
removed. The efforts of the delegates were, therefore,
directed toward the consideration of the rules and prin-
ciples of that branch of law which seemed to offer a real
foundation of peace, namely, justice.
In order to facilitate its work, the Conference
was divided up into three committees, one to study dis-
armament, the second to study the laws and customs of
naval warfare, and the third to study peaceful methods
of adjusting international disputes. It is this third
committee which was important in the development of plans
for the establishment of the World Court. 12
The American delegation to the Conference, consis-
ted of Andrew D. White, noted educator and American Ambas-
sador to Germany from 1897-1902, Seth Low, President of Co-
lumbia University, Stanford Newel, Minister at the Hague,
Captain Mahan of the United States Navy, Captain Crozier of
the United States Army, and the Honorable Frederick W. Holls,
as secretary.
President McKinley and Secretary Hay instructed these
delegates to strive for the establishment of an inter-
12
De Bustamante, ojp. clt
.
. pp. 41-42.
- 8 -
national court and to propose a plan for a tribunal to which
nations might bring all their disputes, with the excep-
tion of those which might Jeopardize their political in-
dependence or territorial integrity. 13
With the instructions of their State Department
in mind, the American delegation drew up and presented the
following provisions which they hoped would be a valuable
contribution to a working plan for a court of arbitration:
1. The highest court of Justice in each nation was to
nominate one member from its own nation to sitat the court as Judge.
2
.
The tribunal was to be organized after ninehad assured adherence. states
j. The disputing states were to select Judges to hear
and decide the case.
4. All the members might be called to sit or any un-
even number down to a minimum of three; but if
there were as few as three, none of the Judges
could be a native citizen or subject of the statesin dispute.
5. The Judgment rendered was to be subject to revisionbefore the same Judges that had handed down the
decision, in case material circumstances which had
not been know at the time of the decision should
come to light. 15
The actual work of the Third Committee of the Con-
James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences
.
American Instructions and Reports
, p. 8.
^ James Brown Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague
Peace Conferences
. Translation of Official Texts--1899.
pp. 834-5.
15
De Bustamante, op. cit
. , p. 43,
- 9 -
ference was done by a sub- committee called the "Comite'
examen"
. This committee chosen for the purpose of draft-
lne a plan for international arbitration and mediation, heard
the sugsestions offered by the various deleSatlons. The
English proposal, which was presented by Sir Julian
Pauncefote, was accepted as the basis of the committee’s
work. This proposal in turn was greatly modified and en-
larged by suggestions from both the American and Russian
delegations, and those of the other members of the com-
mittee. 1^
In order to show more clearly to what extent the
suggestions of the American delegation were embodied in the
final convention drawn up by the committee, I shall present,
first, a summary of the convention; second, the fundamental
ideas of an American corollary to the main plan; and third, the
reasons why several parts of the original American plan
were not acceptable to the committee.
The following are the points included in the final
convention:
1. The Permanent Court was to be competent for all
arbitration cases, unless the parties concerned agreed
to set up a special tribunal.
2. An International Bureau was to be set up at the
Hague to serve as a channel of communications for
the business of the court and as the custodian for
all the transactions of it.
Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences
.
American
Instructions and Reports, p. 51.
10 -
+?
nt
?S
following the ratification of% °reatinS the court, each signatory powerwas to choose a maximum of four persons who were
a
C
°;p
f,
tent in
^
he questions of international lawnd who were to serve as arbitrators. Two or more
aSree on the selection of one or morebitiators in common. Their terms were to be sixyear s
.
4. Powers who wished to have recourse to the court
were to notify the Bureau of their desire and givethe names of the arbitrators whom they had chosen.
5. Powers not signatories to the act were also to beha
y
e jocess to the court under the conditionslaid down by the convention.
6.
The powers which brought disputes to the court wereto sign a special act ( comoromls ) which containedthesubject of the dispute and the extent of the
arbitrator's powers. This act implied the agreement
oi the parties to submit in good faith to the
arbitral award.
7. The decision was to be binding only on the parties
who concluded the " compromis"
.
8. Each party was to pay its own expenses and an equal
share of the honoraria of the arbitrators and the
expenses of the tribunal. 1 '
As an addition to the convention drawn up by it,
Mr. Holls of the United States presented to the committee
a proposal for special mediation. Special mediation, he
said, was to be used when all other methods had failed,
and when war, therefore, seemed inevitable. According
to his plan, both states in dispute were to choose a neutral
^ Scott, The Proceedings of The Hague Peace Con-
ferences — 1899, pp. 852-858.
11 -
power through which they might enter into communication with
each other in order to prevent the breaking down of peace-
ful relationships. This period of communication between
these seconds was not. except by special agreement, to be
over thirty days. During that period the seconds were to
use their greatest tact to settle the disagreement. If,
however, peaceful relations were severed, the seconds were
still to stand by and use the first opportunity to restore
peace. Mr. Rolls said special mediation was based upon the
undeniable fact that there would always be differences
between nations and governments which neither arbitration
nor mediation could prevent. Yet it would be wrong to say
that in such cases the disagreements must naturally be
climaxed by a war. Holls believed he had a solution to
such disputes and so submitted it to the committee. 18
It, in turn, was accepted by the convention as Article 8
under the section Good Offices and Mediation. 15
From the summary of the draft finally evolved by the
Third Committee, it can be seen that several parts of the
original plan of the American delegation were not accepta-
ble to the rest of the delegation. The fundamental idea
presented by the Americans was a permanent, continuous
18 Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Con-
ferences —
, pp. 188.
19
Ibid
. , p. 236.
12
court made up of not fewer than nine Judges from whose
number the states In dispute might choose Judges to hear
their eases. There was in the American proposal a pro-
vision for the meeting of the entire tribunal at one time.
This idea of a meeting of the whole tribunal at once was
not acceptable to most of the Continental states because
they believed that- there had not been sufficient experience
with arbitration to warrant a continuously sitting tribunal.
Another objection to the full membership's sitting contin-
uously was based on the fear that the court would assume
a dignity and importance for which the nations as yet were
quite unprepared. Also they believed that the expense
involved in payment of permanent Judges' salaries was like-
ly to emphasize the undesirable side of an international
court which might have little to do. Sir Julian Paunce-
fote's plan avoided these difficulties by providing for a
permanent court, not unlike the supreme court of the State
of New York, consisting of a comparatively large number of
judges who never sit as a whole body but who exercise their
judicial functions either alone or in separate groups made
up from their number. 20 The American plan differed from
the final one in the choosing of judges. The American
suggestion provided for the choosing of one judge from
20
Scott, The Hapqie Peace Conferences. American
Instructions and Reports, p. 53.
13 -
each country adhering to the contention. The British
proposal suggested two judges from each country. Upon
the advice of the Herman delegate, however, the final number
was increased to not more than four, and the powers were
not restricted to their own citizens in their selection of
judges, for two or more countries could choose the same
Judge. 21
Several sections of the American draft were accepted
by the committee without change. One was the proposal that
every case submitted to the court be accompanied by a
written agreement, on the part of both the states, to abide
by the decision of the court. Another part which was un-
animously adopted by the committee was the proposal that
the Convention go into effect immediately after its rati-
fication by nine states. Also the American proposal that
tne oench of Judges be chosen from the list of members of
the tribunal was accepted without change,
^
The part, however, which was flatly rejected by
the committee was the proposal that the judges of the court
be elected with the co-operation of the highest courts in
eacn country. Many of the nations concerned had no one
highest court comparable to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Also the courts of the Continental countries,
21 IMd« > PP. 54-55.
22 Ibid
.
.
p. 55.
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being based on Roman law, had excluded the idea of any se-
lection by a judicial tribunal of a man for any particular
purpose, even for a judicial position. Also in many Euro-
pean states the members of the highest court were prevented
from having any knowledge of the ability or reputation of
the most noted lawyers or judges since no one was allowed
to practice before- the highest court unless he was a res-
ident of the city of its location and a member of its par-
ticular bar. In those countries the judges of the high
courts were not the best advisers for selection of credit-
able legal representatives. Out of courteous regard for
this proposal of United States, however, the comite d'examen
ordered the reporter to mention the importance of complete
disregard of political considerations in choice of members
to the court. 25 The failure on that point is not par-
ticularly significant in as much as it had little actual
importance in the running of the court itself.
Attention has been called to the fact that the
whole plan for the court and its use was voluntary so far
as sovereign states were concerned. In order that the United
States should make its position concerning the court doubly
clear, the delegation made a declaration in full session
of the Conference to the effect that in signing the Con-
vention concerning the peaceful settlement of international
«
25 Ibid,
, p. 56.
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disputes, they understood that:
oonst^rt°n=
t
?
lnea 1
?
thls oonvehtion shall be so
to depart from Its^adltlonal^ollo^of
’
3
n°t lnt™d
&
ministration of any foreign' Stati
; nor shS! anyl
rttltaa* *«"“* purely
With this reservation the United States' delegates
signed the arbitration Convention. This reservation did
not seem to draw any verbal protests from the other members.
In addition to the court, there was also established
a permanent Administrative Council set up for the purpose
of supervising the organization of the Bureau, which was
to remain under the direction and control of the Council.
It was composed of the diplomatic representatives of the
signatory powers accredited to the Hague. 25
The fame of the Hague Conference of 1899 rests main-
ly on the fine work done by the Convention in unanimously
agreeing upon the settlement of international disputes by
arbitration rather than by war and upon the creation by it
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to put the theory of
p/f
arbitration into actual practice.
Ibid
.
.
p. 57.
25 Choate,
_op. clt. f p. 53.
26 Ibid
. , p. 19.
16 -
Evidence of the practical value of the Court is found
in the fact that, since its creation there have been several
hundred disputes settled and over one hundred and forty-
four standing arbitration treaties concluded by means of
The Second Hague Conference
Among the movements which prepared the minds of
governments for an accord in the direction of assured
peace among men, a high place may be fittingly given to
the Interparliamentary Union, for it was that body which
prepared the way for the meeting of the Second Hague Peace
Conference.
In September, 1904, its annual meeting was held in
the United States at St. Louis. At the completion of its
session, there was passed by a unanimous vote a resolution
to have the governments or the world send delegates to an
international conference to be held at a time and place to
be agreed upon for the purpose of considering:
1. problems left unsolved by the First Hague Conference.
2. negotiation of arbitration treaties between nations
who sent representatives there.
3. the advisability of establishing an international
congress to convene periodically for the discussion
of international questions.
27
David Jayne Hill, The Problem of a World Court ,
p. 14. ; Choate, 0£>. clt . , p. 40.
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The delegates to that Interparliamentary Union paid the
honor and respect to President Theodore Roosevelt of re-
questing him to be the leader in inviting all the nations
to send delegates to the proposed conference. That honor
he gladly accepted. 28
President Roosevelt sent notices of the proposal
for a second conference to all the governments which had
taken part in the first conference. In the notices he made
no attempt to do more than indicate the general topics
which the Final Act of the First Hague Conference had named
as unfinished matters for future consideration and add
the suggestion that it might be desirable to adopt a pro-
cedure whereby states not signatories to the First Confer-
ence might become parties to a second one. 29
Y/ith the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War in
1905, the time and place for the meeting of the conference
were set for June 15, 1907 at The Hague.
The American delegates, Joseph H. Choate, Horace
Porter, Uriah M. Rose, David J. Hill, George B. Davis,
Charles S. Sperry, and William I. Buchanan, went with in-
structions from Secretary of State Elihu Root to work for
a more effective system of arbitration to which the nations
28 Scott, The Hague Peace Conference
.
American
Instructions and Reports, p. 60.
29 Ibid
. ,
p. 64.
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might more readily have recourse and which would be obli-
gatory. He instructed them to work for the development
of the Hague Tribunal into a permanent tribunal composed
of Judges who would be paid adequate salaries
,
and who
would hear and decide cases with Judicial methods and with
a sense of judicial responsibility.-^0
The work of .the Conference was so complicated and
widespread that it was considered advisable to divide the
Conference up into four commissions similar to the three
commissions of the First Conference. In the study of the
origins and precedents for a world court the first Commission
on arbitration and international commissions of inquiry
is of greatest interest and significance.-^
The American delegation proposed to the Committee
the following detailed and complete plan for the establish-
ment of a Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice. The Court
was to consist of fifteen judges, of whom nine were to con-
stitute a quorum. They were to be of the highest standing
morally and of the most competence in international law.
They and their successors were to be appointed according
to a plan to be drawn up by the Conference, but chosen so
that the several systems of law and principal languages
30
Ibid
. , pp. 77-80.
Ibid
. , pp. 91-92.
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should be fairly represented on the court. Their terms
of office were to be decided by the Conference. The Court
was to meet annually at the Hague at the date specified
and was to remain in session as long as necessary. It was
to elect its own officers and, except for stipulations of
the Conference, draw up its own rules and regulations.
All the Judges were- to be equal in rank and were to receive
a salary large enough to enable them to devote their whole
time to their Judicial duties. In no case was a Judge to
take part in the consideration of a case in which his nation
was a party
. The court was to have the power to review
and determine all cases concerning international affairs
of sovereign nations which had not been solved by means
of diplomacy. The Judges of this court were deemed compe-
tent to act as Judges on any special tribunal for arbitra-
tion which might be constituted by any power for the consier-
ation of any dispute! The Court of Arbitration established
by the 1899 Convention was to constitute the basis of the
new Court provided that the powers who signed the 1899
Convention were represented on it.^2
The establishment of a permanent court as proposed
by the American delegation was accepted and supported in
principle by the G-erman and British delegations and the
Scott, Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences
— 1907, vol.II, p. 1015.
20 -
proposed court as framed and recommended by the Conference
was the result of the co-operation of the German, British,
and American delegations along with the loyal support of the
French.
”
With agreement upon the establishment of a Permanent
Court of Arbitral Justice concluded, there remained still
one problem to be solved, namely the choosing of the Judges.
Until a method of selecting them was found, no nation was
willing to submit a case to the Court. Proposal after
proposal was submitted and rejected. Each nation argued
that it should be represented on the court on a plane of
equality with the others whether it was bigger or smaller.
Since, however, there were some forty-four countries repre-
sented at the Conference, it was quite obvious that a court
consisting of forty-four judges would be unwieldly and
impossible. Under these conditions all that the Confer-
ence could do was to recommend that the plan for establish-
ing a Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice be adopted and
that, as soon as agreement was possible, a convention
providing for the method of electing judges be added. 55
The establishment of the Court was not a mere wish
33 Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences
.
American
Instructions and Reports, p. 135.
34 i
De Bustamante, ojd. clt
.
,
pp. 53-54.
35 Ibid
. , P. 63.
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or desire on the part of the Conference, but a recom-
mendation to the powers to undertake the establishment
of the court. The Conference In turn, on accepting the
convention as the organic act, recommended that the Court
be definitely and permanently established by the powers
as soon as they should have agreed upon the method of
appointing the judges. It will be noted that the number
of powers necessary to establish the Court was not stated,
nor was the number of judges specified
.
56
The Court of Arbitral Justice as provided for in
the Convention was not to interfere with the Court of
Arbitration established by the Conference of 1899. The
latter was only a temporary tribunal, erected for a particular
purpose to decide as arbiters a case submitted. The Court
of Arbitral Justice, ,on the other hand, was meant to be a
permanent court, composed of judges acting under a sense
of judicial responsibility, representing the various legal
systems of the world, and capable of assuring the continuity
of arbitral Jurisprudence. The contracting powers were
free to appoint either a large or small number of Judges,
but the judges so appointed were to hold office for a
period of twelve years and were to be chosen from among
persons enjoying the highest moral consideration in their
36
Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences
. American
Instructions and Reports, p. 132.
22 -
respective countries and who were Jurists of recognized
competency in matters of international law. 37
From these provisions, it is evident that the pro-
posed institution was to be not merely in name, but in fact,
court of Justice and that it was to be permanent in the
sense that it did not need to be constituted for any and
every case submitted to it, whereas the Court of Arbitration
had been only a temporary tribunal composed of arbiters
who sat in on disputes, not with the purpose of rendering
a decision based on international law and equity, but with
the purpose of suggesting a compromise agreeable to the
disputing parties. Therefore, the new court might be con-
sidered a supplement to the older court.
Along with the problem of the establishment of a
Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice came the question of
making arbitration obligatory. 38 In the meeting of the
First Commission, Mr. Choate, the American delegate to the
Commission, presented a proposal for such arbitration.
His plan contained the proposal that judicial differences
or differences in the interpretation of treaties which
had failed to be settled by diplomacy, be submitted to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, provided that
the independence or honor of the respective states was not
37
Ibid
.
.
p. 133.
38 Ibid.
. pp. 77-78.
- 23 -
Jeopardized in any way. It was up to each power, he said,
to decide for itself whether or not its honor was at stake.
It provided that, in each case which came up, a special
agreement should be concluded to determine exactly the
subject of the controversy, the powers of the arbitrators,
and the procedure and details to be followed. It provided
for ratification of. the treaty and its communication to the
signatory powers. In the plan there was also a provision
for tje denunciation of the arbitration treaty by the
*G
parties.
In the final act of the Conference the arbitration
convention was concluded. It was to cover questions already
existing and future ones. It provided for general or pri-
vate treaties making arbitration obligatory on the part
of the signatories to the treaties.^ Thus it can be seen
that the plan of the United States delegation was followed
closely in the framing and adoption of the arbitration
declaration. Since, however, the convention as adopted
was vague and indefinite as compared to the proposal laid
before the committee, the United States delegation refrained
from voting on it. It was finally agreed that those who
favored it could enter into the agreement while others
39 Ibid
. , p. 78.
40 Ibid
. , p. 129.
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could stay out or come in later as they pleased. No one
was compelled to be a party to the treaty. The declaration
concerning obligatory arbitration as drawn up by the Confer-
ence read:
"The Conference, conforming to the spirit ofgood understanding and reciprocal concessions whichis the very spirit of its deliberations
,
has drawn
up tne following declaration, which, while reserving
to each one of the Powers represented the benefit
of its votes, permits them to affirm the principles
which they consider to have been unanimously accepted.
It is unanimous:
1. In accepting the principle of obligatory arbitra-
tion.
2. In declaring that certain differences, and notably
those relating to the interpretation and a applica-
tion of international conventional stipulations,
are susceptible of being submitted to obligatory
arbitration without any restrictions."^
The American delegation admitted that the declaration on
principle of obligarory arbitration was an advance, but
they continued to hold that it was not the advance for which
they had hoped.
The conventions and declarations drawn up in 1907,
although they could not be put into action because of the
lack of agreement about the election of judges, were filed
in the records of the conference to serve as a working
basis when the court was finally established. Therefore,
although the Court as planned by the Second Hague Confer-
41
Ibid., p. 130
25 -
ence did not become a reality within the period of the
Conference, the proposals and declarations for it served
to further the cause of international justice by keeping
the idea before the world and by providing a fine founda-
tion for the much desired court of international justice.
A second projedt before the Second Hague Conference
was the establishment of an International Court of Appeal
in Prize Cases. The question of validity of capture had
been the source of disputes for many years. When war
broke out, it had always been the custom for each of the
nations at war to set up national prize courts of their
own to pass on the validity of every capture. With such
a plan the usual result was a judgment of the case in
favor of the stronger nation. This decision was final as
far as the law was concerned. If the decision involved the
disposition of a great amount of property, or was one which
seemed to violate the rules of national justice and equity,
diplomacy was resorted to, in order to obtain reparation
for the neutral whose property had been captured. Sometimes
joint commissions, appointed by the two nations, reversed
the decision of the national court of the belligerent, but
this action was of little value since the belligerent was
not bound to join the commission. It was obvious, then,
that the solution to this problem lay in the establishment
of an International court which was unbiased by national
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interests, and which could Judge the cases on the establish-
ed principles of equity and Justice.^2
Great Britain and Germany proposed plans for the
establishing of such a court, but each with a different
motive. Great Britain with her great navy could seize and
condemn neutral property with ease, while Germany with a
much smaller navy at that time, took the chance of being
a neutral at her mercy. The American delegation did not
present a plan at first, but gave its general consent to
the idea of the Court and waited the development of the
two plans of Germany and Great Britain and possible contro-
versies which were bound to arise from motives so different.
The British and German plans disagreed on four points
concerning the organization and functioning of the Court,
and it was at the appearance of these difficulties that the
American delegation came forward to try to find a common
basis for an understanding. First, Germany believed that
since the whole purpose of the Court was the provision
for a place of international appeal, the appeal should come
after the first decision of the national court. Great
Britain, with the great reputation of her prize courts,
wanted the appeal to come as a last resort only. Second,
Great Britain insisted that the court be a permanent one,
Ap
Choate, ojd. cit.
, pp. 64-66.
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whereas Germany wanted it to be called together only at
the outbreak of war. Third, Germany wanted the appeal to
be made by the owner of the captured property, whereas
Great Britain wanted it taken by the nation of the owner.
Fourth, Great Britain insisted that the judges of the court
should be pure jurists, whereas Germany believed that a
court concerned with, naval matters should be made up of
admirals.^
In spite of the divergence of opinions, the Americans
were able to effect a compromise covering the four points.
Concerning the question as to when the appeal should come,
the American delegation made a suggestion which provided
for the appeal after the second trial by the national court.
This compromise made certain the action of the Supreme Court
of the United States in any case in which the United States
might be concerned. After a discussion of some length, the
American compromise was accepted by both parties. Con-
cerning the question of the permanency of the court, the
American delegation sided with Great Britain and finally
persuaded Germany to yield and to agree to have the court
44
a permanent one. . In regard to which should bring the
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appeal, the owner of the property or his government, the
American suggestion that the owner of the property under
regulation of his government bring the suit was accepted
by both contestants. In regard to the composition of the
Court, the American delegation agreed with the British
plan, but it also saw the value of the German plan to have
admirals with experience in naval warfare on the court.
Therefore they proposed that, although the admirals should
not be made justices, no case should be decided without a
naval representative of each party present and without
their opinions being carefully considered. With a little
pressure from the American delegation the German reoresenta—
tives accepted the plan and a final agreement was reached .
^
The compromise was adopted by the Conference in that form.
The Convention for the creation of the International
Prize Court was opened to signature on October 18, 1907,
but ratification failed because of the lack of agreement
as to what law should be applied in prize cases. ^6
The Central American Peace Conference of 1907
The interest of the United States in a court for the
Ibid
.
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p. 71-72.
Manley 0. Hudson, The Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice — Treatise, pp. 73-74.
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settlement of disputes between states was not confined to
the Hague Tribunals, tut also was directed toward the estab-
lishment of the Central American Court of Justice created
by the Central American Peace Conference at Washington.^
Prior to 1907, the five Central American Republics
had been in continual turmoil economically and politically
as a result of wars and revolutions. In 1906, there had
been a war between Guatemala and Salvador in which Honduras
was an ally of Salvador. At that time. President Theodore
Roosevelt ashed President Diaz of Mexico to Join him in
offering mediation. This offer resulted in the peace confer-
ence held aboard the U.S.S. Marblehead
, during which the
belligerents agreed to end hostilities and attend another
conference to draw up a treaty of peace. The proposed second
peace conference was held at San Jose, Costa Rica. But
President Zelaya of Nicaragua, denying the right of the
United States to Interfere in the affairs of Central America,
refused to send a representative. At the same time Zelaya
was very successful in interfering in the Internal affairs
of the other Central American countries, especially Hon-
duras. Finally, Guatemala and Salvador in their turn started
to incite revolutions against him in both Honduras and Nica-
ragua.
In the summer of 1907, war among the Central American
47
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countries seemed Inevitable. Again the United States
sought by diplomatic intervention to persuade the Central
American governments to stop preparations for war. 48
President Roosevelt. with the co-operation of President
Diaz of Mexico, sent out indentical notes to the five Central
American governments offering the "good offices" of the
United States to help in calling together a peace confer-
ence of representatives of the respective states to be held
at Washington, D.C. 9
The Invitations to the Conference were cordially
accepted by all the governments, which unanimously proposed
that both the United States and Mexico send representatives
to it. So it was that Mr. William I. Buchanan was chosen
as the delegate of the United States and Serior Don Enrique
C. Creel, the delegate of Mexico. 50
Elihu Root, Secretary of State of the United States,
called the Conference to order November 17, 1907. During
the Conference, a number of conventions were drawn up,
the most important of which provided for the establishment
of a Central American Court of Justice .
^
Tne court, to be
48
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established for a ten-year period, consisted of five judges
one from each of the Central American countries. Those
countries agreed to submit to it without reservations of
any kind all disputes which could not be settled by diploma
cy. In this way the arbitration was truly obligatory
.
52
Although the United States government was not a party to
the conventions, it considered them informally binding. 53
The court was set up at Cartago, Costa Rica, on May
24, 1908, with representatives from both Mexico and the
United States taking part in the inauguration ceremonies.
With the establishment of the court, came a fine gesture
of goodwill and friendship on the part of the American
people in the form of a gift of one hundred thousand
dollars for the erection of a temple of peace for the ex-
clusive use of the court. 54
Unfortunately for the peace for Central America, the
court was not to have the success for which its advocates
had hoped. Ironically enough, it was the United States
which contributed ultimately to its failure. 55 it served
52 Samuel Crowther, Romance and Rise of the American
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its purpose of maintaining peace in Central America for ten
years and then went out of existance with the disagreement
over the Byran- Chamorro Treaty between the United States
and Nicaragua in 1916. In that treaty the United States
was given canal rights on the San Juan River which separated
Nicaragua from Costa Rica. The United States was also given
the right to fortify
-Fonseca Bay which controlled not only
the Pacific coastline of Nicaragua but also that of Salvador
and Honduras. The other Central American states claimed
that Nicaragua had legally no right to effect a treaty
which affected them so seriously without consulting them.
And furthermore, they said that Nicaragua had no right to
give away that which did not belong to her. The Court
agreed with the Central American states and decided the
case against Nicaragua. Nicaragua, however, with the
tacit consent of the State Department at Washington ignored
the decision. With this refusal of Nicaragua and the
backing of the United States
,
the other states naturally
lost all confidence and saw no value in the Court if its
members were free to ignore its decisions. Therefore, in
1917, they refused to renew the agreement which had created
it. Therefore, ironically enough, that which the United
States had helped to create, it had also helped to destroy.
CHAPTER II
The United States and the League of Nations
The next important period in the international re-
lations of the United States which had an important influ-
ence on its attitude toward the creation and establishment
of the World Court, came with the close of the World War
and the conclusion of the terms of peace in the form of the
Treaty of Versailles. Since that same treaty embodied in
it the provisions for the establishment of an international
court, the history of the court would be incomplete without
at least a brief study of the League and the reaction of the
United States to it.
The idea of a league of nations had been developing
in the United States during the years of the war, until
on June 17, 1915, there was formed in Independence Hall,
Philadelphia, a League to Enforce Peace. Within a year
of its formation, it had branches in almost every congres-
sional district in the country. In the statement of its
principles, the League held it to be desirable that the
United States join a league of nations which would bind
the signatories (l) to submit all justicible questions to
an international court of justice ’’both upon the merits
and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question",
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(2) to submit all other questions to a eounell of concilia-
tion for hearing, consideration, and recommendation, (3)
"Jointly to use forthwith both their economic and military
forcee" against any member committing acts of hostility
against another before submitting to arbitration or con-
ciliation, and (4) to hold periodic conferences to formu-
late and codify international law. 1,1
Presidential opinion was made public when President
Wilson, in his 1916 campaign, stressed the hope that the
war would bring about the creation of an international
tribunal which would produce some sort of joint guarantee
of peace on the part of the great nations of the world.
Until this time there was virtually no dissent in
the United States from the idea of an organized peace to
replace the old drifting policy which always had led and
forever must lead to war. The active leaders of both parties
had committed themselves wholeheartedly to a league for peace
which would protect the rights of all. 2
On January 22, 1917, Wilson delivered a speech in
which he stated that he believed that it was the mission
of the American democracy to show mankind the way to liber-
ty
; and in the settlement of new world conditions
,
he felt
1 Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations.
1918-1920, pp. 7-9~
2
Ibid
. , p. 12.
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that It could perform a great service. That service, he
said was nothing less than adding its authority and power
to the authority and power of other nations in order to
guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. It was
his belief that the United States Government should frank-
ly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justi-
fied in asking its people to approve formal adherence to a
League of Peace. He felt that the conditions necessary to
a permanent peace were: (l) a peace without victory, because
a dictated peace would have to be accepted in humiliation
and would leave but a bitter memory upon which peace could
not permanently rest. (2) the right of self-determination,
(3) the freedom of the seas, (4) disarmament, and (5) a
league of nations to administer the peace. He stressed the
point that there was no entangling alliance in a concert
of power and that, if peace was to be made to endure, it had
to be a peace organized by the major force of mankind.^
On November 18, 1918, President Wilson announced that
he would go to France to represent the United States at the
Peace Conference. On November 29, the rest of the delegates
were selected and they Included Secretary of State Lansing,
Colonel Edward M. House, Hon. Henry White, and G-eneral
A
Tasker H. Bliss.
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Aoute criticism was leveled at Wilson for making
such a decision to represent the United States at the Con-
ference. Colonel Roosevelt, among others, declared that no
public end of any icind could be served by President Wilson'
s
going to the Conference. He said that the President had
no authority whatever to represent the American people at
that time, and that' the Congress came much nearer than he
to having the right to speak the purpose of the American
people.
^
During the interval between the Armistice and his
departure on December 4, Wilson said little if anything
about his peace plans. He was strongly censored for this
error of not consulting his people before he left for
Paris, especially since he had the opportunity to do so in
his message to Congress on December 2, the day on which
he officially announced his departure.
6
The campaign of 1916 does not seem to have produced
any party cleavage on the question of the League. It did,
however, bring about one issue between Woodrow Wilson and
Henry Cabot Lodge which removed any basis for co-operation
which may have existed between them. This disagreement came
about after the Cabinet had approved V/ilson' s "strict
accountability" note to Germany on the sinking of the
5 Ibid., p t 56.
6
Ibid
. , p. 61.
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Uisltania. After Wilson had drawn up that note. Secretary
Bryan privately pursuaded the Prealdent to permit him to
draft an Instruction to Ambassador Gerard, advising the
German government that the United States would be willing
submit the questions at issue to a commission of investi-
gation. The State Department at once saw the inconsistency
of the President's action, and Wilson was soon beselged
with requests to reconsider. He did so, and, upon hearing
the counter arguments, ordered the instruction suppressed.
Senator Lodge of course heard about this play of forces
within the administration and attempted to show that Wilson
was indifferent to the protection of American rights and
that his whole policy shifted with the currents of public
opinion.
7
This controversy eventually brought a reply from
President Wilson to the effect that Lodges’s statement
was untrue and that his motives in a crisis had always been
to do what was best and his best judgment had prevailed.
Shortly after January 13, 1917, Wilson refused to speak
from the same platform with Lodge, and there is no evidence
that cordial relations were ever renewed between them. 8
disagreement between Wilson and Lodge, as will
be seen in the later developments of the struggle to have
the United States join the League, had the important effect
of causing a definite split between the Republican and
7 Ibid
. , p. 13.
8 Idem.
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Democratic parties, ana, according to some people, was
one of the important causes for the failure of the United
States to ratify the covenant.
Senator Lodge revealed his opinion on the question
of the League and settlement terms in a speech in the
Senate on February 1, 1917. In it he pointed out the danger-
ous implications of the principles laid down by the President
and definitely parted company with the idea of a League of
Nations. Although he did not approve of a League of Nations,
he was not unwilling to use the power and influence of the
United States for the promotion of permanent peace. He
merely did not want to involve the country in a scheme
which would create a worse situation than already existed.
He said it was better to "bear the ills we have than fly
to others that we know not of", 9 He had measures which
he believed to be wholly practicable and which he highly
commended. They were: ( 1 ) adequate national preparedness,
(2) the rehabilitation of international law at the close of
the war, (3) "within necessary and national limits, to
extend the voluntary arbitration as far as possible," and
mobilize public opinion behind it, and (4) to urge a general
reduction of armaments by all nations. As a conclusion
to his speech, he wished to support whole-heartedly the
policy of Washington and Monroe in regard to foreign relations.
9 Congressional Record vol. 54. Pt. 3 p. 2369.
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He said that he saw nothing; but peril m abandoning the
long established policy of the United States. 10
Senator Lodge had a very close friend in the person
of Mr. White. Before he left, Lodge took him aside and
presented him with a nine-page memorandum for a guide. In
that memorandum Lodge stood for a harsh peace. He believ-
ed that heavy indemnities should be exacted from Germany
and that Germany should be broken up "into its chief com-
ponent parts". As for a league of nations, he said that
the provision for it should, under no condition, be made
part of the treaty of peace. He had clearly made up his
mind that the League was to wait. He confidently asserted
that the contents of the memorandum represented not only
the views of the Republican Party, but those of the United
States as well. 11
On December 3, the day before the departure of the
delegation, Senator Knox offered before the Senate a resolu-
tion which declared (l) that our purposes in the Peace
Conference should be confined to the aim of vindicating
the ancient rights of navigation as established under inter-
national law and to remove forever the German menace to
peace; (2) "that for the safeguarding of those aims the
10
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first essential Is a definite understanding that, the saJne
necessity arising in the future, there shall be the same
complete accord and co-operation.
. . for the defence of civil-
ization; and (3) that any project for any general league of
nations or for any sweeping change in the ancient laws of
the sea should be postponed for separate consideration,
not alone by the victorious belligerents, but by all the na-
tions, if and when, at some future time general confernces on
tnose subjects might be deemed useful."^
The attack on a league of nations was opened on Decem-
ber 6. At that time, former Senator Albert J. Beveridge of
Indiana, in an address before the Massachusetts Bar Associa-
tion, raised almost every conceivable question to a league of
nations. The following is an example of the questions. He
asked whether the League bound a country to make war if so
doing was a violation of its own constitution. He said that
the only reason given for the international super-state was
the hope that it might prevent wars. He asked, on the con-
trary, whether it did not contain the very seeds of war. 1?
The determination evidenced by Mr. Beveridge indi-
cated that the League was going to deprive the accused of
the ancient right of the benefit of the doubt. Instead
12
13
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Of being assumed innocent until proven guilty, it was to be
assumed guilty on every account that could be raised against
it. There was not to be the slightest presumption in its
favor. If the American people accepted it, it would be
in spite of every suspicion and fear that some of the best
minds in the country could raise against it. Mr. Beveridge
ended his address by saying that "our mission was to furnish
the earth an example of a free and prosperous people, no
less and no more!"*^
Immediately after Wilson’s arrival in Paris on
December 14, the American press carried a dispatch saying
that the President thought that the creation of a league
was the first task of the conference, and that the League
should be the basis of the treaty. 15
On December 19, Senator Lodge gave notice in the
Senate that he would address it on the question of peace
and the proposed league of nations. His speech on that day
was very long and began with an assertion of the right of
the Senate to advise as well as consent and declared that
it was then the solemn and imperative duty of the Senate
to give advice which had not been invited by the negotia-
tors. He said that the Senate was very capable of making
its opinions known to both the President and the Allies
14
Idem. 15 Ibid
, p. 68.
.
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and that the Allies would therefore not be kept in the dark
as to the views of the Senate on the question.
^
The speech of Senator Lodge marked the beginning
of the campaign to be waged by the Senate. Lodge advised
the Senate not to reply to requests for advice made by the
President, but to influence the negotiations contrary to
his desires as fully as speeches in the open Senate could
do so. The drive for postponement was to be pressed; and,
in case it and other attempts to control the course of
negotiations failed, the country and the Allies were to be
made to understand that the treaty would be handled drasti-
cally in the Senate.
The questions of the treaty of peace and the possible
creation of a league of nations necessarily brought with
them a change in party positions. Until this time it had
been the Republican party, especially from the time of
McKinley to that of Taft, which had worked with one accord
to increase the influence of the United States among nations
and to promote institutions for the safeguarding of the
peace of the world. In 1919, there were, therefore, many
Republicans who refused to accept the reversal of position
which Lodge was endeavoring to engineer. They thought
16 Congressional Record
. 65th Cong. 3rd. Sess. p. 724.
17
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primarily of the party and, in standing for the League,
believed themselves the truer interpreters of the party
policy and the best conservers of its future. 18
Similarly
, there were many Democrats who were not
able to stand on the new ground to which their leader brought
them. The Democratic party had held to a strict construc-
tion of the powers and duties of government, especially
when out of power, for too many generations to be able
to see eye to eye with Woodrow Wilson. Most of them fol-
lowed unquestioningly
,
however, because he was their party
leader. Others followed reluctantly and still others not
at all.
When all the angles of partisanship have been con-
sidered, there were numerous Democrats who, as debate pro-
ceeded, made up their minds wholly aside from party con-
siderations that the new step was too dangerous. Also
there were countless Republicans who ignored every appeal
to partisanship and stood throughout for the League of
Nations because they believed it was right.
That latter group of people, whose attitude toward
the League was never determined by partisanship of any
kind, was large in the country but small in the Senate.
On the Democratic side, the one or two Senators who opposed
the League in any shape or form at all were accused of
18 Ibid
.
. pp. 82-83.
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Personal animosity toward Wilson. A oonslderabls group
of Democrats would Have been slad to see resections attach-
to the Covenant at the start. Many Republican Senators
believed in the League at all times and would have been
Slad to see it ratified without reservation. Of all of
them, however, the only one who voted for it as it stood
and every other way was Senator Porter J. McCumber, of
North Dakota. Although he was later the author of one
of Lodge's reservations, no party considerations of any
kind swerved him from his stand for the creation of the
League.
On January 7
, 1919
,
Seator McCumber came forward in
the Senate with a reply to the speeches which had been made
against the immediate creation of the League. His was a
sentimental appeal for those countries of Europe which had
been torn apart by the war and were looking to the United
States and the Peace Commission for some international
arrangement which would help to make impossible another
war. He told the Senate that, if after peace had been
secured, victory could not secure reform then all sacri-
fices had been made in vain and pretended civilization
was but foolish mockery. He said that he was optimistic,
in that he believed that great world wars could be pre-
vented, and that then was the time to adopt restrictive
19
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measures and not some indefinite time in the future.
Senator McCumber next too* up the "stock criticisms"
aimed at a league of nations. As for the argument that
auch a league would interfere in the internal affairs of
each nation, he said that there was no chance of an intel-
ligent commission ever creating such powers for the League.
If they should neglect such national sentiment, he believed
that none of the great powers would ever ratify the treaty.
In reference to the Monroe Doctrine, he said that certainly
no league founded to guarantee the territorial integrity
and political Independence of all its members would be a
menace to the doctrine which did the same for the nations
of the Western World only.
In reply to the cry for postponement, he gave the
Senate the clear warning that no matter how much they legis-
lated, or how many resolutions they introduced and passed,
three things were certain: (l) that the President was acting
under his constitutional right when he appointed delegates
to the Conference; (2) that those delegates would dictate
and agree upon the terms of peace; and (3) that they would
not stop from their deliberations or attach their signatures
to any instrument of peace which would leavd unsettled
the question of the prevention of another war. 20
20
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On Janurary 13, the last message of Colonel Roose-
velt was read before the Senate, m it Roosevelt stated
that It was his belief that the Monroe Doctrine was the
most important consideration, and that it should be strict-
ly maintained. He said that Europe and Asia should be
left to do their own policing and that the United States
should take no position as an "international Meddlesome
Matty". 21
The next day Senator Borah, of Idaho, delivered an
attack on the whole idea of a league of nations. To him
it was only the old Holy Alliance brought to life. He
was wholly opposed to any kind of internationalism and
argued that the nationalism which had won the war would be
murdered by the proposed internationalism. 22
The Peace Conference was finally opened on January
12, 1919. President Wilson and Colonel House served as
the representatives of the United States on the Commission
which was to draw up the draft for a league of nations.
The Covenant was completed on February 13, and presented by
Wilson to a plenary session of the Conference on the next
day. To that meeting he said that the Covenant was a
definite guarantee of peace against aggression and was a
21
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. , pp. 89-90.
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- 47 -
means of putting armed force in the background . 23
On February 15, the President sailed for home to
attend the closing of Congress and to present the Covenant
of the League to the American people. Before sailing,
however, Wilson cabled an invitation to the Foreign Relations
Committee of the Senate inviting them to dine with him as
soon as he returned In order that he might explain the
provisions of the Covenant to them. 2^
The Senators had been complaining that they did not
know what was going on in Paris. But now that they had
their chance to really find out what had been done by one
who knew, they, according to Mr. Fleming, did not want to
have their objections removed by any sympathetic explanation
of Mr. Wilson. Therefore, after about twenty-four hours
deliberation, the leading Republican Senators declared that
the project appeared to surrender American independence
and upset the Monroe Doctrine. They appear to have feared
that, instead of being permitted to approve the Treaty of
Peace without a League, they were going to be forced to pass
on the League itself first, 'They insisted that the Senate
25 Ibid
.
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pa For the Covenant adopted by the Peace Commission
on February 14, see Senate Documents , vol 13, 66th Cong. 1st
Sess. 1919. pp. 14-18.
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would not endorse It, even by a ferity vote, before the
President returned to France. 25
Senator Poindexter, of Washington, opened the In-
evitable attach on the Covenant In the Senate on February
19. He made five specific charges against the League: (1)
that under It we surrendered the power of disarmament,
(2) that it called for compulsory arbitration of all ques-
tions without exception, (3) that it would compel the United
States to participate in the wars and controversies of
every other nation" and to assume the burdens of a mandate
over any part of Europe, Asia, or Africa that was assigned
to it, (4) that the International Labor Bureau would inter-
fere in our domestic affairs, and (5) that the United States
would surrender to other nations the power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations in arms and amunition.
'
,26
Senator Borah took the floor on February 21, to main-
tain that the Covenant did abolish the Washington and Monroe
Doctrines. He read into Article 10 a guarantee to England
of the possession of every part of land then in the British
Empire and hailed the League "as the greatest triumph for
English diplomacy in three centuries of English diplomatic
asked for a direct vote of all the people of
25
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the nation on the question of entering the League and
begged for the maintaining of full liberty of action in the
future. 27
Senator Reed followed Borah the next day with a
bitter blasting of the entire Covenant. He proved at length
that Great Britain would control the Lea^e and came to the
conclusion that in any controversy the votes of the Britl sh,
French, and Italians and Japanese would always be against
the United States. From the first and all times Europe
and Asia would predominate over the United States. More-
over, he said that the powers of the League were almost
unlimited, for he believed that every nation that entered
the League would yield to its arbitrament and decision
all controversies with other countries even though they
involved the national honor or national life. 28 Such, then,
were the arguments concerning the Covenant before President
Wilson met with the Foreign Relations Committee.
The first White House conference between the Presi-
dent and the Committee took place on February 26. The
Associated Press reported that the discussion covered a wide
range, and that the President was questioned closely. He
answered all questions freely and especially emphasized that
27 Ibid
. , pp. 3911-15.
28 Fleming, o£. cit.
, p. 122.
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his guests were free to discuss the conference and its in-
formation with newspapermen and others. The views of the
Republican members remained unchanged, however, in spite
Of Wilson's explanations. 25
Senator Lodge, courteously observing the President’s
request to be allowed to present his case, had used the
interval to prepare a negative speech which he delivered
in the Senate on February 28. He said that no question of
equal Importance had ever confronted the Senate and that
therefore, there should be no undue haste in considering
it. He said that it was his desire that not only the Senate,
but the press and the people of the country should investi-
gate every proposal with the utmost thoroughness and weigh
them carefully before making up their minds. He stressed
the thought that it was no idle thing to abandon entirely
the policy laid down by Washington in his farewell address
and by the Monroe Doctrine.
Eventually he had demonstrated "the uncertainties
which cloud this instrument from beginning to end," and was
compelled, he said, against his earnest desire to do every-
thing that could be done to secure the peace of the world,
to conclude that "this machinery would not promote the peace
of the world, but would have a directly opposite effect."
29
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He then asked if it was not possible to draft a better,
more explicit, less dangerous scheme than the one presented
by Wilson, and then proceeded to present certain proposi-
tions which he thought it might be well for the peace confer
ence to consider. He suggested that it (l) put three lines
into the draft for the League which would preserve the
Monroe Doctrine, (2)- exclude completely from its juris-
diction such questions as immigration, (3) provide for
peaceful withdrawal and (4) state whether the League was
to have an international force of its own or to have the
power to summon the armed forces of the different members.
Senator Lodge apparently did not have much hope
that the Covenant could be made over so that it would be
acceptable, for he continued: "Unless some better consti-
tution for a league than that can be drawn, it seems to me,
that the world's peace would be much better, much more
surely promoted, by allowing the United States to go on
under the Monroe Doctrine, responsible for the peace of this
hemisphere, without any danger of collision with Europe as
to questions among the various American states, and if a
league is desired it might be made up by the European
nations whose interests are chiefly concerned, and with
which the United States could co-operate fully and at any
time, whenever co-operation was needed." In that way he
disposed of the Covenant so casually that it hardly seemed
- 52 -
to be worthy of consideration, although he did add a final
paragraph of warnings against it.^^
Very little attention had been paid up until this
time to the position which public opinion concerning the
Covenant and the possibility of a league of nations. The
news previews up to March 1, Indicated a clear prefmderance
of support for it.^
President Wilson sailed back to France on March 5,
leaving behind him an opposition in the Senate which he
realized was definitely partisan and not open to reconcilia-
tion. Nevertheless he returned to his job, determined to
press for the amendments which Senator Lodge had considered
so necessary, although he believed that the ends sought
by them were already attained in the Covenant as it stood.
Wilson therefore drew up, about March 22, the date
when the League of Nations Commissions met for the revision
of the Covenant, a set of amendments covering the points at
issue. He succeeded in having three of the four desired
amendments passed with comparatively little opposition.
The desire for the right of withdrawal was met by an addi-
tion to Article I, saying that any member might withdraw
30
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after two year's notice. An attempt to allay the anxiety
as to interference with immigration and tariff was made
by the addition of a clause to Article 15 which said! "If
the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them
and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which
by international law is solely within the jurisdiction of
that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make
no recommendation as to its settlement." The fear of Senator
Lodge that a mandate might be forced upon the United States
was countered by an insertion in Article 22, in describing
those to whom mandates should be intrusted, of the phrase
and who are willing to accept it. "33
Wilson postponed the combat with the Commission
over the Monroe Doctrine amendment because he knew that
the Doctrine had never been popular in Europe, except
among the English. After delivering many speeches explain-
ing the Dectrine to the Commission, Wilson finally succeed-
ed in persuading it that the amendment would not injure
in any way the working of the Covenant, the amendment was
finally accepted and added to the Covenant as Article 21.
It read as follows: "Nothing in this Covenant shall be
deemed to affect the validity of international engagements,
such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings,
33 Ibid.
, p. 184.
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like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the peace of the
world. "^4
However complete the success of President Wilson
at Paris may have been, it was great enough to cause gloom
in the band of men made up of Senators Lodge, Borah, Knox,
Reed, Poindexter, and Beveridge, who had determined to deny
him the creation of the League of Nations. The League
had not only been created, but its Covenant had been amend-
ed to meet the principal American objections raised against
it. The entire Treaty of Feace was also completed and Wilson
was soon to be returning with the finished document con-
taining the League of Nations so woven into it that it would
be impossible to separate the two. Added to their troubles
was the fact that the leaders of public opinion still
stood overwhelmingly in favor of the League.
z/ith the influence and belief of the nation’s leaders
strongly behind the League, there was only one recourse
left, to arouse the masses by persistant repetition of the
cries already raised and many others that seemed likely
to stir the emotion of a considerable block of people.
The opposition decided, therefore, that if the nation would
not think anti-League, it must be made to feel so. Also
they believed that the nation could be eventually wearied
34
Ibid
. , p. 185.
- 55 -
of the whole League business If action on It could be
delayed long enough, ^5
This strategy of joining the irreconcilables and
reservationists was agreed upon by Lodge and Borah and was
undoubtedly clever and most ably followed up in months to
come. The reservationists included Senators Lenroot, Fre-
linghuysen, Cummins MeWary
,
McCumber, and Kellogg. It was,
moreover, a good bargin for both leaders. If it could be
executed, Lodge had had the practical certainty that at the
worst the Republican trademark would be stamped on the
League; Borah knew from long experience that he need not
have much fear of any treaty that Mr. Lodge set out to
"perfect".^
One first requisite was essential to success-- the
control of the Senate machinery. This control was in their
hands as a result of the election of the November before
in which the Republicans had secured a majority. That
majority meant also a majority in the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations and the power to delay or hasten the
37
action as the needs of their policy dictated.
Not only was the victory in the Committee on Foreign
Relations one for the Republicans, but also for the "Irrecon-
55 Ibid .
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enables" of the party, with the Irreconcilable Senators
Knox, Borah, the Committee Included LodSe, really an Irrecon-
cilable, Senator McCumber, the most outspoken advocate of
the League among the Republican senators, and two staunch
party regulars who could be trusted to follow the party
leaders.
The extraordinary composition of the Committee drew
bitter comments from both Republicans and Democrats.
Senator Hitchcock, in appealing to the Republicans who
favored the League, pointed out the membership of the Com-
mittee as evidence that there was a settled purpose to make
a political issue out of the Treaty. No explanation was
offered by any Republican leader in the Senate. The sole
comment made by Lodge was that it was a strong committee
and such as the existing comditions demanded. 58
With the Committee on Foreign Relations safely
under their control, the lrreconcilables faced the future
with greater confidence. They were still, however, far
from their ultimate victory and their immediate program
met with failure. Senator Knox Introduced a resolution
demanding that the Senate be given the opportunity to
ratify the Treaty of Peace without the Covenant which was
70
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to be left for future consideration.39
opposition
developed to prevent the Knox resolution from being pushed
to a vote.^O
It became increasingly clear during the debates in
Kay and June, when the irreconcilables continued to display
more activity than the others, that the Republicans in the
Senate were going to- make the treaty an issue for party
action. The best evidence of this can be found in the
growing alarm of the Republicans who favored the League
and who knew that partisan consideration would endanger the
Treaty.
Such was the situation when Wilson returned with
the Peace Treaty. On July 10, he submitted the Treaty
to the Senate and delivered a speech in person. With the
Treaty in the hands of the Senate, the powers of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations were brought into play. That
control was the means of keeping the Treaty from the Senate
for two months. Delay was essential to their cause, for
the state of public opinion was such that prompt action
would have been fatal. Time was needed to arouse a hostile
opinion. Devices to gain time proved readily available.
First, the long treaty of several hundred printed pages was
40
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read aloud line by line. The reading took two weeks.
Then the Committee held public hearings which lasted for
six weeks more.
At those hearings various members of the American
delegation to the Conference gave testimony, but no one
else appeared before the Committee except representatives
of national groups that felt that their countries had re-
ceived less than justice at Paris.
^
2
The majority report of the Committee on Foreign
Relations that reached the Senate on September 10, made
several things certain. The irreconcilables no longer
entertained any hope of persuading the Republicans in the
Senate to unite on a policy of complete rejection. Fol-
lowing the advice of Lodge, the Republicans, who had openly
desired rejection, proceeded "by way of amendment and reser
vation, and with Lodge, Harding, and New, recommended
four reservations, forty-five amendments, many covering
the same point. The purpose of the amendments were as
follows: (l) to secure for the United States a vote in the
Assembly of the League equal to that of any power including
G-reat Britain, who, with all her possessions, had six votes
(2) to provide that where a member of the League had self-
governing dominions and colonies, which were also members
42
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of the League, the exclusion of disputants under the League
rules should cover the aggregate vote of that empire.
The remaining amendments, with the exception of no.
45, had the same purpose, namely, to relieve the United
States from having representatives on the commissions estab-
lished by the League, which dealt with questions in which
the United States had not and could not have any interest
and in which the United States had evidently been inserted by
design. Amendment 45 provided that the United States have a
member of the reparation commission, but that such a commis-
sioner of the United States, could not in the case of ship-
ping, where the interests of the United States were directly
involved, deal with or vote upon any other questions before
that commission except under instructions from the government
of the United States.
The four reservations drawn up stated that::
1. The United States reserved to itself the uncon-
ditional right to withdraw from the League of Nations
upon giving the notice specified in Article I of the
Treaty.
2. The United States declined to assume, under any
article, any obligation to preserve the territorial
integrity or political independence of any country,
or to interfere in controversies between other nations,
members of the League or not, or to employ the mili-
tary or naval forces of the United States in such con-
troversies, or to adopt economic measures for the pro-
tection of any other country against external aggres-
sion or for the purpose of coercing any other country,
or for the purpose of intervention in the internal con-
flicts or other controversies which might arise. No
mandate was to be accepted by the United States.
3. The United States reserved to itself the exclusive
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There was no pretence in the report of the majority that
these changes would make them want to ratify the Treaty.
On the contrary the report showed a bitter hostility toward
The Report of the Committee further showed that of
the ten Republican members, nine were demanding serious
changes in the Treaty, while six of the seven Democratic
members signed a report urging its acceptance with no changes.
The Committee, however, did not accurately represent the
Senate. Though the enemies of the League who controlled
the Committee did not propose the direct rejection of the
Treaty, their report was not one on which the Republicans
in the Senate could be held together.
That Republican unity was not attainable on those
terms, had been made clear even before the report reached
the Senate. All during July and August when the Treaty
4^5
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was still in Committee, the debate in the Senate had con-
tinued, and for the first time the expression of Republican
Saratorial opinion was not left chiefly to the irreconcil-
ables. The speeches of those previously silent Republican
Senators proclaimed the defeat of the irreconcilables who
had struggled to commit the party to a rejection of the
Treaty. Some desired strong reservations, others were
satisfied with mild reservations. According to newspaper
accounts they expected that about twenty Republicans would
join their movement and hoped that the results would be
accepted by the Democrats, for they were seeking agreement
with the Democrats as much or even more than with Republican
leaders. The campaign of the irreconcilables may have driven
them to a policy of insisting on reservations to the Treaty,
but with some reservations the Republican majority in the
Senate was going to vote for the entry of the United States
into the League of Nations.
^
Wilson had begun to fight for his Treaty immediately
after his return from the Conference with the amended form.
He invited many of the Republican senators to the White
House for individual conferences. He placed his chief reli-
ance, however, on an appeal to the people. The speaking
tour which he began early in September, ended three weeks
46
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later in his collapse. With his collapse.it was evident
that the strongest weapon that could be used in behalf of
the Treaty was useless.
The serious consequents of the lack of leadership
in the fight for the Treaty became apparent two months
after Wilson's collapse. Public opinion, which according
to common agreement had been decidedly in favor of joining
the League and upon which Wilson had counted for success,
had become confused and had drifted away from its earlier
position. 47 In the United States, as throughout Europe,
there was occuring a shift in opinion which might have
been described as a substitution of near-sighted national-
ism for international co-operation and the general good.
The people of Europe and America showed themselves less
willing than during the war to sacrifice any immediate
national interest for the sake of future international
peace.4®
While the public and the majority in the Senate
were groping toward some decision, the debate in the Senate
continued with increasing tension. The intellectual level
of it gave no cause for national pride. Many of the speeches
did not compliment the public mind, for there was much
47
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demagoguery. Most of this came from the opponents of the
Treaty, since the circumstances of the case restricted them
to the opportunities to gain favor by paying up to popular
and nationalistic prejudices.
The hatred of the Irish in America for Great Britain
was exploited. The British Ambassador was informed that
in using the Irish question that England would be attacked
without mercy but that such an attack was not stimulated
because of any real animosity. Lodge was keenly aware of
the possibilities in the Irish question and realized the
importance of the Irish vote in the United States.
Other groups besides the Irish received attention.
One irreconcilable, Sherman, gave a perfect example of a
demagogue in a speech devoted to the thesis that the majori-
ty of countries in the League would be Catholic, that the
Papacy had never abandoned its claim to temporal power,
and that the League would be under the dominion of the Pope.^9
The Democratic irreconcilable, Reed, who generally
warned the public that the six votes of the British Empire
would mean English domination of the League, devoted one
speech to proving for the benefit of the South that the
League would be ruled by colored peoples
.
^0
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Next to the " injustices" of the Irish the most
frequent subject for the type of attack were the wrongs
done the Chinese in Shantung. The Treaty was vulnerable
on this point and probably the speakers were not unaware
of tne effects of their speeches on anti-Japanese feeling
along the Pacific coast. The irony of the situation was
that the Treaty was being opposed not because of real or
alleged injustices in it, but because of the machinery
provided to correct international wrongs. 51
When voting began in October, no steps had been
taken by the Democrats to reach an understanding with the
Republicans wanting mild reservations, and the latter were
drifting toward a politically natural alliance with their
fellow Republicans on terms more hostile to the Treaty
than those they would have preferred. The Republican ranks
held firmly together.
As reservation after reservation was added to the
Treaty by the unbroken Republican majority, some friends of
the League begged with the Democrats to take what could
be gotten rather than lose everything. Other sincere
advocates of the League, who were not members of the Senate,
urged the same course. 52
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All the reservations presented durins the periods
Of debate in the Senate may be summarized in the reservations
presented to the Senate by Senator Lodge on October 24,
1919:
}• u P°n giving notice of its withdrawal +uLeague, the United States was to be toe on?v ^
obligations
e
under'
1
the^Covenant.
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of any country by employing the military or naval
of^rticle^O of^h
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tateS under the Provisionsi Ar le 10 f the Covenant. Such action aq th Pdeclaration of war was to be taken only by act orjoint resolution of Congress. 7 7 °
3. The United States reserved the exclusive rishtquestions fell within its domesticJurisdiction and declared that internal matterssuch as immigration, labor and coast wise traffic
q+rL!°
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7 within the Jurisdiction of the Unitedotates and were not to be submitted for arbitrationor consideration of the Council or Assembly of theLeague or to any similar agency.
J’ J
he United States refused to submit any questionfalling under the Monroe Doctrine to arbitration
of any kind.
5
.
No person was to represent the United States orperform any act on its behalf except with the approval
of the Senate of the United States.
6.
The United States was not to be obligated to pay
any contribution to the expenses of the League unless
and until such appropriations had been made by the
Congress
,
even though the United States may have
agreed to a limitation of armaments.
7.
It reserved the right to increase its armaments
without the consent of the Council whenever the
United States is threatened with invasion or engaged
in war.
8.
The United States reserved the right to allow
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The effect of the reservations was, for all practical
purposes, the abrogation, on the part of the United States,
of all the important responsiblities which membership in
the League would naturally involve and therefore the nul-
lification of the effects of the League. They did, in
fact, deprive the League of the very influence and power
which it hoped to gain from the membership of the United
States. In connection with the reservations it may be noted
here that several of them, namely those which dealt with
the Monroe Doctrine and matters of domestic jurisdiction,
were used as conditions to the adherence of the United
States to the World Court. It is perfectly possible that
Lodge and the rest of the opponents of the League were
looking forward to the creation of the court under the League.
On November 19, 1919, the Senate came to a vote.
At that time the Treaty of Versailles was considered with
and without the reservations. With the reservations it
was rejected by a vote of 39 to 55. Without the reservations
it was rejected by a vote of 38 to 55. An analysis of the
18.
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vote with reservations showed that four Democrats voted yes
and forty- two voted no. In the case of the Republicans,
thirty-five voted yes and thirteen voted no. In the vote
without reservations, thirty- seven Democrats voted yes and
seven voted no, and one Republican voted yes and forty- six
voted no. This would indicate a definite influence of party
politics on the vote,- for with but few exceptions, the Demo-
cratic party was in favor of the Treaty without reservations
and the Republican party with reservations. 54
The rejection of the Treaty caused great amazement
and widespread demands for a bi-partisan conference to draw
up a compromise. The conference, however, was unable to
draw up such a compromise, because Lodge refused to accept
any reduction in his reservations. 55
In spite of the failure of the conference, the Treaty
again came before the Senate, and on March 19, 1920, the
final vote was taken. The Treaty received a majority of
49-35, but not the required two- thirds majority. The Republi-
cans cast 28 for and 12 against, while the Democrats cast 21
for and 23 against the Treaty. 55
An analysis of this vote shows some significant simi-
larities and contrasts with the vote in November. As before,
the Republican senators cast a practically solid party vote
for the Lodge reservations. In contrast with the
54 Ibid., p. 297. 56 Ibid . . pp. 299-301.
55 Ibid
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Republican unity, the Democrats split decidedly and many
more voted for the Lodge reservations than in the November
vote. 57
The fate of the Treaty of Versailles was the result,
I believe, of three different factors: (l) the constitu-
tional struggle of the Senate against the President, (2)
party politics and (3) personal hatred of President Wilson.
The constitutional struggle between the Senate and
the President was due to the indifference with which Wilson
treated the treaty-making power of the Senate. He com-
pletely ignored the traditional policy of consulting with,
or even imparting to the Senate any plans which he had in
mind to present to the Peace Conference. He made matters
even worse when he went as a delegate himself instead of
remaining at home to take care of domestic affairs, A
powerful resentment naturally arose among the Senators
against Wilson. And it was this resentment which was the
underlying cause for the many reservations which ultimate-
ly spelled the doom of the Treaty.
The pressure of party politics was easily discernable
in the struggle in the strong and utmost undivided stand
which the Republican party took. Only the Republicans
entered the battle in the defense of the Senate's preroga-
tives, and in the last vote the Democratic Party was decidedly
divided on the question and the Republicans practically
57 Ibid
. „ p. 301.
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unanimous in its rejection.
The personal hatred of President Wilson, held es-
pecially by Senator Lodge, was, I believe, one of the most
important if not the most important factor contributing
to the failure of ratification. It began by a contempt,
on the part of Lodge, for the fickleness of Wilson's
dealings with Germany at the time of the sinking of the
Lusitania and was increased by Wilson's disregard for the
rights of the Senate and by Lodge's supreme loyalty to his
party over against the Demcratic. This animosity led
Lodge to exert his influence at every turn in order to
frustrate any move Wilson made. Lodge's motives in creating
the reservations, which ultimately killed ratification, were
based on party loyalty, dislike for Wilson, and his in-
sistence on the consitutional place of the Senate in the
treaty-making procedure. He was able to succeed in his
plans mainly because of his superior ability to manage
his party and make moves at the most strategic time.
The failure of the Senate to ratify the Versailles
Treaty should have made one fact very evident to the people
of the United States. That fact is that conflicts between
the President and the Senate and could so increase the
opportunities for political warfare that the questions of
the merits of treaties could be entirely lost.
CHAPTER III
THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
The Permanent Court of International Justice may
be said to be the advanced, if not the final, step in the
movement begun hundreds of years before its time in the
effort to peacefully settle international disputes. The
Institutions* beginning with the Court of Arbitral Justice
and ending with the Permanent Court of Arbitration, served
as the stepping stones to this court of international
Justice and really paved the way for its establishment.
vVith the end of the World War came new hopes and
aspirations for an organization of the world based on
Justice and order, in which the weak would not be dominated
by the strong, and in which there would be a means to apply
all possible guarantees against the recurrence of the horri-
ble devastations of another war. So it was that the
period following that war was to see the establishment of
a great international organization, in which nations small
and large were to have the same influence, and which would
act as a collective body for the good of all nations rather
than a chosen few.
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Establishment of the Court
The unofficial drafts of the Covenant for the
League of Nations, drawn up prior to the Peace Conference
of 1919, contained references to an international court, but
laid very little emphasis on its importance.
With the convening of the Peace Conference in
January 1919, several more proposals were made. In Jan-
uary, Lord Robert Cecil of Great Britain circulated a
draft sketch of a League of Nations in which he referred
to a “judicial body 15 which he described as the existing
Hague organization, with any additions or modifications
made by the League, or by the Peace Treaties . 1 In Jan-
uary 1919, also, President Wilson formulated two drafts
,
2
which, although they indicated that he did not think a
court important, did provide for arbitration and for a
possible appeal from an arbitral decision to a “Body of
Delegates'*. His drafts continued to refer to the settle-
ment of disputes by judicial decision or arbitration.
At a plenary session of the Preliminary Peace
Conference on January 25 , 1919, a resolution was adopted
^David H. Miller, Drafting of the Convenant , vol. II,
p. 63 .
“
2
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approving the principle of the League of Nations and
creating a commission to work on the details of its
organization. With the creation of this commission,
began the first step, not only in the creation of the
League of Nations, but also in the establishment of a
court.
^
On January 31 , of the same year, it was agreed
at a conference of American and British representatives,
that definite provisions regarding the method of arbi-
tration were not essential and that Just a general pro-
vision should be inserted for the creation of a permanent
court. Shortly afterward, the Hurst-Miller draft was
made, and it was this draft which was placed before the
Commission by President Wilson.
This Commission of the League, set up under the
resolution began its work on February 3 , 1919, with the
Hurst-Miller draft as the basis of its deliberations.
That draft, reported by the Drafting Committee as articles
13 and l4 and adopted by the Commission* read as follows?
"Article 13 . The High Contracting Parties
agree that whenever any dispute or difficulty shall
arise between them, which they recognize to be
suitable for submission to arbitration and which
^ Ibid .
. vol. I, p. 61.
4
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any Convention existing between theS.e High Contracting Parties agree that they willcarry out in full good faith any reward that maybe rendered. In the event of any failure to carryout the award, the Executive Council shall proposewhat steps can best be taken to give effect there-
X»0 • 1
11Article l4. The Executive Council shallformulate plans for the establishment of a Per-
manent Court of International Justice, and thisCourt shall, when established, be competent tohear and determine any matter which the parties
recognize as suitable for submission to it for
arbitration under the foregoing article. 11
These articles appeared in this form in the draft Covenant
which was reported to the Preliminary Peace Conference in
February 1917.^
In March several amendments were added. President
Wilson and Lord Cecil agreed upon the addition to Article
lA of the words: "and also any issue referred to it by
the Executive Council or Body of Delegates." 6 This ad-
dition was the forerunner of what was to be classed as an
advisory opinion. At a meeting of the Commission on
March 2k several minor amendments and additions were pro-
posed to Article 14- by the English and French delegates.
5 Hudson, The P.C.I.J . — Treatise, pp. 89-90.
6
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Two days later a drafting committee was set up which made
several important changes in the drafts of Articles 13 and
14. Those provisions which finally became the second para-
graph of Article 13 and the third sentence of Article 14
were reported by this drafting Committee, adopted by the
Commission on April 11 in the following form, were included
in the conditions of peace to the German delegation, and
later embodied in the Treaty of Versailles:
^T^clg— The members of the League of
nations agree that whenever any dispute shall
arise between them which they recognize suitablefor submission to arbitration and which cannot be
satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will
submit the whole subject matter to arbitration.
Disputes as to the Interpretation of a treaty,
as to any question of international law, as tothe existence of any fact which if established
would constitute a breach of any international
obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the
reparation to be made for any such breach, aredeclared to be among those which are generally
suitable for submission to arbitration.
For the consideration of any such dispute the
court of arbitration to which the case is referred
shall be the court agreed upon by the parties to
the dispute or stipulated in any convention exist-ing between them.
The Members of the League agree that they will
carry out in full good faith any award that may be
rendered, and that they will not resort to war
against a member of the League which complies there-
with. In the event of any failure to carry out
such an award, the Council shall propose what steps
should be ta&en to give effect thereto.
1 Article l4 . The Council shall formulate and
submit to the Members of the League for adoption
plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court
of International Justice. The Court shall be
competent to hear and determine any disputes of an
international character which the parties thereto
submit to it. The Court may also give advisory
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According to the mandate In Article 14 of the League
Covenant, the Council elected a Committee of Jurists to
prepare the plans for the Court. 2 Among the Jurists elected
by the Council was Elihu Root, who, as Secretary of State
of the United States, had been responsible for the policy
of the American representatives at the Hague Conference in
1907- All the credit for the contributions which the
United States was able to make to the organization and
estsblishment of the Court is due him for the fine work
done while he was a member of that Committee.
At the first regular meeting of the Jurists, Mr. Root
proposed that the Committee adopt "as the basis for con-
sideration the subjects referred to it in the Acts and
Resolutions of the Second Hague Conference at the Hague in
19°7- The members of the Committee, however, preferred
not to be bound by the Draft Convention of 1907, but
favored proceeding more Independently. They did not over-
look the value of the work of the First and Second Hague
Conferences, but wanted to enlarge the scope of its work
^ Miller, op.cit . . vol. II, p.729.
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beyond the point suggested by Mr. Root. 11
After the Committee came to an agreement concern-
ing the rules of procedure for the conduct of business,
the delegates, led by Mr. Adatcl of Japan, came forward
with their plans for the establishment of the Court. 12
V?itn the presentation of the various plans, it became
very clear that the big obstacle in the way of the
establishment of the Permanent Court of International
Justice was the very same obstacle which had prevented
the realization of a court at the time of the Second
Hague Conference in 1907- That obstacle was the claim
of the so-called great powers to permanent representation
in the court regardless of the principle of "equality of
nations" and the claim of the "small" states that the
principle of equality should be observed in the formation
of the court. A deadlock seemed Inevitable in the Com-
mittee of Jurists, unless some method could be found
which would satisfy these claims.
^
That method so necessary as a compromise between
the great and small powers was proposed by Mr. Elihu Root.
In making his proposal, he took advantage of the agencies
11 Ibid
.
,
p. 15.
12
Ibid., p. 16.
15 Ibid
., p. 29.
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of the League of Nations and also of the experiences of his
own country in bringing into peaceful harmony the interests
of the larger states and those of the smaller states in
drafting the Constitution of the United States of America.
He showed that the American problem in 17^7 was solved by
the creation of two chambers, one in which the states were
represented on a basis of equality, and the second in which
representation was based on size and population .
^
Mr. Root
did not intend that that method be accepted as such, but
merely mentioned it to show how divergent interests could
be reconciled. He pointed out that the Paris Peace Con-
ference, composed of representatives of large and small
states which, without satisfying the views of the other,
had created the League of Nations consisting of two chambers,
one the Assembly in which all powers big or small were equal
and the second chamber the Council in which the great powers
outweighed the small. With such an ideal arrangement he
asked why the judges could not be elected by a concurring
vote of the Assembly and Council. He pointed out that the
necessity of a concurring vote of both the bodies would
make it impossible for either body to violate the special
interests of the other. Quoting Mr. Root*s own words!
11 The effect of the practical working would
be, that in the Assembly, where the smaller powers
l4 wIbid., pp. 29-30*
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Ctical interests of their greater trade,and their greater production and their greater in-terests as would be submitted to the Court. 15
Should a difference arise between the two bodies, the As-
sembly and the Council, Mr. Hoot suggested that a smaller
joint committee of the two houses could be appointed and
this committee, similar to the joint committees of the
Senate and House in the United States, would serve as a
practical method to reconcile the differences between the
. ^
16
Assembly and Council.
Lord Phillimore, of Great Britain, was very much
impressed by Mr. Root*s plan for the election of the
judges to the Court and so organized it into the follow-
ing five articles:
”1. The judges of the High Court are appointedby the joint authority of the Council and of the
Assembly of the League of Nations.”
"2. The Council votes a list which is trans-
mitted to the Assembly.”
H 3* The Assembly considers the list voted by
the Council and any names brought before it as
candidates by any state which is a member of the
Assembly and then votes its list.”
"4. The names which are found on both lists
are to be elected.”
”5* As to the residue the Council votes afresh
and the Assembly votes afresh and so they continue
until a final agreement is reached.”
16
Ibid., p. 32.
15 Ibid
. , pp. 31-32.
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“*• 11001,8 Plan thUS reduced ^0 the form of articles by
Lord Phillimore became known as the Root-Phillimore Plan. 1 ?
After being organized by Lord Phillimore, the plan
was placed before the committee, and the fundamental idea
was approved by seven out of the nine Jurists. But several
amendments had to be made before it was accepted. Justice
Loder of Holland, in- discussing Mr. Roofs plan, said the
basic idea of collaboration between the Council and the
Assembly was an excellent suggestion but that the method
used to work out the plan was open to criticism. He said
it WdS very unlikely that both the Assembly and the Council
would draw up lists containing the same names, since each
body represented a different group of states. In order to
preserve the good of the Root-Phllllmore project and to
eliminate what he considered defects in it, Justice Loder
advocated the addition to it of part of the plan of Baron
Descamps of France. 1 ^ The Baron had advocated a close bond
between the Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice of 1907
and the P.C.I.J. by having it elect the Judges. This plan,
however, was seriously criticized because it made the
Permanent Court dependent upon the Court of Arbitration.
17
16
Ibid., p. 3
6
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Mr. Loder then suggested that instead of having the
Arbitration Court elect the judges it should prepare a
list of nominees for the Council and the Assembly of the
League to vote on. This list, however, was to be the one
and only list from which to take names for the election of
19judges. Mr. Loder*s plan, of thus combining the best
parts of both plans, served to set up a bond between the
work of the Second Hague Conference and the Permanent
Court draft committee and solved the problem of the equali-
ty of the States.^0
The question of compulsory jurisdiction and advisory
opinions was next discussed by the committee. Mr. Root
said he believed that the limits of compulsory Jurisdiction
ought to be clearly laid down, since states would not
accept a court which had a right to settle disputes in ac-
cordance with rules established by itself. The draft
finally adopted by the committee provided for obligatory
arbitration of disputes which could not be settled by
diplomacy. in the matter of advisory opinions the pro-
posal of Messrs. Phlllimore and Root restricted the giving
of advisory opinions to any subject or question submitted
Ibid
.
,
p
.
39
•
Idem .
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by the Council or Assembly. Mr. Root explained that he
was opposed to the Court's giving an advisory opinion
“with reference to an existing dispute". Later on he
abandoned, this position . 22
With the foregoing changes made in the Root-
Phillimore plan, the draft was sent to the Council with
Just a little over a month's time having elapsed from the
time of the selection of the Committee to the drawing up
of the final draft. Upon its arrival in the Council,
the draft statute was amended by the Council and Assembly
of the League and was adopted by the Assembly on December
2k
13, 1920. On December 16, 1920, three days after the
Assembly's adoption of the Statute, the Protocol contain-
ing it was ready for signature.^ In that Protocol of
Signature it was provided that as soon as it had been
ratified by a majority of the Members of the League, it
would come into force. Since the required majority rati-
fled the Protocol by September 1
, 1921, the Statute may
22
^Ibid., p. 179 .
23
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be said to have gone Into effect then. The election of
Judges took place that same month and the first meeting of
the Court was held on January 30, 1922.
The official inauguration of the Court took place
February 15, 1922, at which time it was installed in the
Palace of Peace, the building made possible by the gift of
Andrew Carnegie. With its inauguration, the long-looked-
for Court was established with the hope that it might prove
to be the faithful guardian of International peace and good-
will.
Organization of the Court
Proceeding from the brief account of the process of
establishing the Permanent Court of International Justice,
we come to the actual organization of the Court itself. A
study of the Court may be divided for the sake of conven-
ience into three separate sections, namely composition,
jurisdiction, and procedure.
First of all the Statute of the Court provides for
the qualifications, election, terms, and duties of the
28judges of Court. The judges are independent and elected
regardless of nationality from ‘‘persons of highest moral
27
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character”, who possess the qualifications necessary for
appointment to the highest Judicial offices in their
respective countries. The Court consists of eleven Judges
and four deputy- Judges. Provision is also made, however,
whereby the number of Judges and deputy-Judges may be in-
creased by the Assembly upon the proposal of the Council
to fifteen, nine Judges and six deputy-judges.
The Statute also provides for the selection of a
judge for parties not represented in the Court. In case
only one of the contending parties is represented among
the Judges, the other party may choose from among the
deputy-judges, a Judge of its nationality to take part.
In case, however, there is no deputy-Judge of its nation-
ality, it may choose a judge, preferably from those nomi-
nated in the manner that the regular ones are chosen.
Should it happen, however, that neither of the contending
countries are represented among the Judges, each may select
a judge in the same way. The Judges so chosen must conform
to all the qualifications of the regular Judges and may
take part in the decision on the basis of complete equality
with the other Judges.
The system for the election of judges is necessarily
very complex and long for it has to take care of the old
dispute concerning the equality of the large and small
states in the matter of representation. The members of
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the court are elected by the Assembly and Council from a
list drawn up by the national groups In the Court of Arbi-
tration with the provision that m case of Members of the
League of Nations which are not represented In the Court
of Arbitration, the lists should be drawn up by national
groups appointed by their governments for that purpose.
The same conditions prevail as for the nomination of members
by the Court of Arbitration. The candidates who obtain an
absolute majority of votes In both the Assembly and Council
are considered elected. In the event that more than one
national of the same member of the League Is elected by the
votes of both the Council and the Assembly, the eldest only
is to be considered elected. If, after the first meeting
for the election, there are one or more seats still to be
filled, the Statute provides that a second and even a third
meeting be held. If, after the third election meeting,
there are still seats vacant, the Statute contains a pro-
vision for the creation at the request of either Assembly
or Council of a Joint conference of six members, three ap-
pointed by the Council and three by the Assembly, for the
purpose of choosing one name for each seat to be filled.
These names are then submitted to the Council and Assembly
for acceptance. If the Conference agrees unanimously upon
any person who fulfills the required conditions, then his
name may be included in its lists even though it has not
- 85 -
been included either in the list of nominations prepared
by the nationals in the Court of Arbitration or in the list
prepared by the national groups which are not members of
the Court of Arbitration. If, after this process of nomi-
nation, the Joint conference is not sure of securing an
election, there is a provision whereby the members of the
Court who have already been appointed may, within a time
llmlst set by the Council, fill the seats by selecting
candidates from those who obtained votes either in the
Council or in the Assembly. In case of a tie, the eldest
Judge is given the deciding vote.
The terms of the Judges are, for the purpose of
continuity of action, long. They are elected to serve
for a period of nine years and may be re-elected and may
continue to perform their duties until their places are
filled by a new election. Any vancancies which occur are
filled according to the provisions for the flrat election.
The deputy-judges are called upon to sit in the order laid
down in the list prepared by the Court. The names on this
list are considered first according to priority of election
and secondly, according to age.
In order to maintain absolute impartiality in the
court, there are certain restrictions concerning the cases
which the Judges may hear and also concerning the dismissal
of Judges for malfeasance while in office. No member of the
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court may take part in the deoiling of any case in which
at some time previous he has actively taken part as agent
or counsel for one of the contending parties, or has taken
part as a member of a national or International court or
Commission of Inquiry. A member of the court may be dis-
missed if it is the unanimous opinion of the other members
that he has ceased to fulfill his duties as a Judge.
Provisions are made in the Statute concerning the
duties of the Judges when sitting in full court or when
sitting in a special court created to take care of special
duties or speed up the work. The Statute provides that
the Court meet on June 15th of every year. The full Court
meets except where there is an express provision drawn up
by the court to do otherwise. If eleven Judges cannot be
present the needed number of deputy-judges are called in.
In case, however, eleven Judges or deputy-judges are not
available nine judges may constitute a quorum. Provision
is also made for the appointment of special chambers of
Judges to hear cases concerning questions of labor, transit,
and communications. These special chambers may, with the
consent of the parties to the dispute, sit elsewhere than
at the Hague. In all cases heard by these special chambers,
the Judges will be assisted by four technical advisors, who,
however, have no vote. Annually, the Court may also form
a chamber composed of three Judges, who may at the request
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°f the contending parties hear and determine oases by
summary procedure. This special chamber is created to
speed up the work of the Court in general. Judges of the
same nationalities as the parties to the dispute have the
right to sit in on the case.
The salary of the judges is determined by the
Assembly of the League, acting upon the proposal of the
Council. This salary cannot be decreased during the period
of the judge's appointment. The Assembly also draws up the
regulations governing pensions for the personnel of the
Court.
It is interesting to observe that ever since the
creation of the Court, there had been an American judge
taking part in its activities, elected, not by the United
States, but by the European countries in the Council and
Assembly of the League of Nations. Those Americans who
have served as judges are: John Bassett Moore, who was
elected for the first period and who served until 192g;
Charles Evans Hughes, who served from 1923 until his ap-
pointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1930; Frank Billings Kellogg, late secre-
tary of State who was elected for the second period and
served until 1935 > and Manley 0. Hudson, the principal
American expert on the court and professor of law at
Harvard, who was elected in 1936 to succeed Judge
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Kellogg. ?9
Preceeding from the section on the composition of
the Court we come to the portion of the Statute devoted to
the jurisdiction of the Court. In regard to states which
may be parties to disputes before the Court, it is provided
that states not members of the Court may use the Court on
a basis of equality with the member states, provided that
they make a declaration to accept the jurisdiction of the
Court in accordance with the Statute and the rules drawn
up by the Court. Also, they must make a pledge to the
effect that they will carry out in full faith the decisions
of the Court, and that they will not resort to war against
any state complying with these rules. Non—members may ac-
cept the Jurisdiction as compulsory H lpso facto” in all or
any disputes concerning questions of treaty Interpretation,
international law or breaches in international obligation.
These qualifications are drawn up by the Council and are
subject to the special provisions of the treaties which
may be in force at the time.
Concerning the Court’s jurisdiction over cases
brought before it, this section on jurisdiction of the
Statute provides that the Court may hear all cases which
the aforementioned parties may refer to it, especially
questions mentioned in treaties and conventions already
29
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In force. In addition to its right to give decisions on
cases brought by qualified states, the Court may give
advisory opinions. These advisory opinions are given after
the deliberation of the full Court. The request for an
advisory opinion must be written and signed either by the
President of the Assembly or Council of the League or by
the Secretary-General according to Instructions from the
Assembly or Council. The request must contain an exact
statement of the question on which the opinion is desired
and must be accompanied by all documents which would be of
assistance in settling the question. Any advisory opinion
given by the Court and the request for the opinion are
printed and published in a special collection.^0 In case
of a disagreement, the Court itself decides whether or not
it may assume Jurisdiction over a certain dispute. The
Court bases its decisions as far as possible upon inter-
national convention recognized by the disputing states,
upon international customs and lastly upon the general
principles of law as recognized by the nations of the world.
If the nations agree, however, an exception may be made to
the effect that the court may use its own judgment as to
what is good and just in rendering its decision.^
IMd.
,
pp. 202-203*
^ Ibid., pp. 161-162.
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The third section of the Statute deals with the
procedure of the Court in regard to the languages to be
used, the methods of bringing disputes before the Court,
the actual hearing of the disputes and finally the binding
power of the decision itself.
The official languages of the Court are French and
English. In the case, however, that no agreement can be
maae concerning which language is to be used, each party
may use the language it wishes and the decision is given
in both languages. Also the Court may at the request of
the disputing parties, authorize that a language other
than the two mentioned be used.
Cases may be brought before the Court either by
notification of a special agreement of the disputing par-
ties to refer their dispute to the court or by written
application sent by the parties to the Registrar of the
Court. The notification or application must Include the
subject of the dispute and the name of the parties in-
volved. The application is then made known to all those
parties concerned and to the members of the League.
Court proceedings are divided into two parts, oral
and written. The written proceedings consist of the noti-
fications to the judges and parties, and the papers and
documents used in support of the cases. A certified copy
of every document is given to all the parties concerned.
The oral proceedings consist of the actual hearing of the
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case by the Judges ana also Includes the speeches of the
witnesses, agents, experts, and counsel. The public may
attend the hearings unless the Court or parties decide
otherwise.
The Court may, at any time, permit organizations,
commissions, or individuals to carry on special investi-
gations or give expert opinions. A period of time is
agreed upon for the presentation of evidence and after
that time is up, the Court may refuse to accept any more
evidence, unless both sides consent to it. The Judgment
must be given by a majority of the Judges present at the
hearing and, in the case of a tie vote, the presiding officer
has the deciding vote. The Judgment must contain the
reasoning upon which it is based and the names of the
judges who took part in the decision. If one of the parties
does not appear in Court to defend its case, the other party
may demand that the Court render the decision in its favor.
Upon the completion of the presentation of the case by
both parties, the presiding judge may declare the hearing
closed and the Court withdraws into private quarters to
consider the judgment.
Perhaps the most important rule of procedure is
that concerning the binding power of the Court's Judgment.
The decision of the court is binding only on the parties
concerned and only in respect to that particular case. The
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judgment is final and without appeal, except upon the ap-
plication for revision by one party based upon the dis-
covery of a decisive factor which was unknown to the court
when the decision was rendered. The application, however,
must be made within six months of the discovery of the new
fact and the omission cannot have been due to negligence.
A State which considers that it has a legal Interest in
the decision rendered, may make a request to the Court that
it be permitted to intervene as a third party. If the
Court grants the request, that State has a right to inter-
vene in the proceedings, but if it uses this right, the
judgment of the Court is equally binding on it.^2
The final provision in the Statute concerns the
cost of the Court and provides that, unless the Court
decides to the contrary, each party shall bear its own
costs.
32
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CHAPTER IV
THE UNITED STATES AND THE COURT 1921-1930
The long campaign for adherence began on August 15,
1921, when Secretary of State Charles Hughes received a
certified copy of the Protocol of the Permanent Court of
International Justice from the Secretary-General of the
League of Nations. 1 On February 17, 1923, formal action
began, for on that date, Secretary Hughes sent a letter
to President Warren Harding requesting him to ask the
Senate to take action in favor of the adherence of the
United States to the Protocol of December 16, 1920 « He
advocated the acceptance of the adjoined Statute of the
Court, but not the optional clause for compulsory Juris-
diction. Adherence, hov/ever, was to be based on four
reservations which he drew up and which were to be made
part of the Instrument of adherence. Those reservations
stated that, (l) adherence was not to be taken to involve
any legal relation on the part of the United States to the
League of Nations; (2) the United States was to be permitted
to participate, through representatives designated for the
Hudson, The World Court
. 1921-1934, pp. g;21g-224.
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purpose, upon a basis of equality with the members of the
League In the election of Judges and In the filling 0f
vacancies; ( 3 ) the United States was to pay a fair share
of the expenses of the Court as determined and appropriated
by Congress; (4) the Statute for the Court was not to be
amended without the consent of the United States. ?
One week after receiving the letter of Secretary
Hughes, President Harding honored the request by sending
to the Senate a message of his own concerning the Court
and adherence. President Harding stated that the Permanent
Court of International Justice had been established at the
Hague and was, at that time, functioning. He informed the
Senate that, although the United States was not a member
of the Court, it could, through provision of the Statute
creating it, legally bring suits before it with the same
rights and privileges as enjoyed by the regular members
of the Court. Expressing his own opinion, he said that the
position held by the United States was not sufficient for
a nation which had so long been committed to the peaceful
settlement of international disputes.^ He pointed out that
the United States had been conspicuous in its efforts to
2
Ibid
., p. 224.
^ Ibid
., pp. 224-225.
95 -
create a tribunal which would be instrumental in the
settlement of disputes between the nations of the world,
and that deliberate public opinion was now overwhelmingly
in favor of the full participation of the United States in
such a tribunal. The following passage, which I will quote
from his message, seems to me to sum up clearly his attitude
toward the World Court. He said:
.
noL a new Problem in international re-lationship. It is wholly a question of accenting
an established institution of high character*, and
making effective all the fine things which havebeen said by us in favor of such an agency of
advance civilization. It would be well worth the
while of the Senate to make such special effort
as is becoming to record its approval. Such action
would add to our own consciousness of participationin the fortunate advancement of international re-lationship, and remind the world that we are ready
to take our proper part in furthering peace and
adding to stability in world affairs.” 4
In spite of the recommendation of Secretary Hughes
and the request of President Harding, the Senate was not
disposed to take any action whatever on the matter. Mean-
while the Secretary of State renewed the arbitration con-
ventions drawn up with France, England, Norway, Sweden,
Portugal and Japan In 1903, and renewed for five year
periods in 1913* and 1913. In the neglotations Secretary
Hughes concluded agreements which provided for the modifi-
cation of each convention so that, in the event that the
4
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Senate ratified adherence, all disputes, provided for in
the conventions, would be taken to the newly created perma-
nent Court of International Justice instead of the older
Court of Arbitration. Each country was informed that the
use of the new court by the United States was in complete
agreement with the foreign policy which the United States
had always pursued . 6 '
At the next meeting of the Senate, President Coolidge
revived the question of adherence to the Court. In the
message to the Senate, President Coolidge made an appeal
for favorable action concerning adherence. He, like Hughes
and Harding, mentioned the fact that, since its efforts to
establish the Court of Arbitration in 1899, the United
States had hoped and worked for the creation of a permanent
world court of justice. As for his own opinion, he went
on record as being in full accord with the policy of ad-
herence, and as favoring the establishment of a court which
would Include the whole world . 6
Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin, then introduced a
resolution for adherence which contained, with only three
5 Foreign Relations of the United States , v. 2 1923,
pp. 16-177 316-317 ; 511- 512 ; 630-631 ; 75?r75 Iff v. 2 1924,
pp. 696-699.
6
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exceptions, the same reservations as those included in
the proposal of Secretary Hughes. Those additions were
as follows: 7
1* A11 independent states which had diplomaticrepresentatives accredited to the Hague^d whLh
T
l
Q?n
n
°h
t0 the Protoco1 of December 16,1920, but which accepted the Statute of the Courtwere to be permitted to adhere.
2. The judges
• were to be elected, not bv theCouncil and^ Assembly of the League, but by thediplomatic representatives of the states adheringto the Protocol and accredited to the Hague. Those
representatives were to be divided into two groupsA and B. Group A, consisting of Great Britain,
P
France, The United States, Brazil, Germany andItaly, was to perform the election duties of the
council, and group B, consisting of the remaining
states, was to perform the election duties of theAssembly.
3* The expenses of the Court were to be paid by
the adhering states, rather than by the League ofNations.
The resolution of Senator Lenroot marked the be-
ginning of a series of proposals which were introduced
into the Senate in the next few weeks. These new reso-
lutions contained various conditions and reservations,
too numerous and unimportant to mention here. The signifi-
cant thing, however, in connection with these proposals
was the fact that in spite of their number, the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations was too busy to conduct a
hearing until compelled to by public demand. The committee
7 Ibid
., p. 151.
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consisted of Senator Lodge as chairman and Senators Borah,
Brandegee, Johnson of California, Moses, McCormick,
Wadsworth, Lenroot, Willis, Pepper, Shipstead, Swanson,
Pittman, Shields, Robinson, Underwood, Walsh of Montana,
and Owen. Of this group, Senators Lodge, Borah, and
Johnson were the outstanding opponents of adherence. Not
until April 30, 192V was a hearing given, at which time
Senator Claude Swanson introduced the proposal that the
United States adhere to the Court according to the
Hughes - Harding terras.^
From the discussion which followed the presentation
of the Swanson proposal, it was soon evident that the
factor which was to prove the obstacle in securing the
committee's acceptance of a plan was not the difficulty
of coming to an agreement concerning which terras should
be set as the basis of adherence, but in the basic con-
struction of the Court as an Instrument of the League of
Nations. As long as that problem of the relationship of
the Court to the League was unsolved it was obvious that
there could be little hope for any agreement on a plan
for the adherence of the United States. 9 Furthermore, it
S
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was the election of the Judges by the Assembly and Council
of the League which tied up the Court with the League.
Therefore ,lt was obvious that the election of Judges was
really the source of the trouble.
Senator Pepper of Pennsylvania, himself a member of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, came forward on
May 22
, 1924 , with a plan for the election of the judges
of the Court which he believed would separate sufficiently
the Court and the League of Nations. His plan permitted
the Council and the Assembly to continue as the electoral
bodies, provided that they were called to order, not by
the League but by an official of the Court. 10
Senator Pepper’s plan, like all the rest received
a very cool reception by the Foreign Relations Committee.
The committee was not satisfied that the League-Court
relatlQ^iip had been cleared up and saw a new danger to
the prestige of the United States. That danger lay in
the provision of the Article l4 of the League Covenant
which empowered the Court to give advisory opinions at
the request of the Council and Assembly on any question
of International law. According to that arrangement, the
committee believed that it was possible that the Council
might ask the Court’s opinion as to whether the World War
debts should be paid according to the terms agreed upon.
Congressional Record . 66>th Congress, 1st Session,
p. 9157-
100 -
It was also possible that Japan might ask, through the
Assembly or Council, for an opinion concerning the action
of the United States which excluded all Japanese immi-
grants from its borders. 11
That danger as envisaged by the committee was, in
reality, without a firm foundation for three reasons. In
the first place, advisory opinions were binding on no one.
Secondly, a protective precedent had been set up by the
Court in the Eastern Carelia Case between Finland and
Russia, in which case the Court had refused to give an
advisory opinion because one of the parties, Russia, had
denied that the Court had Jurisdiction to give such an
opinion. thirdly, it was a well established precedent in
international law that no state could, without its consent,
be compelled to submit its disputes to mediation, arbi-
tration or any other method of pacific settlement. 12
In spite of the three above-mentioned reasons, the
committee said that it could not exclude the possibility
that the Court might be compelled to give an advisory
opinion harmful to the United States, a non-member, if it
should be necessary to do so In order to fulfill its
functions in the interests of peace under the Covenant of
11 Fleming, op. olt ., p. ?43 .
12
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the League of Nations. Thus in the face of possible
humiliation at the hands of the League, it was argued
that the only way that the United States could defend
Itself was by taking its place in the Council and
Assembly, where both as a member of the League and a
signatory to the Statute of the Court, it could defend
itself by both vote and voice. 1 3
As early as May 23, 1924, it was decided by the
Committee on Foreign Relations that a reservation on
advisory opinions must be added. They believed that the
lawyers in the Senate could easily be persuaded that
nothing should be left to the good sense of the Judges of
the Court and that everything should be made safe for all
time by another added clause or two. Therefore, on May
24, the committee finally let the Court proposal go to
the Senate for discussion of an amendment. 1 ^
A year*s time elapsed between the time that the
proposal was presented to the Senate and the time when
any action was begun. During that period Senator Lodge
had died and Borah had taken over the chairmanship of the
Foreign Relations Committee. Borah, still strongly an-
tagonistic toward the Court, used the period of Senate
13
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Inaction to campaign throughout the country against the
Court, branding it as a “League Court". His campaign met
with little success, however, for with few exceptions, the
great national organizations, both lay and religious, were
in favor of the Court. Numbered among these organizations
were the American Bar Association, the American Federation
of Labor, the Federal' Council of Churches of Christ in
America, and the National League of Women Voters
It was the House of Representatives and not the
Senate which took the first real action. On March 3 , 1925 ,
it passed by a vote of 30J-28 a resolution recording its
desire to have the United States adhere to the Court. The
resolution was divided into two parts, the first of which
recommended early adherence in accordance with the reser-
vations proposed by Secretary Hughes and approved by
Presidents Harding and Coolidge. The second section con-
tained a statement of its willingness, following the
approval of the Senate, to participate in the enactment of
such legislation as would necessarily follow such approval.
"Such legislation" referred to a bill appropriating the
funds necessary to enable the United States to pay its
share of the expenses of the Court.
15
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Even after the gesture of approval of the House,
the Senate still did not mahe any move to consider the
question for nine months. Then on December 17, 1925,
Senator Swanson Introduced the long-awaited fifth amend-
ment to the Hughes Reservations, which It was hoped would
solve the problem of the advisory opinion Jurisdiction of
the Court. His reservation stated that;
1 ^
i* The United States should In no way be bound“ advisory opinion of the Court which was notgiven pursuant to a request In whloh the Unitedstates had had a part*
ll
The signature of the United States should notbe affixed to the Protocol of the Statute untilthe states signatory to the Protoool had Indicatedthrough an exchange of notes their acceptance ofthe five reservations as the basis of the adherence
of the United States*
The reservation drawn up by the court proponents
led by Senators Swanson, Lenroot and Robinson, was con-
sidered worthless by their opponents. The opponents were
led by Senators, Borah, Reed, Johnson, Shepard and
ISLaPollette* The reservation was not rigid enough be-
cause there was in it no provision which would create any
opposition to adherence either in the United States or in
Europe among the members of the Court* Therefore, their
17
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immediate plan of action became that of making the con-
ditions of adherence so stiff that the signatory powers
would be very unlikely to be in a position to accept them.
While Borah and other opponents of the Court
thundered on in the Senate about the Court's connection
with the League and the resulting peril to the Monroe
Doctrine, Senator Pepper drew up a new reservation. In
it he demanded first, that all the members of the Court
pledge themselves to make forever binding the principle
laid down in the Eastern Carelia Case, to the effect
that no advisory opinion be given when one of the parties
did not accept the Jurisdiction of the Court, and secondly
that no advisory opinion be given on any matter affecting
the United States unless the Court was given the consent
of the United States to do so.
The anti-Court men believed that those demands ac-
complished the desired end, namely the proclaiming abroad
that the members of the League and Court were not to be
trusted, and were likely at any time to take back their
word. These demands also had the effect in the Senate of
making it appear that the proponents of the Court were
really seeking to put the United States at the mercy of a
bunch of cut-throats in the persons of the League Council
and Assembly .
^
19 Fleming, Op. Clt ., pp. 246-247.
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In order to make their strategy secure, the anti-
Leaguers procured the assistance of the American Judge,
John Basset Moore, who had served on the Court since 1922.
Judge Moore had never been friendly toward the League, for
he had not approved at the very beginning of the giving of
advisory opinions to the Council or to the Assembly of the
League. He had later- supported the establishment of the
same full and open procedure for the consideration of ad-
visory opinions as for the consideration of cases In which
a Judgment was to be given. In 1923 , he had ably and ef-
fectively opposed a proposal for a secret procedure in the
giving of advisory opinions.^
With such an attitude toward the League Judge Moore
was Just the man to assist in the remaking the fifth reser-
vation. Therefore, with his assistance Senator Swanson*s
reservation was expanded and reintroduced into the Senate
on January 23» 1926. It contained the following provisions j^l
1. The Court was not to render any advisory
opinion until due notice had been given publicly
to all states adhering to the Court and to all
states interested in the question, and until
public hearing or an opportunity for a public
hearing had been given.
2 . The Court was not to entertain a request for
an advisory opinion touching any dispute or
20
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question In whloh the United States had or claimedan in
3 * The signature of the United States was not to
t)e , until the powers signatory to the Proto-
col had Indicated, through an exchange of notes,their acceptance of the foregoing conditions and
reservations as the only conditions under whichthe United states would consider adherence to theCourt*
4* Recourse to the Court for the purpose of set-tling disputes, between the United States and any
other state was to be had only by agreement throughgeneral or special treaties concluded with the
parties*
5* Adherence to the Court was not to require the
United States to abandon its traditional policy of
not intruding upon, interfering with or entangling
itself in the political questions of policy or theinternal administration of any foreign state*
The resolution as amended by Judge Moore was passed
by the Senate on January 27, 1926, by a vote of 76-17, with
the same anti-Leaguers Borah, Johnson, La Follette and
Shipstead holding out against it, and with Senators Pepper,
Lenroot, Robinson, Swanson and Pittman as the influential
proponents voting in favor. 22 Such a vote would seem to
indicate two things. In the first place, it showed that
the opposition to the Court in the Senate was slowly
dwindling. Secondly, it indicated, I believe, that the
opponents were not sincere in their creation of the reso-
lution and had to vote against it because they realized
that they were going to be forced to take a definite stand
22
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against the Court in the final vote. This second con-
clusion which I have drawn seems to me the only possible
answer to the question as to why the opposition should
have voted against a resolution of their own creation.
With the passage of the reservations by the Senate,
Secretary of State Kellogg proceeded according to the in-
structions in the fifth reservation, to communicate the
proposal to the signatory powers and to the Secretary-
General of the League of Nations. The Secretary-General
in turn sent copies of Secretary Kellogg's letter to the
members of the League and after the meeting of the states,
wrote back to, and Informed Secretary Kellogg of the de-
cision of the League to hold a meeting on September 1, 1926*
to which the United States was invited to send a delegate
to meet with the signatory powers. The meeting was to be
held for the purpose of discussing the problem of adherence
of the United States and for the purpose of framing any new
agreement which might be necessary in order to put into
effect the special conditions drawn up by the United States
as the basis of its adherence.
^
In response to the letter and invitation of the
Secretary-General, Secretary Kellogg sent a rather brusque
letter stating that he could see no useful purpose could
23
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be served by designating a delegate from the United States
government to attend the conference. The United States, he
said, had given Its consent to adherence to the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice with certain
specific conditions and reservations set forth in the
resolution. These conditions he believed to be clear and
concise and declared that they had to be accepted by ex-
change of notes between the United States and each of the
forty-eight signatory states before the United States could
become a party to and sign the Protocol. As the Secretary
of State, he informed him that he had no authority to
modify any of the conditions or reservations as stated in
2k-the resolution.
In spite of the seeming lack of cooperation on the
part of the United States in assisting in making some
agreement possible between the United States and the
signatory powers, the conference was held as planned. At
the meeting the signatories accepted the first four reser*-
vations completely, but the fifth they accepted in part
only. According to the directions included in the reso-
lution passed by the Senate, they were to communicate
individually their acceptance or rejection of the tenns.
24 Ibid., pp. 231-232.
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It was, however, as a group that they drew up the answer. 25
The answer of the signatories, therefore, was con-
cerned mainly with a discussion of the fifth amendment
since the first four were acceptable as they stood. Con-
cerning the first part of that amendment they pointed out
in the articles 73 and 74 as revised, there was definite
provision for a public hearing before the delivery of an
advisory opinion, 2^ As to the second part which dealt with
the question of the giving of an advisory opinion in cases
in which the United States was not a party, but in which
it had or claimed an interest, the signatories agreed that
the United States should possess the same right to prevent
the adoption of a proposal for such an advisory opinion as
any other state which was represented either in the Council
or the Assembly of the League. Since, however, a unanimous
vote was not necessary for the adoption of a request, the
United States could not have the deciding vote. 2?
Upon receiving the reports of the decision of the
signatories which were sent in accordance with the specifi-
cations laid down in the resolution of the United States
Senate, Secretary of State Kellogg passed the report on to
the Secretary General of the League of Nations on February
25
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19, 1929. if1th the report he enclosed a message of his
own In which he stated that the United States would have
liked to avoid any proposal which might Interfere with the
work of the League of Nations. He said there was no choice
In this case, because the security of the United States
was still uncertain under the arrangement presented by the
signatories. The one and only answer that he could give,
since the fifth amendment of the signatories was not ac-
ceptable to the United States, was that the United States
could not consider adherence under the aforementioned con-
ditions.^
In spite of the failure of the United States to
accept the decision of the signatories, the Council of
the League was still determined to find a solution which
might prove favorable to the United States. Therefore,
on March 9, 1929, it held a meeting to work out such a
plan. As a result of that meeting, a resolution was
passed in which the Committee of Jurists, appointed by the
Council in December, 1929, was requested to consider a
revision of the Statute of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice. That committee was instructed to Mmake
any suggestions which it felt able to offer with a view
to facilitating the adherence of the United States on
26
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conditions satisfactory to all concerned. " c '/
In order to further persuade the United States
that It was desirous of formulating a plan In which the
interests of the United States would be fully protected,
the Council invited Elihu Root from the United States to
serve on this second Committee of Jurists. It may be re-
called that It was Mr. Root who was chiefly responsible
for the success of that first committee which framed the
original draft of the Statute of the Court.
The Invitation extended by the Council was gracious-
ly accepted by Mr. Root, who Immediately consulted with
Secretary of State Kellogg and members of the Senate In
order to draw a general plan which he might present to
the Jurists at their meeting. Although his plan was not
in written form before he left the United States, by the
time of the meeting on March 11, 1929, Mr. Root had it in
final form and ready for presentation.
It was Mr. Root's plan which became the basis of
the discussion of the committee, and also the basis of the
revised protocol drawn up by it.^° In its revised form
29
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the protocol contained the following provisions:^-
1 ; ,
Th® Un
^
ed states was to be permitted to par-ticipate, through representatives designed for
P^rp0 ® e > upon a basis of complete equality withthe signatory members of the League in any and allproceedings of either the Council or the Assemblyin the election of Judges. The vote of the UnitedStates was to be counted in determining the absolute
majority of the vote required by the Statute.
2 * The Statute was not to be amended without the
consent of all of the contracting states*
3 * The Court was to render advisory opinions inpublic session after notice and opportunity forhearings had been given, as provided in the revised
Rules of Court.
4. The Court was not to entertain without the con-
sent of the United States any request for an ad-
visory opinion which concerned any dispute in which
the United States had or claimed an interest* 32
The above provisions were unanimously adopted by the
signatories at their conference on September l4, 1929 .
Following the adoption, the Secretary- General sent a formal
communication to Secretary of State Stlmson enclosing the
texts of the meeting of the Committee of Jurists and the
adopted protocol.
In answer to the communication of the Secretary-
General, the official confirmation of the Department of
State was given by Hugh R. Wilson, American Minister to
League of Nations Pamphlets V Legal
. 1929, v. 5*
pp. 132-133.
For complete details of the Protocol see
Appendix pp. 1- 3 .
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Switzerland. He, according to Instructions from Washington,
delivered an aide memo Ire acknowledging the receipt of the
documents and containing a personal message from Secretary
Stimson. In his message Secretary Stlmson said that after
a careful examination of the draft protocol, he considered
It an effective medium for meeting the objections of the
United States and would constitute a satisfactory basis
for the adherence of the United States to the Protocol and
Statute of the Court. He further promised that he would
ask the President for the necessary authority to sign the
protocol and recommend that it be submitted to the Senate
for its consent and ratification. 23
Accordingly Secretary Stimson sent to the President,
on November 16, 1929, the report of the work of the com-
mittee of Jurists and the report of the adoption of the
protocol by the signatory states and asked him to authorize
the American Minister in Bern, Switzerland to attach the
signature of the United States to the three protocols.
The willingness of President Hoover to further the
cause of adherence was shown when he allowed only a little
over a week's time to elapse before he authorized Secretary
^ Hudson, The World Court , 1921-1934, pp. 24o-2*&
.
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Stimson to make the necessary arrangements for the
signing, on the behalf of the United States, of the Protocol
of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, the Protocol of Accession of the United States,
and the Protocol of Revision of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice . 25
35 Ibid
., p. 259
CHAPTER V
THE UNITED STATES AND THE COURT 1930-1935
The real proof of President Hoover's interest in the
campaign for the adherence of the United States to the
World Court came on December 10, 1930, when he formally
presented the three aforementioned protocols to the Senate
and asked for immediate action on them. In his message,
he informed the Senate that the protocols not only freed the
United States from any entanglement in the diplomacy of
other nations, but also made it impossible for the United
States to be summoned before the Court without its own con-
sent. On the otherhand, they permitted the United States,
with the agreement of the other member nations, to seek the
services of the Court at any time. He also pointed out that
the protocols permitted the withdrawal of the United States
whenever it so desired. Such withdrawal waB not to reflect
any ill will or reproach. He concluded his remarks by
saying: "Our great nation, so devoted to peace and justice,
should lend its co-operation in this effort of nations to es-
tablish a great agency for such pacific settlements." 1
1 Congressional Record
.
71st Congress, 3rd Session,
p. 504
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On January 21, 1931, the Senate took the first real
steps in the consideration of the revised protocol as pre-
sented by President Hoover. On that day, it requested Mr.
Root to appear before the Senate Committee on Foreign Re-
lations to explain in detail the protocol as revised by
him and the Committee of Jurists. At that meeting, Mr. Root
emphasized, as the es-sential step in preparing for adherence,
the thorough study of the five reservations which constituted
the back bone of the draft.
The discussion of Mr. Root was confined to the contro-
versial fifth amendment, since the first four had already
been accepted by the signatories. According to him, that
reservation, as embodied in the draft protocol of 1929, pro-
vided ample protection for the United States against the
action of the Council. Under the fifth reservation, the
Council would still have the legal right to request an
opinion and the United States would still have the legal
right to interpose before the Court an objection based on
the claim of interest and refusal to consent. But in an
agreement terminable at will, the exercise of these powers,
he said, had to be free from subterfuge and concealment of
motives or the agreement would surely come to a speedy end.
The procedural provisions which followed the state-
ment that the Court would not, without the consent of the
United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion
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concerning a question In which the United States had or
claimed an interest, did not in the slightest modify the
provisions of the reservation. On the otherhand, they
merely provided a means of protection for the signatory
powers against the misuse of the reservation by the United
States. He believed that it was only fair that they be
afforded the same protection as the United States.
Under such circumstances, Mr. Root said that he was
sure that the United States would want to come to an early
agreement because, although the signatory powers were very
desirous that the United States adhere to the Court, the
United States itself had much to gain from the successful
working of the Court. The Court, if backed by all of the
powerful nations, especially the United States, could help
to preserve peace in Europe, peace which was so necessary
to the material interests of the United States. 2
From the time that Mr. Root appeared before the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations to discuss the protocol, until
late in March of 1932, efforts on the part of the proponents
of the Court were sporadic. This was probably due to the
fact that the peace organizations had begun to devote them-
selves with great fervor to the support of the disarmament
2 Hudson, op. clt
. , pp. 266-270.
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program. 3 it might also have been due to the fact that
the leaders In the Foreign Relations Committee were the
anti-Court Senators, Borah, Johnson, and Reed. 11 Their
presence would Indicate that the committee was hostile
as before to any more in favor of adherence.
On March 22, 1932, however, Secretary of State
Stimson, at the request of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, sent a message setting forth his views concerning
the revised or Root protocol.- The following is an
exerpt from his message:
M The protection which is given us by this
Protocol as to advisory opinions is a special
protection given upon our request and given to
no other nation. The fifty odd other nations
who are members of the World Court have joined
that institution without requesting or apparent-
ly feeling the need of such a precaution, al-
though nearly all of them are weaker and smaller
than we and thus presumptively are more in need
of such protection against being overreached by
their members. It is a protection which goes to
the very jurisdiction of the Court, and if we
Join, cannot be annulled or amended without our
consent; ... by joining we incur absolutely no
liabilities (except the Insignificant liability
to pay our share of the Court* s expenses) while
on the contrary we gain a power to exeroise our
3 Jessup, P. C., International Security
, p. 26.
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5 The committee was made of largely the same men
as in 1926 with the exception of Senators Lenroot and
Pepper and a few new men who were not particularly
important.
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only in choice of the Judges of
wh?r*h°
Urt,
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+
n lts metil0ds of procedure as well,
we do not now have. Never before was theworld in greater need of orderly development ofinternational rules of conduct by the wise methodJudicial decision, which we Americans are so
^
C?^intSd rith 12 the development of commonlaw in this country. We have delayed long in
availing ourselves of that opportunity. I sin-
cerely hope that we will now assume the privlllges
and the responsibilities of taking part in thatgrowth in the future.” o
The Foreign Relations Committee made a report to
the Senate on June 1, 1932.^ It recommended adherence
with reservations which were substantially the same as
those already approved by the League, and so contributed
little to the progress of adherence. The reservations
provided that:
1. The United States advise and consent to the ad-
herence to the three protocols (not Including the
optional clause for arbitrary Jurisdiction) with
the understanding that the Court would not enter-
tain any request for an advisory opinion concerning
any dispute in which the United States had or
claimed an interest.
2* The signatory powers indicate their acceptance
of the reservations as the condition of the ad-
herence of the United States before the signature
of the United States be affixed.
3* The United States approve the Protocol and
Statute with the understanding that cases might be
brought before the Court through general or special
treaties concluded between the parties to the
dispute.
Hudson, op. clt .
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4. the adherence of the United States was not tobe taken to require the United States to depart
£f?!J “V!: ad“lonal polloy of not interfering
™
4
?S
Up0n
>
he P°lltlcal questions ofany foreign nation, or imply the giving up of itstraditional attitude toward purely Americanquestions*
After presenting the reservations, the committee
gave a history of the campaign for adherence from the
time of President Harding to that date. It concluded its
report with the following statements^*
“Whether the question be viewed selfishly
or altruistically, our government ought to give
the Court the moral support that would follow
from association in maintaining lt* w
The passage of the Foreign Relations Committee
report seems to me to be in complete discord with the
spirit of the reservations preceding it* The reservations
seemed to have as their purpose the obstruction of any
move which might be made to facilitate the plans for ad-
herence of the United States to the Court. The final
statement on the other hand seemed to convey the idea
that the committee was ready to recommend adherence*
The work of the Foreign Relations Committee was
therefore, very confusing. To the casual observer it
would seem as though the committee had been trying by
means of its various resolutions and reservations to
facilitate adherence, whereas in reality their plans were
g Idem
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only a means of blocking or delaying any attempts on the
part of the proponents to secure adherence® A further
delay was caused by the closing of the Seventy-Second
Congress before any action had been taken by the full
session of the Senate, Because of that the protocols
had to be referred back to the Committee on Foreign
Relations until the next session of Congress convened.^
Late in after the matter had been dropped
temporarily by the Senate, the House of Representatives
took the question. At that time it voted to appropriate
the money necessary to pay the share of the United States
in the expenses of the Court. By voting such an appro-
priation, it is my belief that the House hoped to convey
to the Senate the fact that it was in favor of adherence
and thereby perhaps to stimulate it to real action on the
question. If that were its purpose, it failed because
there is no record of the action in the record of the
Senate meetings.
At the time of the appropriation voted by the House,
hearings were held for the purpose of securing public
opinion concerning it. At these hearings were many men
prominent in the field of law. To mention only a few,
they were Dr. Manley 0. Hudson of the Harvard Law School f
9
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Charles H. Strong, secretary of the Bar Association of New
York City, Professor Edwin Dickinson, professor of law at
the University of Michigan, and the Hon. Irving Lehman of
the Court of Appeals of New York City,
All present at the hearings seemed to be in accord
In approving of the appropriation as a way to make easier
the entrance of the United States into the Court. Both
Mr. Hudson and Mr. Dickinson believed that the money should
be available since the United States was free to use the
Court whether or not it adhered to its Statute or Protocols,
and since the United States could not feel free to use the
Court unless it paid its share of the expenses. Mr. Strong
said that his association urged strongly the adherence of
the United States to the Court and so would endorse the
appropriation. Mr. Lehman said that the appropriation
could lead the United States into no harm and might help
to show that the United States was really interested in
establishing a means for preserving peace among the nations
of the world.
10
Again, however, the proponents of the Court met
with defeat, and no action was taken because agreement
could not be reached as to the wisdom of such a move in
Hearings before the committee of Foreign Affairs—
House of Representatives, 72nd Cong. 1st Sess. on H.J.Res.
37S on the P.C.I.J. pp. 2-12; 26-29.
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the face of such strong opposition in the Senate. 11
It would seem as though the House had gone to a
great deal of work knowing that the opposition was still
strong in the Senate. It was, I believe, an example of
an attempt on the part of the House to do something worth-
while, even though the odds were against them, with the hope
that It might again help to break down the opposition in
the Senate.
After the failure of the House resolution to appro-
priate a sum equal to the share of the United States in
the expenses of the Court, action on the question the
World Court was dropped until the Spring of 1934. At
that time hearings were again held before the Foreign
Relations Committee. Separate hearings were granted to
the proponents and the opponents. On March 23 the pro-
ponents were heard and on May 16 the opponents were heard.
Present on March 23 at the hearing were over forty
speakers representing the Republican and Democratic parties,
the various bar associations, state legislatures, chambers
of commerce, and committees on international peace which
were in favor of adherence. A review of the representative
speeches of the more important organizations will give a
clear indication of what part of the American public
favored adherence.
11
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The position of the American Bar Association was
presented by Clarence E. Martin, Past President. He stated
that the association with its 30, 000 members had repeatedly
endorsed adherence as a necessity for national honor and
welfare. He added the hope and recommendation that the
Senate would consent to the ratification of the three
protocols.
The endorsement of the Republican party was pre-
sented by Miss Margaret Buttenheim, who represented the
National Committee of Republican Women for the World Court
and the Women's National Republican Club. She presented
the World Court plank adopted by the Republican party in
June 1932, in which it had advocated membership in the
World Court in order that it might offer to the United
States a M safer, more Judicial and expeditious instrument
for the constantly recurring questions between us and
other nations. .. M She added that the Republican party
still advocated adherence according to the plank of 1932.^
The stand of the Democratic party concerning ad-
herence was presented by Mrs. Carroll Miller, National
Decmocratic Committeewoman for Pennsylvania. T^e 1932
plank of her party advocated adherence as had that of the
12 Hearings before the Committee of Foreign Relations
of the United States Senate
, 73 Congress, 2nd. Session
relative to the Protocols concerning the adherence of the
United States to the P.C.I.J. Friday, March 23,1934. pp. 17-19.
15 Ibid.
. pp. 37-3S.
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Republican party and like the Republican party was still
In favor of adherence*
^
Mr. Forrest C. Donnell, Chairman of the St. Louis
World Court Committee and a member of the Missouri Bar
Association, presented at the hearing the report of the
action of 65 state and local bar associations. He re-
vealed that the 25 state associations and the 4o local
associations had given the question serious consideration
through debates and special committee investigations and
as a result of those debates and investigations had passed
resolutions favoring adherence* The virtual absence of
any expression of opposition by any state or local organ-
ization was, he said, a slgnifcant indication of the bari^
President Henry I. Harriman of the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States appeared in behalf of the
approximate one million businessmen in the United States
with the message that the Chamber of Commerce since its
organization had urged the participation of the United
States in the World Court along beside the other nations.
He said he believed that the Court provided a mechanism
for settling many international disputes, some of which
might otherwise end up in war. The interest of the
lk
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businessman was, he stated, In the orderly conduct of
International affairs. Membership on the part of the
United States would not only help to stabllze and In-
crease commerce, but would also help to establish good
International relations, he said. 1 ^
Theodore F. Greene, Governor of Rhode Island, pre-
sented reolutlons passed in 1933 and 1934 by sixteen state
legislatures all urging the Senate to consent to and ratify
the three pending protocols. 1 7 The resolutions of those
states represented some of the industrial and agricultural
Interests of the country. The resolution of the Rhode
Island legislature is typical of all the rest and so will
serve as a good example. It read as follows: 1^
"Prompt ratification - the reaffirmation of
our faith in the Judicial process as the primary
substitute for war - would be of Instant and im-
measurable encouragement to a world striving, in
the face of threats of wars which would ruin it,
to emerge from the worst depression in history."
The eleven women’s national organizations in the
National Conference on the Cause and Cure of War were
Ibid
.
, pp. 24-26.
^ Resolutions in Rhode Island, N. J., Ark., Del.,
Iowa, Tenn., Oregon, Vt.
,
Md., Ohio, were passed by both
houses, while those in Conn., Fla., Nev., and Miss, were
passed by the Senate only and those in No. Carolina, and
So. Carolina were passed by the House only.
18 Hearings Cited., pp. 28-30
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represented by Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, Honorary Chairman
of the conference. At the meetings of the conference were
from 10,000 to 12,000 women. The organizations which she
represented Included the American Association of University
Women, The Council of Women for Home Missions, The Feder-
ation of Women’s Boards of Foreign Missions of North
America, The General Federation of Women's Clubs, The
National Women's Christian Temperance Union, and The
National Women's Trade Union League. Mrs. Catt said that
according to polls recently taken, it was shown that the
number of senators approving of adherence had increased
to the necessary two-thirds, that the two political parties
had endorsed adherence and finally that President Roosevelt
had given the plan his approval.
With such an almost ideal situation she said that
she could not see why the Senate had delayed so long.
Quoting from her speech, she saidj
"There is nothing more sickening, discourag-
ing, and disheartening than the hopeless, help-
less drifting of the world at this moment towards
war. The world needs now a few gestures towards
peace instead of so many in the direction of war.®
She said that the Court might not prevent war, but that
it was still the necessary part of the machinery of peace.
She believed that unless the United States became a part
of the Court, it would not work perfectly. Therefore,
she and the organizations which she represented begged the
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Senate to take such action upon the World Court as would
make the entrance of the United States as easy and quick
as possible.
The stand of the dally newspapers concerning ad-
herence was presented by Mr. W. W. Waymack, associate
editor of the Des Moines Register, Des Moines, Iowa. He
reported that in response to a poll taken of 2,306 papers
concerning ratification by the United States of the three
protocols, 1, 357 or 67 per cent replied that they were in
favor of ratification while 263 or 13 per cent replied
that they were opposed to ratification. Fifty-eight of
the papers took no stand at all, fourteen sent replies
too ambiguous to make a fair classification possible, and
3^-2 papers sent no answers at all.
A further analysis of the newspaper poll showed the
following statements to be true. The 3^2 papers which sent
no replies represented, so far as their combined cir-
culation was concerned, only 6 per cent of the combined
circulation of all of the daily papers in the country. The
X
» 357 dally papers that favored ratification included most
of the leading papers of the country, from the New York
Times 8nd Herald Tribune in the East, to the San Francisco
Chronicle, The Seattle Star, the Los Angeles Time, the
19 Ibid., pp. 31- 34 .
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Portland Oregonian In the West.
In New England, the papers advocating adherence In
their editorials included the Boston Transcript, the
Boston Herald, the Boston Post, the Christian Science
Monitor, the Springfield Republican, and the Hartford
Courant.
In the South the papers favoring adherence were the
Atlanta Constitution, the Birmingham Age Herald, the New
Orleans Tlmes-Picaycime, the Chatanooga News, the Memphis
Commercial Appeal and the Richmond Times.
The Mid-West papers advocating adherence were the
Des Moines Register, the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the
Indianapolis Star, the St. Paul Pioneer Express, the Omeha
World Herald and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Times-Star,
20
and Globe-Democrat.
As a result of the poll Mr. Waymack said that there
could be found no grounds for the contention that the news-
paper support of the Court was sectional. The most clear-
ly affirmative states represented all sections of the
country. Connecticut, with 32 papers, registered 25
favorable, none opposed, and 7 which did not reply. In the
case of Pennsylvania, out of 15£> daily papers, 106 regis-
tered favorable and only 24 were opposed. Twenty-four of
20
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the 29 Kentucky papers replied as favorable. In the state
of Iowa, 34 of the 45 papers were favorable. In Colorado
twenty-two of Its twenty-nine were favorable, as were the
nineteen of the twenty-five in Oregon.
The opposition, Mr. Waymack said was concentrated
in the papers owned by Hearst. Thirty-two of the 265 papers
opposed to the Court made up three fourths of the total
circulation of the opposition. Of the thirty-two papers,
twenty-four of them belonged to the Hearst chain. Mr.
Waymack concluded his report by saying that when two thirds
of the American press favored adherence it was safe to say
that it was also the voice of a majority of the American
people.20
'
The National Grange was also represented at the
hearing. Its position concerning adherence was presented
by Frederick Brenckham, Washington representative of the
National Grange. Mr. Brenckham said that since 1924, at
each annual convention the Grange had unanimously recorded
its conviction that the United States should adhere to
the Court. The plea of the Grange was, he said, based on
the conviction that only in an international order, depend-
ing upon the application of the principles of law for the
settlement of disputes , could there be security of life or
20 ‘ Idem.
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livelihood for any of its citizens* 21
The recommendations of the log World Court com-
mittees throughout the United States was presented by Tom
Wallace, editor of the Louisville Times and member of the
Louisville World Court committee. He reported the com-
mittee, which he represented, had waited patiently since
1925 for the United States to do its part in maintaining
the World Court* The only explanation which it could
find was ’•delay”. In explaining why his and other com-
mittees believed that delay was the cause of the failure
of the plan for adherence, he made the surprising state-
ment that opponents of adherence claimed to have within
their ranks officers of the army, navy, and American
Legion, distinguished lawyers In both the Republican and
Democratic parties, all members of World Court committees
and some of them even chairmen of their respective com-
mittees 1 In spite of the possibility of such a situation
he asked that the protocols be reported quickly so that
the Senate could take immediate action on them.^
The last organization to be heard by the Foreign
Relations Committee of the Senate was the Federal Council
of Churches of Christ in America. Its representative was
21
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Dr. S. Parkes Cadman, former president of the Council.
He said he believed that the World Court could prove a
source of social and political cohesion as well as judi-
cial among the nations of the world as had the Supreme
Court of the United States among the forty-eight states
of the Union. He went on to say that the Senate was not
to be criticized for its delay in ratifying the protocols,
for he believed that it was much better "to make haste
slowly in controverted issues" in order that the public
might be completely educated concerning the question. He
did consider, however, that the moment had come, when affairs
in both the United States and abroad were so confused, for
the United States to ratify the protocols and so bring to
a successful completion its active service in the World
Court.
In addition to the individuals who spoke in behalf
of their respective organizations were two men prominent
in public affairs, Alfred E. Smith and Admiral William S.
Sims. Mr. Smith favored very strongly the adherence of
the United States to the World Court. He said that in
times when the peace of the world was threatened by war,
the United States should certainly do its part to persuade
the nations of the world to settle their differences by
23 Ibid
., pp. 46-47
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reason and law rather than by force.
Admiral Sims spoke very briefly, but said that the
rights of the United States were amply protected by the
protocols already signed and that the Court would be of
great Influence In promoting confidence in the relations
among the countries of the world.^
On May 16, of the same year a similar hearing was
held for the opponents of the Court. As at the other
hearing, there were present prominent citizens and repre-
sentatives of numberous interested organizations. Among
the individuals who spoke were former Senators Reed of
Missouri, and Pepper of Pennsylvania, Judge Daniel F.
Cohalan, former Justice of the Supreme Court of the state
of New York, and Edward A. Hayes, National Commander of
the American Legion.
Former Senator James A. Reed of Missouri began by
saying that the controvery over adherence to the Court
was the most important question before the Congress, was
in fact so important that if a mistake was made there
would be no mind capable of prophesying the results of
the mistake. He said that the proponents of the Court
were proponents of the League of Nations and were seek-
ing by means of the Court to gain a back door entry into
pi
i
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the League. Their propoganda, he said, was financed
entirely by large contributions from the Carnegie Foun-
dation and Mr. Curtis Bok of Philadelphia and carried
on through the efforts of agents hired for that purpose.
With such funds at their disposal it was no wonder to
him that such a system of propoganda was possible. He
brought in, in connection with the financing of proponent
propoganda, the fact, perhaps unknown to the general
public at the time, that the officers of the Carnegie
Foundation were none other than Elihu Root, James Brown
Scott, Joseph H. Choate, the foremost advocates of ad-
26
herence.
Leaving the matter of proponent propoganda,
Senator Reed proceeded to a discussion of the Court and
the proposed protocols. In answer to the statement made
by Admiral Sims to the effect that the rights of the United
States were amply protected by the protocols, he asked
why, if the five amended reservations had the same pro-
tective power as the original five, the amended reser-
vations were any more acceptable to the signatory powers
than the original ones. His answer to the question was
that the five amended reservations did not guarantee suf-
ficient protection for the citizens of the United States.
26
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Next Mr. Reed proceeded to take the Court apart
and prove that It was not a court at all. In the first
place, he said that the Court was made up of men, who even
If they so desired, could not be Impartial because love
of country would, In any dispute, always come first In
their actions. In the second place, he said the important
essential of a court was that It should act under a code
of laws drawn up by the people to be governed. Since the
United States had had no part of the League of Nations it
seemed to Mr. Reed very queer that it should want to be
governed by a court created by the League. He not only
though it queer but very dangerous for the United States
to adhere to a court whose rules and regulations had been
drawn up by foreign powers. Government by the governed,
he said was the basis of liberty. In the third place, the
Court lacked the power inherent in a true court, namely,
the power to enforce its own decisions. The only way
that the World Court could enforce its decisions was by
combining by force all the nations possible against the
offender. Lastly, Mr. Reed said that the World Court was
not a true court because it had the power to give advisory
opinions at the request of the League of Nations, and not
27
necessarily at the request of the litigants.
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He concluded his speech by ashing the Committee on
Foreign Relations why the United States should be swayed
by paid propogandists when ,by following the advice of such
great statesmen as Washington and Lincoln, the United
States had prospered without meddling in foreign affairs. 2S
Former Senator George Pepper, of Pennsylvania, was
the next to speak. Incidentally, he was the same Senator
Pepper who supported the Court in 1926. He began by saying
that the World Court was a tribunal with a dual character,
one of a Judicial character and the other of an advisory
or non-judicial character. In its twelve years of function-
ing, the Court delivered twenty-two Judicial decisions and
twenty-five advisory opinions. He claimed that a judicial
body which had spent more time and effort during the
twelve years of its life in giving advice to a political
body than it spent on cases submitted to it for judicial
decision was not entitled to be regarded exclusively as
a Judicial body. Such a situation, he said, only helped
to strengthen his argument that the Court was merely a
tool of the League of Nations. As long as there was such
a tie between the Court and the League, Senator Pepper
said that the Court could never measure up to the
28
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American ideal, and was, therefore, worthy only of un-
compromising opposition on the part of the citizens of
the United States.^
With his analysis of the Court as Judicial body.
Senator Pepper continued the attack on the Court as a
non-Judicial body. In doing that, he tried to show that
the Court had been greatly overrated as a factor in
international life. He believed that the proposition of
adherence had been seized upon by League propogandists
merely because the Court was an organ of the League. 3°
In conclusion, he said that he believed that there
had been a deliberate attempt on the part of advocates
of adherence to force the hand of the Senate in compelling
it to accept whatever a group of signatories might choose
as a substitute for its better Judgment. He again urged
the Senators to realize the trust which they had in their
hands and not to be stampeded by strong proponent
propoganda. ^1
Judge Daniel Cohalan followed Senator Pepper in
presenting his views on the subject of adherence. He
29 Ibid
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said that the arguments used by the proponents just pre-
ceeding the Senate Resolution of January 27 , 1926, had
been destroyed by the action of the Court In the meantime.
He cited as an example the statement made by the Court
advocates to the effect that the Court was a body whose
decisions were not affected by political trends or national
bias.
It was in September 1931, that the action came
which Mr. Cohalan presented as evidence that the state-
ment of the proponents was false. At that time, a matter
concerning the Austro-German Trade Union was submitted
to the Court. According to the comment at the time, the
case was decided entirely on political grounds by a vote
of seven to eight against the validity of the Austro-
German customs pact. That, in his estimation, was an
example of the nature and character of that legal body
which the United States was being asked to join. He said
that under such conditions the United States was not going
to submit its problems to the Court composed of foreign
and biased Judges. The United States, he said, had always
had and would have enough internal problems of its own to
keep its government busy. It would have no time to go
abroad to try to settle disputes and incidentally take
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the chance of Involving Itself in a European war, 32
Mr. Cohalan then rapped the proponents by saying
that not one of them had given any sound reason why the
United States should join the Court. Their arguments
were Just other examples of the passion of a small
minority of the people of the United States trying to
regulate the lives, habits and interests of the rest of
the people. He concluded by saying that the only way to
maintain peace and sanity among the peoples of the world
was to mind our own business and to leave the Old World
to do likewise. 33
Mr. Edward A. Hayes, National Commander of the
American Legion, spoke in behalf of his fellow comrades
all over the United States. He said that he realized
that resolutions in great numbers could be passed with
little or no actual consideration of the subject concerned.
He came to impress upon the Senate the fact that the
American Legion had considered the question for over two
years before coming to their decision. When their de-
cision was made, it was made by men and women who had
already given their country a sample of their patriotism.
Their final decision had been that America^ interests
32 Ibid
., p. 198.
33 Ibid., p. 199.
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came first and that those Interests could be best served
by staying out of the Court* Their resolution, he said,
was worded simply and clearly. It read as follows:
H Be It resolved by the American Legion
,
That It is opposed to the' entry or the United
States Into the League of Nations or to the
adherence to the World Court, either with or
without reservation."
That resolution, according to Mr. Hayes, was the unanimous
expression of 10,879 posts of the American Legion and
nearly 8,000 units of the American Legion Auxiliary.
^
The International Seamen's Union of America was
represented at the hearing by Mr. Andrew Furuseth, its
president. He said that he came before the committee
representing a class of people who were “utterly opposed
to the United States entering the League of Nations either
by the front door or indirectly through the World Court".
They were opposed to it because it was destructive of the
fundamental ideas and principles adopted by the colonists
and won through the War of Independence. He explained
the fundamental difference in sovereignty and freedom in
America and Europe. In America, it was placed by the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution in the
hands of the voter ,whereas in Europe it was in the power
of the King or those who exercised the kingly power. It
3* Ibid
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would be impossible, he said, to Join in conferences,
treaties or courts in which those fundamental questions
might be at issue without Jeopardizing the American way
of life. 35
Mr. Charles Francis Adams, director of First
National Stores, presented to the committee a statement
of Governor Joseph B.
-Ely of Massachusetts and also his own
' opinion. The governor wanted to go on record as opposing
the adherence to the Court on the basis that the United
States had enough problems to solve at home without getting
caught in the complicated disputes in Europe.
As for himself, Mr. Adams said that it was his
belief that any participation, interference with, or even
advice to nations in such a state of mind was bound to
antagonize or displease either that or some other nation
and might destroy what good will the United States had
or any pleasant or profitable relationship which we might
have in the future. He used as proof of his belief
examples in the past where the United States loaned money
to foreign friends and allies, and helped them to fight
wars of their own making only to find as a result little
el se but death, debt, disappointment, strained relations
and misunderstandings.
35 Ibid
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He concluded by reminding the committee of the
opinion of time-honored Americans who warned their country
to stay out of any foreign entanglements. If those warn-
ings were not respected, he said the country could well
fear for the future
No survey of public opinion directed against the
adherence to the Court would be complete without some
mention of the Hearst newspaper chain. Mr. E. D. Goblentz,
editor of the New York American, and supervising editor
of the Hearst newspapers, represented those newspapers
and presented their petition protesting against adherence
to or participation in the World Court. This petition
was gathered under the auspices of that newspaper chain
and represented a cross-section of the entire nation and
was signed by 1,334,347 citizens. It read as follows;
M We protest against the United States par-
ticipating in the League of Nations or in the
World Court of the League of Nations, with or
without Reservations*
.
We petition our Federal Government to keep
our United States 'free from foreign entangle-
ments 1 as the Father of our Country wisely
enjoined.
We urge our Congress at Washington to keep
our Government from meddling in foreign affairs,
and to keep foreign nations from meddling in our
American affairs."
36
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As loyal American citizens, we ask our loyal
representatives to keep our country out of foreign
conflicts and complications, and to keep foreign
conflicts aud complications out of our country#**
The statistical report of this League of Nations protest
included twenty-two Hearst papers from Los Angeles,
37California, to Boston, Massachusetts*
In studying the reports of the two hearings an
interesting observation may be made. The largest number
of the speakers in favor of adherence were representatives
of some organization, whereas in the case of the opposition,
the largest number of speakers were people, distinguished
not because they held an office in some powerful organiza-
tion, but because they had been prominent in national affairs.
In regard to the arguments presented at those hear-
ings, I believe that the opponents presented the best
arguments. Each speaker had a definite point against ad-
herence, and presented it very forcefully and clearly.
As for the proponents, very few convincing arguments were
given. The importance of their hearing, therefore, lay
not in the presentation of reasons for adherence, but
rather in the indication of what groups were in favor of
adherence. For that reason I consider that the opponents
hearing contributed more to the debate on the question
37 Ibid
., pp. 205-207
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of adherence*
The Impetus gained by these two hearings before
the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in the
spring of 193^ was not lost, because the Committee an-
nounced that the protocols would be brought up for con-
sideration by the Senate early in the next session*
The new Congress met on January 3 , 1935 , At that
time, Mr* Roosevelt, like every President since the
World War, indicated that he approved of adherence* On
January 5 , he called a conference of the Senate leaders
and representatives of the Department of State including
Secretary of State Hull, Democratic leader Senator
Robinson, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, Senator Pittman, and Assistant Secretary of
State Francis B. Sayre*^ The purpose of the meeting was
the consideration of immediate action on the protocols.
Four days later the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, by a vote of fourteen to seven, submitted a
report recommending ratification. That committee, headed
by Democratic Senator Pittman, was overwhelmingly Demo-
cratic* In fact only four of the nineteen members were
Republicans*^ The opposition was held, as usual, by
xgJ New York Times , January 6 , 1935*
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Senators Borah, La Follette and Lewis. The recommendation,
however, was accompanied by an “understanding". The
conditions of the "understanding" were based on the
promise "that the Permanent Court of International Justice
shall not entertain, over an objection by the United States,
any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute
or question in which -the United States has or claims an
interest.^
0
This reservation was really only a re-statement
of the fifth reservation which the Senate had included
in its consent to ratlficatio n in 1926. At that time, the
members of the World Court had taken exception to it. Since
that time, however, the Department of State had made in-
quiries which Indicated that the leading members of the
Court, in view of the provisions of the Root protocol,
no longer objected to the provision. Also it was believed
by friends of the Court that such an additional phrase
4l
would go far to cut down the opposition in the Senate.
Two days after the recommendation was presented,
a correspondent of the New York Times reported that the
the opposition in the Senate had dwindled down to a
40
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handful of “bitterenders", of which six were known to be,
the Republican minority leaders Borah and Johnson,
Senators Nye and Cutting, the Progressive Senator La
Follette, and the Farmer-Laborite Senator Shipstead. 1*2
The resolution of adherence was debated intermit-
tently from January 15, until January 29. President
Roosevelt, contrary to his frequent custom, did not send
his message to the Senate until it had considered the
question. On January 16, after the opposition had begun
to crystallize, he sent the following notet^
"The movement to make international justice
practicable and serviceable is not a subject to
partisan considerations. For years Republican
and Democratic administrations and platforms
alike have advocated a court of Justice to which
nations might voluntarily bring their disputes
for judicial decisions.
To give concrete realization to this obvious-
ly sound and thoroughly American policy, I hope
that at an early date the Senate will advise and
consent to the adherence by the United States to
the Protocol of Signature of The Permanent Court
of International Justice, dated December 16, 1920,
the Protocol of Revision of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, dated
September l4, 1929, all which were submitted to
the Senate on December 10, 1930.
I urge that the Senate’s consent be given in
such form as not to defeat or delay the objective
of adherence.
The sovereignty of the United States will be
in no way diminished or Jeopardized by such action.
At this period in international relationships,
**2 Ibid
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when every act is of moment to the future of world
peace, the United States has an opportunity once
more to throw its weight into the scale in" favor
of peace* 15
Debate in the Senate was opened on January 15, by
Senator Robinson of Arkansas* He said he saw no basis for
the fear that the entry of the United States into the
Court would involve it in the League of Nations Just be-
cause it had access to the Council and Assembly of the
League and could not understand why the Senate had
delayed so long# He argued, that since the kinds of cases
which could be brought before the Court were limited to
the four enumerated in the section on the Jurisdiction of
the Court, he oould see no reason why the United States, in
bringing cases before the Court, would in any way be com-
promising its sovereignty or sacrificing its independence#
He pointed out that by reservations,, the Court could not
recognize any dispute in which the United States had or
claimed an Interest except as it had the consent of the
United States. Senator Robinson concluded by saying that
the right of the United States to bring disputes to the
Court was made possible not by "natural right", but by
the organized efforts of other nations. He said that if
the United States would rather be a "sponger" than an
equal participant in the backing of the great work of
the Court, then the responsibility for the failure of the
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other nations to take part would weigh on the shoulders
of the United States. This responsibility he considered
hardly worthy of a nation which had taken so much interest
and had put so much effort into the creation of the Court.
^
On the next day Senator Johnson of California con-
tinued the debate by presenting a defense of the Senate's
delay in ratifying the protocols. As for the belief that
the Senate was to blame for the delay, he said that it was
not the fault of the Senate, but of the scheming European
diplomats and conservative Americans. Those persons, he
said, by means of their reservations, had reduced the pro-
tection of the United States to a point where adherence
could not be safely attempted.
He next developed a series of arguments why the
United States should not join the Court. He said that it
was foolish to think that the United States could help to
maintain peace in Europe by joining the Court. The fact
that there were countries, Bolivia and Paraguay, which had
been at war for years and which had made no effort to bring
their dispute to the Court, proved that the Court was use-
less unless the nations would bring their disputes to it.
If the European nations would not make use of the Court to
solve their disputes, he could see no reason why the adherence
44
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of the United States could possibly bring peace to Europe.
It could only lead to the entry of the United States Into
quarrels and wars In which It would be expected to play
the part of the savior.
His second argument was based on the fact that the
United States had been able to maintain peace for over one
hundred years by means of arbitral courts and arbitration
treaties. To say, then, that adherence to the Court was
the only way to maintain peace was, according to him,
counting as nothing the great record of the United States
government in its relations with the other countries of
the world.
Another of Mr. Johnson*s reasons for opposing ad-
herence to the Court was based on the very sensible idea
that charity began at home. Therefore, he believed that
the United States government could well afford to deal
with its own problems, such as unemployment, and let
Europe take care of her own.
His concluding argument was based on the fact that
the Court was an instrument of the League of Nations. He
said that since the United States had chosen to stay out
of the League, Joining the Court would amount to a blunder-
ing into the very thing which it had chosen years earlier
to avoid. He had opposed the Court in 1926. He summarized
his whole speech by saying that there was enough in the
United States to take the time and efforts of the government
150 -
and that therefore the people should be satisfied to remain
44’
just plain "Americans" I
Senator Huey Long of Louisiana, also an opponent of
the World Court, presented his opinion during the debate
in the Senate* He said that the title of the campaign
for the adherence of the United States should be "America
for Sale", since, according to him, the adherence of the
United States to the Court would mean the outright sale of
this country to Europe .
Senator Long also based his arguments against the
adherence of the United States to the Court on the fact
that the United States had maintained peaceful relations
with foreign countries for over one hundred years by
means of an agent which was purely American* That agent
was the Monroe Doctrine. In spite of such an unusual
record the United States was ready, he said, to scrap that
doctrine which had been used to keep Europe out of the
Americas and to plunge itself right into the middle of
European troubles and conflicts. This he said was a
drastic and sudden change from the policy followed by the
government, which not only kept the United States out of
European affairs, but also kept Europe out of the affairs
of the Americas.
44 '
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Concerning the argument that the United States could
withdrew from the Court at any time after it had Joined if
it were dissatisfied with the running of it, Mr. Long said
that it would be just as hard for the United States to do
that as it was for the Southern States to secede in 1661 ,
and even more disgraceful. The only way he could see for
the United States to get out of the Court was by having an
army big enough to stand up against the Court and all its
members.
Senator Long concluded by saying that the United
States might think that it was doing a good thing for all
concerned by Joining the Court, but it also thoughtthe
same thing back when it fought Europe’s war in order to
make the world safe for democracy, and came out of the war
with the name M Uncle Shylock” and with almost all of its
war loans repudiated. With such an experience any move
to Join the Court would not be only dangerous but foolish .
^
During the address of Senator Long, Senator Robinson
interposed several opinions concerning adherence. He said
that he could see no reason why a condition of war in
Europe was any excuse for the United States to refrain from
doing what it could reasonably do to encourage the peace-
ful disposition of those disputes. In answer to Senator
Robinson’s remark, Senator Long asked him what possible
45 Ibid., pp. 563-57S.
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chance there was for the United States to avoid war, If it
Joined the Court, which was composed almost entirely of
representatives of nations which had defaulted In their
debt obligations to the United States.
Senator Rpblnson answered the question of Senator
Long by saying that the threat of possible conflict was
no excuse why the United States should allow the destruction
of millions of lives and billions of dollars worth of
property. He pointed out that there were only two ways
to settle disputes. One was by force and the other was by
arbitration. He believed that It was both proper and right
that the United States should contribute in every Instance
that it could, to the settlement of those disputes by
46peaceful means.
After the speeches In the Senate against the ad-
herence of the United States, Senator Vandenberg came
forward and presented to the Senate his amendment to the
protocols of adherence which read as follows:^7
H Resolved further . That adherence to the
said protocols and statute hereby approved shall
not be construed as to require the United States
to depart from its traditional policy of not
intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling
itself in the political question of policy or
internal administration of any foreign state; nor
shall adherence to the said protocols and statute
be construed to imply a relinquishment by the
United States of its traditional attitude toward
purely American questions. 1®
46 ^7
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Senator Vandenberg declared that he did not present
the amendment with the idea of defeating the fundamental
issue itself as had the opponents of adherence. On the
contrary, he believed that the protocols without such an
amendment were ample protection for the interests and
territorial Integrity of the United States. For the bene-
fit, however, of those who did not share his opinion, he
presented the amendment as a means to ensure what he
believed was already provided for in the protocols.
He admitted that he did not want the United States
to Join the League of Nations, but still maintained that
it was possible to create an effective discrimination and
distinction between the League and the Court and that the
protocols secured that distinction.
In the discussion which ensued during the period
of Senator Vandenberg' s speech, Senator Logan of Kentucky
came forward to refute the statement of the opponents that
the World Court was a League Court. He said that it would
be Just as sensible to say that the Constitution of the
United States was a Magna Charts constitution as that the
World Court is a League Court.
Senator Logan next considered the attitude of the
United States in refusing to be bound by any rule of interw
Ibid
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national law. He said that there were only two alternatives,
namely, complete co-operation with the other nations in the
Court, or complete withdrawal and isolation from international
affairs. If the United States accepted the second alternative,
he said, it would be necessary for it to have the largest
army and navy in order to defend itself from all others.
In answer to the arguments of Senator Johnson and
Senator Long that the United States had maintained peace over
a period of one hundred years by means of arbitration, he
declared that adherence to the Court on the part of the United
States would not prevent the use of the Court of Arbitration
at the Hague. He also stated that the United States had
made use of arbitration partly because there was no court
that could be used.
Senator Logan further attacked the arguments of the
opponents by trying to prove how foolish was their argument
that the decisions of the Court would be rendered by foreign
and biased judges. He declared that that very thing could
be said about the courts all over the United States. Some-
body, he said, is always saying that courts are not fair.
He said that no American would ever attack the scruples of
the American Judges, Hughes, Kellogg, and Moore who had
served on the World Court and that, therefore, what right
had they to do that very thing to any judge Just because
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he was not from the United States. Courts, he said, might
make mistakes, but they were almost always fair.
Senator Logan concluded by saying that peace among
the members of the human race had been brought to its
present state by the process of education and growth and
through a better understanding of each other. To say that
law could not be substituted for war, denied that society
was capable of further progress and advance. He declared
that it was up to the United States to show that inters
national law could be substituted for war. Even though its
entry into the court might not stop wars, Senator Logan
insisted that it was at least a step in the right direction
and a step which should be taken immediately. 45
On January 21, Senator Borah entered the debate on
the proposed World Court protocols. He based all his op-
position to the court on its power to give advisory opinions.
If the power of the court to give advisory opinions had not
been included in the protocol, he said that he would have
had no objection to the Court at all. He went on to
explain that the proposed Court was not a Judicial body
but an advisory tribunal and no matter how many reservations
were added, it would always remain an advisory body.
He objected not only to the power of the court to
49
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give advisory opinions but also to the method by which
those opinions could be secured, namely, the action of the
League of Nations. That Jurisdiction, therefore, was not
in the Court itself but in the League. With that arrange-
ment Borah could see no way of preventing politics from
entering the opinions. To back up his argument he cited
the example of the Austro-C-erman customs decision, which
case, he was certain, was decided on a purely political basis.
senator Borah explained the attitude of the opponents
in connection with the argument that they were opposing a
movement which had been advocated in the United States for
years. He did that by saying that the United States had
always advocated Judicial tribunals for the settlement of
international disputes, but that this court was not a
Judicial one in the true and accepted sense of the word.
Furthermore, he said that no leading American, prior to
the time of the advisory Jurisdiction, created in the
World Court, had ever advocated such a Court, or that any
advisory power be attached to it. The World Court was,
therefore, not an American product, and did not come as
50
the result of any American proposal*
Senator Thomas of Utah followed Senator Borah in
an attempt to discredit the term “League Court” as applied
50 Ibid., pp. 695-702
157 -
to the World Court. He said that the only connection that
the League had with the Court was In Article 14 of the
Covenant, which created the Court. There the relationship
stopped. After the Court was established the power of
Article 14 was spent. Furthermore, he said that the Court
was created by a multi-lateral treaty drawn up by a con-
ference of representatives of many states, in which members
and non-members of the League took part.
As for the opposition to the Court because of its
power to give advisory opinions, he declared that the
United States would be safer as a member of the Court. It
would be safer because as a member, the Court could not,
over the objection of the United States render opinions
touching any disputes in which the United States had an
interest. He, therefore, believed that the United States
was completely protected by the 1929 Protocol of Accession.'"'
Senator Reynolds of North Carolina recorded his
opposition to adherence on January 24. He said that our
ancestors left Europe and faced starvation and cold to
come to America to realize freedom of government. Since
their settlement, this country made the greatest progress
of any nation of the world. That progress he said was due
to the fact that the people minded their own business
51 Ibid
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and kept out of the affaire of other nations. He believed
that just so long as the people continued to mind their
own business would they remain great. He continued with
the statement that the people did not want their country
to enter the Court because doing so only meant an entry
into the League of Nations. The experience of the World
War and the resulting taxes, he said, had taught the
people that another entry into foreign affairs would only
result in added hardships and misery#
Continuing his speech, Senator Reynolds asked the
question, What had tne United states to gain from adherence
to the Court”? His answer was nothing. We had no boundary
questions or International problems of immigration or
tariff. He said that the people of the United States were
busy enough minding their own business and taking care of
themselves. Until some one could give him a sensible
reason why they should Join the Court, he was definitely
of the opinion that they should stay out.^ ?
On January 25, Senator Norris of Nebraska presented
an amendment to be added to the end of the amendment pre-
sented earlier by Senator Vandenberg. It read as follows:
nRe solved further , that the adherence of the
Government of the United States to said protocols
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and statute is upon the express condition andunderstanding that no dispute or question In
Th
1
??
J
5
i
^'
ed States Government is a partyhall be submitted to said Permanent Court ofInternational Justice unless such submission has
Unlted States Senate by atwo-thirds vote.” 53 J H
According to his amendment, Senator Norris provided
that any dispute or controversy in which the United States
was a party, had to have a two- thirds vote of approval
by the Senate before it could be brought before the Court
for a decision. He demanded the two-thirds vote because
such action was in the nature of a treaty. He said that
he had always been opposed to the League and would oppose
adherence to the Court without some reservation amounting
in substance to the one he proposed. He insisted upon
that because he realized that, if the United States did
Join the Court, someday an important question would come
up which demanded the uttermost precaution. He said he
did not want his country to become involved in European
questions, not because he did not trust the Europeans, but
because he did not want his country to enter a court made
up of judges whose environments and ways of living were
so different from those of his own country. He admitted
that they would probably act very conscientously and
still be biased toward the European type of civilization
and so do great harm to the United States. Therefore, he
53 Congressional Record
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was not willing that the United States submit any dispute
to the Court unless the matter had the same consideration
by the Senate as a treaty would have. He looked ahead to
the possibility of the rejection of adherence because of
his amendment by the members of the Court. That very
rejection, he said, would be the very best reason why the
United States should stay out of the Court .
^
While debates on the resolution were being held in
the Senate, public opinion was voiced. On January 13 , the
National World Court Committee sent a message to the Senate
commending the action of the Foreign Relations Committee
taken on January 10
,
when it reported the three protocols
favorably to the Senate. The message also contained a
plea that the Senate delay no longer but take the immediate
action which was so important to the foreign relations of
the United States. That plea was signed by such prominent
members as Newton D. Baker, former Secretary of State, Pro-
fessor Felix Frankfurter of Harvard University, Professor
Manley 0. Hudson also of Harvard University, Mr. Scott M.
Loftin, President of the American Bar Association, and
Professor Phillip C. Jessup of Columbia University.
On the same day that the World Court Committee
message was sent to the Senate, the ministers of 150
54
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Brooklyn protestant churches urged their congregations to
send telegrams to their congressmen urging them to vote m
favor of adherence.
Taking the side of the opponents In an article appear-
ing in the January 13 issue of the New York Times, Senator
Johnson assailed the so-called "World Court Plan". He said
that adherence under the three protocols would mean the
abrogation ox the policy of the United states of non-inter-
ference in the political questions of foreign countries.
He saw no reason why the Court would afford the United
States any greater avenue to judicial settlement, but could
see clearly how it could be a certain way into a European
war. The article ended with the statement that the Court
could not settle any difficulties for the United States
because the United States had none which it would want
to have settled by a group of foreigners .1
The propoganda of the opposition was reenforced on
January 20 by Father Charles E. Coughlin, who delivered
a firery speech denouncing the Court. In that speech he
said that “joining the World Court to maintain peace
strongly stinks of diplomatic conceit". He was old
enough, he said, to prefer Washington and his logic and
principles to Wilson and those who followed him with their
crude internationalism and their unsound love of minorities 2
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He said that It was neither the farmer nor the laborlte
who was anxious that the United States go International*
They believed, on the other hand, that the American struggle
should be to preserve the American standard of living rather
than to “enmesh ourselves with the debasement of the
standardized poverty of Europe".
According to Father Coughlin, the World Court was
a”brotherhood of men founded not upon love, not upon the
right of the majority to rule, but upon the right of the
minority to disrupt". He concluded by saying that the
Court was nothing more than an "artificial creation of
those who wish to exempt themselves from all national
law, of those who wish to profit by the injustice of the
Treaty of Versailles"
On January 25, the day before the Senate vote was
to be taken, the proponents and opponents had their last
chance to try to bring the Senate to their respective
sides. Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler gave a heated speech
in which he "chided the World Court foes" and said that
their attitude was inexplicable save on the ground that
they had "neither ideas, principles, nor courage, nor any
concern for the highest interests of the American people".
In the evening of the same day, Father Coughlin
New York Times , January 21, 1935* P* 16.
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renewed his battle against the Court, urging his listeners
to wire their Senators as a last chance to block adherence.
He appealed to every stolid American who loved democracy,
the United States, who loved the truth, to stand back of
the tired and true Senators in their hopeless but honest
fight to keep "America safe for Americans and not the
hunting ground of international plutocrats" I
*
*
The objections offered in the Senate, over the
radio, and through the Hearst and other newspapers, bore
little relation to the proposed protocols. In the Senate,
it finally became necessary to set a limit to the length
of the Senators* speeches because the effort on their
part to delay action by filibuster."
In that final attack, the Court was denounced as
a creature of the League. The administration was accused
of attempting to sneak Into the League by the back door,
and the Court itself was criticized as a political body.
The country was told that membership in the Court would
result in the cancellation of the Allied war debts, the
lowering of the bars of immigration, and the end of tariff
protection for the working class, and the complete dis-
appearance of the Monroe Doctrine. In fact, it was finally
57 New York Times , January 29, 1935> PP* I-?*
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said that the United States, if it Joined the Court, would
find itself embroiled in European quarrels and wars.
The arguments of the proponents, especially in the
speeches of Senators Vandenberg, Logan and Robinson, were
to the effect that the Court was not bound to the League
any more than the Constitution of the United States was
bound to the Magna Charta; that the protocols, along with
the Vandenberg amendment, gave adequate protection to the
United States; that the Court was not a “foreign" one
Just because the Judges were Europeans; that the mere
fact that there were wars going on in Europe, was no
excuse why the United States should not expend some effort
to try to bring them to a peaceful settlement; and, finally,
that adherence to the Court would in no way hinder the
United States in its use of the Court of Arbitration, if
it so desired* In other words, the proponents believed
that adherence could help to establish international
peace, and yet not force the United States to do anything
that was foreign to its traditional policy of the Monroe
Doctrine*
Finally, on January 29, the question of adherence
came to a vote in the Senate. It was the opinion of
Washington observers that the fate of the measure had been
decided during the preceding few days when the well or-
ganized opposition had delivered its powerful mass attack.
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Evidence of the strength of the attack was found In the
fact that on a single day 40,000 telegrams were delivered
to the Senate.
^
Before the vote was taken, President Roosevelt was
informed that four votes would mean the success or failure
of the measure. He, therefore, called to the White House
Senators Cutting, Gerry, Walsh and Donhahey for a con-
ference in the hope that he might persuade them to lend
their vote to the cause of the World Court. Senator
Cutting, however, was the only one who stood by the Presi-
dent. 60
The final poll showed fifty-two Senators in favor
of adherence and thirty-six opposed — Just seven votes
short of the two-thirds vote necessary for ratification.
An analysis of the vote shows that of the fifty-two votes
cast for adherence, forty-three were Democratic and nine
were Republican. Of the thirty-six votes cast against
adherence, twenty were Democratic and fourteen were
Republican, one Progressive and one Farmer-Laborite.
This analysis would seem to show that neither the Re-
publican nor the Democratic parties solidly were for or
against adherence. 62-
59 Shepardson and Scroggs, op. cit ., p. 226.
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The geographical significance of the vote may be
clearly seen by means of the accompanying map* Two centers
of the country were definitely in favor of adherence, the
Southwest and the Mississippi Valley* The one center of
the opposition to adherence was in the states of the
Northwest*
The map also shows that the senators in thirteen
of the states split the votes of their states* In four
of those cases only was the split along party lines. In
seven cases, however, the split was within the party it-
self* Such an observation serves to prove all the more
strongly that the Court question was not a party question.
The failure of the Senate to ratify the protocols,
revealed a change in attitude toward the Court since the
vote taken in 1926. At that time, it had approved the
Moore amendments to the resolution of adherence by a vote
of 76-17* During the intervening time, the opposition
had increased by nineteen votes, and those nineteen votes
spelled the defeat of ratification*
A comparison of the two votes in tabulated form
reveals the following facts in regard to the source of the
increase of opposition:
1. Of the thirty-six senators who voted
against adherence in 1935 > twenty-one of them
were men who had been elected since the 1926 vote*
2. Of the eight senators who had been opposed
to adherence in 1926, and who voted in 1935* only
one, Senator Robinson, left the ranks of the
opposition and voted for adherence in 1935*
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3* 0f> the fifty-two senators who voted forln 1935> thirty-eight were new sincethe 1926 vote*
Of the fifty-two senators who voted infavor of adherence in 1935, thirteen had voted
the same way in 1926.
5» Of the senators who had favored ad-
herence in 1926, and who also voted in 1935,
eight swished to the side of the opposition
The data gained from this comparison shows that
the increase of opposition came primarily from the votes
of the new senators, and only secondarily from a change
of position from 1926 to 1935*^ There is no evidence,
however, either in the Senate debates or hearings, which
can be used to pick out any one group which can be held
responsible for the killing of ratification. The eight
senators who switched their position towards adherence
were not outstanding as either proponents or opponents
and so there is no record in the Senate proceedings of
any statement on their part as to why they made the
change. The new senators who voted against adherence
were also inconspicuous in the debates in the Senate and
so made no statement which would indicate why they voted
62 The eight senators who changed their position
were: Senators Gerry, Metcalf Norbeck, Norris, Smith,
Trammell, Walsh, and Wheeler.
63 For the tabulated votes see Appendices V and VI.
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as they did. The answers to these questions will have to
wait until the biographies or private letters of those
senators are published and their personal opinions are
brought to light.
In connection with the question of why the senators
voted as they did, comes the question of the sincerity of
their beliefs and arguments. There is no evidence that
either the proponents or the opponents were insincere in
their belief that the United States should or should not
Join the Court, as there had been In the case of the
opponents of the League of Nations, where a personal ani-
mosity entered into the question. Also in the case of
the proponents of the Court, there Is no evidence to
show that they were insincere in the presentation of their
arguments and amendments. On the contrary, In the case
of the opponents, there is evidence that they were not
sincere in their presentation of amendments as a means
to make adherence safe for the United States. That
evidence is found In the account of the amendment process
of the famous "fifth reservation". At that time the
opponents openly admitted that the reason for their
refusal to accept the amendments to that reservation was
based on the fact that they were not rigid enough to be
unacceptable to the members of the Court. Their purpose
in presenting amendments was then, I believe, either to
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make the conditions to adherence so harsh that they could
not be accepted, or to hold off the vote long enough to
muster more opposition to their side*
With the failure of the Court to ratify adherence,
the United States was prevented, for the second time in
fifteen years, from taking its place with the other nations
of the world in an association for the maintenance of
International peace. To the proponents the failure was
an overwhelming disappointment, and to the opponents it
was a wonderful victory*
In the following chapter, I will attempt, through
a summary of the whole story of the struggle for adherence
to the World Court, to come to some conclusion as to why
the campaign for adherence failed. Suffice it to say
here, that the question, as to whether the right side won
in 1935 » is still a matter of personal opinion* What the
future holds for the United States and the World Court
only time can tell* The best that we can hope for, is
that our United States may be able to continue to main-
tain peaceful relations with all the countries of the
world
CHAPTER VI
Summary and Conclusions
The idea of the association of nations or peoples
for the preservation of peace and liberty originated in
Europe in the fourteenth century. This fact is very likely
to be quite new to most people of this day whose belief
it probably is that such moves began with the Hague Confer-
ences and not much earlier than that. Those early statesmen
and philosophers, originators of the idea, had the same
basic proposition underlying their plans, namely, the united
efforts of nations to establish peaceful and just methods
of settling disputes, although the actual plans had several
variations. The plan of one of the first men, Pierre Dubois,
for example, had as its prime purpose the uniting of the
Christian World against the infidels. Dante in his project
came nearer to our idea of a World Court in his proposal
for a "world state" with a central court of justice. King
Podiebrad of Bohemia presented a project very similar to
that of Pierre IXibois and Dante in his plan for the uniting
of the nations of the Christian world into a Federal State
held together by a permanent congress of ministers.
None of these early proponents, however, formulated
any system of international law which was so necessary in
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the fulfillment of their projects. It was not until the
time of Hugo G-rotuis, during the period of the break down
of feudalism, that such a system of law was produced. His
was then the first authoritative treatise on the law of nations.
Other plans, preceding the Hague Tribunals, were
those of Henry IV, Emeric Cruce, William Penn, the Abbe
St- Pierre, Emmanuel Kant and Jeremy Bertham. These schemes
like the earlier ones had the same methods but slight vari-
ations in the ends to be secured. Henry IV, for example,
wanted to establish a system whereby Europe was to be
divided up evenly among fifteen powers which were to be
represented in a Council where all disputes among them
could be settled. The purpose of it all was the avoiding
of any possibility of jealousy over or a fear of a balance
of power in Europe, Emeric Cruce, on the other hand, pro-
posed a union of the states of the whole world for the
peaceful settlement of disputes. His was perhaps the most
famous of all the plans of the period. The rest of the
projects were more or less enlargements of the proposals
of the foregoing men and were valuable in that they con-
tinued the idea up until the time when practical means
for carrying out the ideas were developed.
In 1899, the calling of the First Hague Conference
by the young Czar of Russia marked a practical attempt
to bring about the realization of what, up until that time,
had been only plans and projects on paper. The convening
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of the Conference also marked the entrance of the United
States into the problem of European peace and stability.
The American delegates, Messrs. White, Mahan, Crozier,
Low and Holla were instructed to strive for the establish-
ment of an international court and to propose a plan for a
tribunal to which the nations might bring their disputes.
The value of the American suggestions and the influence
which they had upon the work of the Third Committee of the
Conference was evidenced by the fact that there was but one
point which was flatly rejected and the rest were accepted
either without change or at least with very little change
into the final draft for the Court of Arbitration. In the
case of Mr. Holls' special mediation, it was accepted as a
separate article under the section of G-ood Offices and
Mediations.
The convention drawn up and accepted by the members
of the Conference made the use of the Court purely volun-
tary. In order to make its position clear, the American
delegation made a declaration in full session to the effect
that in signing the Convention it understood that nothing
in it was to make the United States depart from its tradi-
tional policy of not intruding upon or interfering with
the political questions of any foreign state. This state-
ment was accepted by the Conference without any protest and
was the first appearance of the reservation which was to
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be used time and again by the opponents of the World Court
as an argument against the adherence of the United States
to the World Court. In 1904, five years after the establish-
ment of the Court of Arbitration,
, the delegates to the
Interparlimentary Union Conference at St. Louis asked Presi-
dent Roosevelt to take the leadership in inviting the nations
to send delegates to a second conference at the Hague. That
conference they proposed for the purpose of considering
questions left unfinished by the first one in 1899 and also
to consider the advisability of establishing an international
congress which would convene periodically for the discussion
of international questions.
The President accepted the charge and sent out the
invitations, but the conference was not convened until
1907, after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. Seven
men, including Joseph H. Choate, Horace Porter, Uriah M.
Rose, David J. Hill, George B. Davis, Charles S, Sperry
and William I. Buchanan, were sent by the United States as
delegates with instructions from Secretary of State Root
to work for the development of the Hague Tribunal into a
permanent one composed of Judges who were Judges and were
paid adequate salaries for their services and who would use
Judicial methods in deciding cases.
The American delegates showed the same enthusiasm
as had their predecessors at the first conference. They
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presented to their committee a detailed plan for the organ-
ization of the court according to the instructions given
to them by Secretary Root, Their plan was accepted and sup-
ported in principle, that is with a few minor modifica-
tions, by German, British, and French delegations and adopted
by the conference. The only point at which agreement could
not be reached was the question of the method of the election
of the Judges
. Therefore although the court was not actu-
ally established within the period of the Conference, the
American delegation succeeded at least in laying its founda-
tion.
The Americans were not as successful, however, in
their efforts to make arbitration obligatory. The conven-
tion as finally concluded merely provided for general or
private treaties which made arbitration obligatory only
for those who entered upon them and even then entering upon
such treaties was purely voluntary. Because this arrange-
ment fell short of their hopes and expectations the United
Stated delegation refrained from voting on the matter at all.
A second project taken up at this Second Hague Confer-
ence was the matter of establishing an International Court,
of Appeal in Prize Cases. In working out the convention
the American delegation was instrumental in working out a
compromise between the projects of Great Britain and Germany
and by so doing facilitating its acceptance by the Confer-
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ence. Although the plan for the Court failed to be rati-
fied because of a disagreement as to what law the Court
would apply
,
it still served as a step toward the realiza-
tion of international co-operation.
The interest of the United States in a Court for the
settlement of disputes between states was not confined to
the Hague Tribunal, for in 1907, it engineered the establish-
ment of the Central American Court of Justice as a means
of maintaining peace among the Republics of Central America.
Although the Court was in existance for only ten years and
was ironically ignored by the Republics after the ten year
period because of a disagreement with the United States,
it was still aamonument to the American desire for the
establishment of judicial means for securing peaceful
relations among nations.
The post war era ushered into the United States a
period of intense interest with the presentation of the
problem of the ratification of the Versailles Treaty and
the League of Nations. Although the idea of a league of
nations had been in circulation before the war ended, the
conclusion of the war and President Wilson's determination
to see the idea put into effect, brought the question to
the attention of the people and the Senate of the United
States.
Up until 1916, both political parties had been in
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accord in their approval of a league. A break did come
between them, when Senator Lodge, Republican leader, came
to a disagreement with Wilson over his foreign policy toward
G-ermany and the sinking of the "Lusitania". To this break,
I believe, can be attributed at least part of the cause
of the failure of the League of Nations in the United
States.
In January 1917, President Wilson stated his condi-
tions necessary to a permanent peace, the most important
of which were disarmament and a league of nations. Just
about one month later Senator Lodge stated his position
concerning the peace settlement by pointing out the danger-
ous implications in the principles laid down by the Presi-
dent and then parted company with the League forever. He
gave as his reason the desire not to involve the United
States in a scheme which might create a worse situation
than already existed. He stated, however, several measures
which he believed were as practical and more commendable
than the League. Those measures contained provisions for
(l) an adequate national preparedness, (2) the rehabilitation
of international law, (3) the extension of voluntary arbi-
tration, (4) the general reduction of armaments and finally
(5) the strict observance of the doctrines of foreign
policy of both Washington and Monroe.
The signing of the Armistice brought the announce-
ment from the President that he would attend the peace confer'
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ence in person as a representative of the United States.
That announcement of his proved to be a source of much bit-
ter feeling on the part of government leaders, especially
the members of the Senate, who believed that it was the
President's duty to stay home and manage the business of
the government. They argued that he had no authority to
represent the American people at that time.
Wilson incurred still more criticism when he failed
to even mention his plans for presentation at the conference
in nis farewell speech to the Senate prior to his departure
for France. Senator Lodge did succeed, however, in making
known to the delegation through his friend Henry White
what he believed were the sentiments of his party on the
matter of peace terms and a league of nations. He did
this by presenting to Mr. White a memorandum calling for
heavy indemnities from Germany and the exclusion of any
provisions for a league of nations in the treaty of peace.
On December 6, two days after the departure of the
American delegation, the attack on the League of Nations
was begun. At that time Senator Albert Beveridge declared
that instead of avoiding future wars, it would be more
likely to become the very source of them.
The speech of Senator Lodge in the Senate on December
21, marked the beginning of the determined battle on the
part of the Senate to defeat any plan which Wilson might
- 179 -
propose for the organization of a league of nations. In
that opening speech Lodge made it clear that since the
negotiators ( referring to Wilson) had not sought the ad-
vice of the Senate, the Senate would not in the future
respond to any such requests, but would influence negotia-
tions contrary to the desires of Wilson as fully as speeches
in the open Senate could do so.
With the decision of Senator Lodge to fight the
proposals for a league of nations necessarily came a rever-
sal of the former policy of the Republican party concerning
international relations. Up until that time it had been
the conservative Democrats who had been the isolationists.
The Democrats, on the other hand were believers in the
strict construction of the powers and duties of government
to be able to see eye to eye with President Wilson. Many
followed him unquestionally
,
however, because he was their
leader, others reluctantly, and still others not at all.
Consequently, there were numerous Democrats who, as debate
proceeded, made up their minds wholly aside from party con-
siderations that the new step was too dangerous, and count-
less Republicans who ignored every appeal to partisanship
and stood throughout for the League of Nations because
they believed that it was right. This latter group was
large in the country but small in the Senate. On the
Democratic side the one or two senators who opposed the
League in any shape or form probably held a kind of personal
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animosity toward Wilson. 1
The speech of Senator Me Cumber was an example of the
opinion held by a Republican who favored the idea of a
league of nations and, therefore, is of interest in a summary
of the opinion concerning the League. The speech was a
sentimental plea for the countries of Europe which had been
torn to pieces by the war. He told the Senate that, if,
after peace was secured no means for making it perpetual
were instituted, then all sacrifices had been made in vain,
and pretended civilization was but foolish mockery. As
for the overused argument that a league would interfere
with the internal affairs of the members, he maintained
that no intelligent commission would ever create such powers
for the League. In case such powers were granted, however,
he was sure that none of the great nations would ratify
the treaty. In regard to the Monroe Doctrine, he said
that no league, founded to guarantee the territorial integ-
rity and independence of its members, would be a menace to
a similar doctrine applicable to the Western World.
Further arguments against the League, before Wilson's
return with the first draft of the Covenant, were voiced
by Borah and Colonel Roosevelt. Roosevelt believed that
Europe and Asia should do their own policing and that the
1 Fleming, ojd. cit
.
, p. 84.
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United States should maintain strict adherence to the
Monroe Doctrine and take no position as an "international
Meddlesome Matty"
. Borah said that nationalism would be
murdered by the League and therefore was against any form
of internationalism*
The inevitable attack on the draft Covenant began
in the Senate with the return of Wilson from the conference.
Charges were made against it to the effect that, (l) under
it the United States surrendered the power of disarmament,
(2) it called for compulsory arbitration of all questions
without exception, (3) it would compel the United States
to participate in the wars and controversies of other nations,
(4) it would force the United States to surrender to other
nations the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations
in arms and amunition, (5) England would control it in
accordance with her own interests, and (6) under it the
powers of the League were unlimited.
A White House conference between Wilson and the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations followed upon the
outburst of Senatorial criticism. At that meeting Wilson
had to answer many questions put to him by his opponents.
In spite of his explanations, the Republican members remained
unchanged in their views, and were all the more determined
to continue their campaign against it.
Senator Lodge began the new assault in a speech
in which he made a plea for caution in the consideration of
182 -
the Covenant by all the people in the country. He stressed
the fact that it was no small thing to abandon entirely a
doctrine laid down by America’s great statesmen Washington
and Monroe. He asked if it were not possible to draft a
better, more explicit, and less dangerous one than already
drafted. He then drew up his four amendments which stated
that the Covenant should, (1) contain a section which would
preserve the Monroe Doctrine, (2) exclude from the juris-
diction of the League such questions as immigration, (3)
provide for the peaceful withdrawal of any nation from
the League, and (4) state whether the League was to have
an international force of its own or the power to summon
the armed forces of the different members.
Wilson then returned to the Conference to try to
come to an agreement with the other powers in regard to
Lodge's four amendments. He secured the acceptance of all
the amendments with little opposition except for the one
concerning the Monroe Doctrine. Finally, however, after
much explaining and assuring that the change would not
affect the protection of European countries under the League,
he secured the acceptance of the fourth amendment.
The success of Wilson in securing the changes demand-
ed by Lodge, made necessary a different plan of attack on
the part of the opponents. With the Covenant amended to
to meet the principal American objections, and with the
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masses of people still strongly behind the League, the
anti-Leaguers decided that if the nation would not think
anti-League that it must be made to feel so by a persistant
repitition of the cries already raised against it and others
which could be counted on to appeal to the emotions. Also
they believed that the nation could be wearied of the idea
of the League if the action on it could be delayed long
enough.
Fate seemed to have played into the hands of the
Republican opponents of the League because in the election
of the November previous to the change in plans
,
they had
received a majority in the Senate. Thus the machinery needed
for the success of the plan was theirs. During the Senate
debates in May and June, when the irreconcilables continued
to display more activity than the others, it became more
evident that the Republicans were making the Treaty and
League an issue for party action.
Such was the situation when Wilson returned from
Paris with the amended Treaty. With the Treaty in the
hands of the Senate, the powers of the Committee on Foreign
Relations were brought into play. Devices instrumental in
the plan for delay were right at hand. First the long
treaty of several hundred printed pages was read aloud
line by line. That reading took two weeks. Next* the Com-
mittee held public hearings which lasted for six weeks. At
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those hearings,.
.members of the American delegation gave
testimony. No one else appeared except representatives
of national groups tnat felt that their countries had re-
ceived less than justice at Paris. Because of the lack
of important speeches, the hearings were of little actual
value except as they wasted time.
The majority report of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, which came out in September of that year, made
several things certain. In the first place, it showed that
the irreconcilables in the Senate no longer had any hopes
of pursuading the Republicans to unite on a policy of com-
plete rejection, for the report recommended forty-five
amendments, many covering the same point. Those amendments
were obviously in accord with Lodge's plan of proceeding
"by way of amendment and reservation". There was no pre-
tence in the report that those changes would make them want
to ratify the Treaty. On the contrary, it showed a bitter
hostility toward it.
For the first time, during the debate in the Senate
during July and August, the expression of the Republican
senatorial opinion was not left to the irreconcilables. At
that time the speeches of those previously silent Republicans
proclaimed the defeat of the irreconcilables who had strug-
gled to commit the party to a rejection of the Treaty.
Some desired strong reservations, others were satisfied
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with mild reservations. It seemed then as though the
Republican majority in the Senate was going to vote for
the entry of the United States into the League with reserva-
tions.
In September, Wilson began his speaking tour, for
he had placed his chief reliance on an appeal to the people.
The tour, however, ended in his collapse and the loss of
the most important leadership that the League had. With
the breakdown of President Wilson, public opinion, which
had according to former reports been overwhelmingly in favor
of the League, began to drift away. In the United States,
as in Europe, there seemed to be occuring a shift in opinion
which has been described by Mr. Holt as a substitution
of near-sighted nationalism for international co-operation
and the general good. That shift in feeling was just what
Lodge hoped to gain in his program of procrastination.
While the public and the majority in the Senate were
thus groping about for some decision, debate in the Senate
continued on. The arguments used were the ones referred
to by Senator Lodge as those which would appeal to the
emotions. They were of very low calibre and consisted of
such statements as, "The League would be under the power
of the Pope because most of the countries in the League
would be Catholic," or "The League would be ruled by colored
people." Each argument was aimed to sway one section of
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the country against the League and if viewed intelligently
were utter nonsence. The Irish question was also cleverly
used by Lodge in an effort to win over the large Irish vote
in the country.
No steps had been taken by the Democrats to come to
an understanding with the Republicans, wanting mild reserva-
tions, when voting began in October, and the latter were
drifting toward a natural political alliance with their
fellow Republicans on terms more hostile to the Treaty
than those they would have preferred. The Republican ranks
then were for the first time firm.
The final vote in the Senate took place on March
19, 1920. The resolution of ratification received a majori-
ty of votes cast but not the required two- thirds majority,
and with that vote Senator Lodge succeeded in his efforts
to block the entrance of the United States into the League
of Nations.
As for a conclusion as to the reason for the failure
of the Senate to ratify the Covenant, I an inclined to
agree with Mr. Holt that it was the intense dislike of Mr.
Lodge for the way that President Wilson disregarded the
right of the United States Senate in the negotiation of
treaties with foreign countries, and his superior ability
in handling the affairs of his party in the Senate. This
opinion is justifiable, I believe, because of the fact that
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Senator Lodge actually made a statement to the effect that
he would not make any response to the suggestions of the
American negotiators at the conference, but would do every-
thing to oppose any move that they made. That statement
he made in his speech to the Senate on December 21, 1918.
Also, the fact that he changed his tactics several times in
order to win over the desired groups to his side, showed
that he did not want the League at any price. And his
animosity toward Wilson is the only evidence that I can find
for his being so opposed to the League.
The ratification of the Covenant by the nations of
Europe not only brought into existence the League of Nations,
but also through Articles 13 and 14 of the Covenant, provided
for the creation of the World Court. It may be said that
the United States was partly responsible for the suggestion
of the idea of the Court because President Wilson in his
drafts for the League of Nations had a provision for such a
court. Most of the credit for the actual drawing up of the
Convention creating the Court goes to Elihu Root, who as
the Secretary of State of the United States, had also been
responsible for the policy of the American delegates at
the Hague Peace Conference in 1907.
A Committee of Jurists was elected by the Council
of the League according to the mandate in Article 14 of
the Covenant of the League. Among the jurists elected was
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Mr. Elihu Root. As a Jurist he was responsible for solving
the problem of the election of Judges and together with
Lord Phillemore drew up the draft, which with but few amend-
ments y the Council and Assembly of the League, became
the Statute which established the Court. The Statute was
opened for ratification on December 16, 1920 and was rati-
fied by the required majority by September 1, 1921, and
went into effect on that day.
The long campaign for the adherence of the United
States to the Court officially began with the receipt of
the copy of the Protocol by Secretary of State Charles
Evans Hughes. Formal action, however, did not begin until
February 17, 1923, when Secretary Hughes sent a message to
President Harding requesting him to ask the Senate to take
action favorable to the adherence of the United States
to the Protocol of December 16, 1920, subject to four reser-
vations which he had drawn up and enclosed.
One week after receiving the message of Secretary
Hughes, President Harding delivered a message to the Senate
in which he passed on the request of Secretary Hughes and
recorded his approval of adherence to the Court. The Senate,
however, made no move to consider the question, and the
whole matter was dropped until President Coolidge made
an appeal to the Senate for favorable action. Like Hughes
and Harding, he was completely in favor of the establish-
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ment of a court which would include the nations of the
world.
Senator Lenroot followed up the message of Goolidge
with a resolution containing reservations concerning the
election of judges, the countries which should be allowed
to adhere to the Court, and the method of paying the ex-
penses of the Court. .His resolution was just the beginning
of a series which were presented in the Senate. No hearings
were held in the Foreign Relations Committee until April
30, 1924. At that time it became obvious that the question
of the election of Judges was going to cause trouble.
Senator Pepper of Pennsylvania, a member of the
Foreign Relations Committee, made an attempt to solve the
problem of the election of Judges in a plan which he pre-
sented to his fellow committeemen. This proposal was treated
very cooly by Chairman Lodge and the rest of the Committee,
who proceeded to find another point to argue over. That
point was the relationship of the League to the Court, es-
pecially in the power of the League to request advisory
opinions of the Court. The Committee believed that with
that authority, the League could injure the prestige of the
United States. Even after evidence had been given to dis-
prove the fears of the Committee, it still stood fast in
its convictions.
The pressure brought to bear on the Foreign Relations
Committee by proposals finally brought on an admission on
its part that an amendment to the advisory power of the Court
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must be added. In May, therefore, the Committee allowed the
proposal to go to the Senate. During the time that the
matter was before the Senate, Senator Lodge had died and
Borah had taken over the chairmanship of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, and had used the period to campaign over
the country against the Court, branding it a "League Court".
He met with little success because the great national
organizations were in favor of the Court.
The Senate was just as slow in taking any action as
its committee had been, and it was the House which finally
came forward to record its approval of the Court by a vote
of 303-28. Nine months later the long-awaited move on the
part of the Senate came in the form of a resolution drawn
up by Senator Swanson, one of the ardent proponents of the
Court. In his resolution he offered what he believed was
a solution to the problem of advisory opinions. His plan,
however, met with the same fate as the former ones. The
Committee still did not believe that the rights of the
United States were securely protected. To most observers
the reason for its failure was the fact that it was not
rigid enough to make sure that it would not be accepted by
the signatories or the proponents of adherence in the United
States. With the rejection of Senator Swanson's proposal,
it was becoming more and more evident that the opponents
in the Committee were not working for a plan which would
protect the rights of the United States, but were seeking
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to impede the proponents. With Senator Borah as chairman of
the Committee, such a program was easily explained, since
he was just as antagonistic toward the Court as he had been
toward the League.
In order to make their position more secure, the
anti-Leaguers secured the aid of Judge Moore in drawing up
an amendment to the Statute of the Court. That amendment
was introduced into the Senate in January 1926, and was
passed by a vote of 76-17, with the same opponents Borah,
Johnson, LaFollette, and Shipstead holding out against it
and the proponents Pepper, Lenroot, Swanson and Pittman voting
in favor of it.
The notice of the Senate's approval of adherence ac-
cording to the amended reservation was sent to the League
and in turn to the signatory states. At a meeting of the
signatories it was decided to hold a meeting to discuss with
the delegate from the United States the possibilities of
adherence according to the reservation. The United States
refused, however, to attend the conference and so it was
held without it. At the conference the signatories accepted
the four reservations based on the first four of Secretary
Hughes, but could not accept completely the rigid terms of
the advisory amendment. The signatories said that the United
States could not have the desired deciding vote in the adop-
tion of a request for an advisory opinion because a unani-
mous vote was not necessary.
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The failure of the United States to come to an agree-
ment with the signatories did not discourage the League,
for it was determined to find a solution favorable to both
sides. It , therefore, held a meeting and passed a resolution
appointing another Committee of Jurists to consider a re-
vision of the Statute of the Court. Again Elihu Root was
invited and accepted the invitation to serve on that committee.
He drew up a plan covering the question of advisory opinions
which, with a few minor revisions , was accepted by the
Committee and served as the basis of the revised protocol
drawn up by it.. The provisions were adopted unanimously by
the signatories and sent to the Secretary of State Stimson
who believed that the revised protocol would meet the ob-
jections of the United States and would constitute a sat-
isfactory basis for adherence. He promised to ask the Presi-
dent for the necessary authority to sign the protocol and
recommend that it be submitted to the Senate for consent and
ratification.
The willingness of President Hoover to further the
cause of adherence was shown when, in a little over a week's
time, he gave the necessary authorization for the signing
of the Protocol and in less than a month he presented the
protocols to the Senate and recommended imediate action in
favor of adherence.
Senate action took the form of an invitation to
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Mr. Root to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee
to explain the revised protocol. At the meeting Mr. Root
discussed the Protocol in detail and tried to show the
members that the United States was duly protected by it
and that therefore adherence was perfectly safe.
Additional evidence of the policy of the Foreign
Relations Committee to stand in the way of adherence came
as a result of its report after the meeting with Mr. Root.
In the report it presented reservations, which if adopted,
would have pushed proceedings back to the stage following
the vote taken in the Senate in Janrary 1926. The closing
of the Seventy-Second Congress before any action could be
taken was another delay which seemed to play right into
the hands of the Committee.
Late in 1932, the House took up the question which
had been temporarily dropped by the Senate, and drew up a
resolution appropriating the money necessary to pay the
share of the United States in the expenses of the Court.
Although no final action was taken because of the strong
opposition in the Senate, the move was an indication that
the House did want adherence.
Action on the World Court was dropped, after the
gesture of the House, until the spring of 1934. At that
time hearings were held before the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, one for the proponents and one for the opponents of
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the Court.
At the hearing for the proponents, the following
went on record as approving of the adherence of the United
States: The American Bar Association with its 30,000 members;
The Republican and Decocratic Parties; 65 state and local
bar associations; The Chamber of Commerce of America; the
legislatures of sixteen states; eleven national women's
organizations, including the American Association of Univer-
sity Women, The C-eneral Federation of Women's Clubs, The
National Women' s Christian Temperance Union and The National
Women's Trade Union League; The Federal Council of Churches
of Christ in America; Alfred E. Smith; and Admiral William
S, Sims.
The following registered their opposition to ad-
herence at the hearing for the opponents: Senator Reed;
Senator Pepper, Judge Daniel Cohalan; The American Legion;
The International Seamen's Union; Governor Joseph B. Ely;
Charles Francis Adams, director of First National Stores;
and The Hearst Newspapers.
The two hearings marked the only action which was
taken until the new Congress met on January 3, 1935. At
that time President Roosevelt, in his opening speech in-
dicated his approval of adherence and two days later called
a conference of the Senate leaders and representatives of
the Department of State including Secretary of State Hull,
Democratic leader Senator Robinson, Chairman of the Foreign
195 -
Relations Committee, Senator Pittman, and Assistant Secre-
tary of State Francis B. Sayre. The purpose of the meet-
ing v:as the consideration of immediate action on the
protocols.
Four days later, the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, by a vote of 14-7, submitted a report recommending
ratification. That recommendation, however, was accom-
panied by an understanding which amounted to a restatement
of the battle scarred fifth amendment. Two days after the
report of the Committee of the Senate was presented, the
New York Times reported that the opposition in the Senate
had dwindled down to a handful of "bitterenders" of which
six were the Republican minority leaders Borah and Johnson,
Senators Nye and Cutting, the Progressive Senator La
Follette and the Farmer-Laborite Senator Shipstead.
The final debates began in the Senate on January
15, and continued until January 20. Senator Robinson, of
Arkansas opened them with a speech in defense of the Court.
He argued that the United States had nothing to fear in
joining the Court because the Court could not recognize
any dispute in which the United States had or claimed an
interest without its consent.
Senator Johnson followed with a new argument against
the Court. He said that he wanted peace just as much as
anyone else but was quite sure that it was not to be found
in the World Court. He backed up his argument with the
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example of Bolivia and Paraguay, both members of the League
and Court, who had been fighting for over three years with-
out seeking any assistance from either the League or the
Court. He also showed the ineffectiveness of the Court
in the taking over of Manchuria and China by Japan and the
blowing up of Corfu and the invasion of Abyssinia by Italy.
According to Huey Long, the campaign for adherence
should have been called ’’America for Sale"
,
for he believed
that the entry of the United States into the Court would
amount to the outright sale of it to the countries of
Europe. He said that the experience gained in the World
War should have taught the United States that it was use-
less to think that it would gain anything but debts and
hard feelings from adherence to the Court.
Senator Vandenberg continued the debate by presenting
his amendment which provided that the adherence of the United
States should not make it depart from its traditional policy
of non-interference in European disputes. He said that as
far as he was concerned, the amendment was not necessary,
but was presented for the benefit of those who still believed
that the rights of the United States were not sufficiently
protected. He admitted that he had opposed the entry of the
United States into the League, but was certain now that the
Court was sufficiently separated from the League under the
proposed protocols and that it was safe for the United States
to join the Court.
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Senator Logan followed Senator Vandenberg with a
refutation of the arguments of Senators Long and Johnson.
He declared that the mere fact that the United States had
maintained peaceful relations for the hundred years by
means of arbitration was no argument against the Court. In
the first place, it was no proof that the same peace could
not be maintained by the use of the World Court. In the
second place, the arbitration Court was the only means
for settling disputes at the time. He next attacked the
argument that the Court was made up of foreign judges.
That argument he saw was ridiculous because, the fact that
they were not Americans did not make the judge unscrupu-
lous foreigners. He said that the Americans would resent
the same belittlement of its Judges by the Europeans and so
had no right to do the same to the European ones.
Senator Borah's opposition, aired in the Senate,
was based entirely on the advisory power of the Court. He
said that that power made the ^ourt nothing but an advisory
tribunal and no number of amendments would ever change that
status in his opinion. Therefore, he was going to oppose
adherence to the Court as long as that provision was in the
protocol.
Senator Thomas followed Senator Borah in an attempt
to disprove the name "League Court" as applied to the
World Court. He claimed that the relationship of the Court
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and League ended with the establishment of the Court, accord-
ing to Article 14 of the Covenant. Furthermore, he said
that the Court was created by a conference of representatives
of many countries, not all of which were members of the League
and was, therefore, not a pure creation of the League. He
concluded with the statement that he believed the rights
of the United States were completely protected by the 1929
protocol.
Senator Reynolds recorded his opposition to adherence
by saying that isolation had made the United States great
and isolation only would keep it so. He backed up this
opinion by citing the results of the World War in the
United States in the form of unbearable taxation forced on
the people for generations to come. Until some one could
give him a good reason why the United States should Join
the Court, he was determined to oppose adherence.
Senator Norris entered the debate with an amendment
to the effect that any dispute in which the United States
was a party had to have a two- thirds vote of approval of
the Senate before it could be brought to the Court for a
decision. The acceptance of that amendment by the members
of the Court was necessary before he would vote for adher-
ence. Its rejection by the Court members, he said was the
most reasonable excuse possible why the United States should
stay out of the Court, Without its protection, he believed
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that ruin might be brought on his government.
During the period of debate in the Senate, public
opinion really came forward and asserted itself. World
Court Committees sent messages to the Senate begging it
not to delay any longer but to take immediate action. The
ministers of 150 Protestant churches urged their congre-
gations to send telegrams to their congressmen to vote
in favor of adherence.
The propoganda of the opponents was re-enforced by
Father Charles E. Coughlin, who delivered a fiery speech
denouncing the Court. He said that "joining the World
Court to maintain peace strongly stinks of diplomatic
conceit." The Court, he said, was based not on the right
of the majority to rule* but on the right of the minority
to disrupt, and was nothing but an "artificial creation of
those who wished to exempt themselves from all national
law and to profit by the injustice of the Versailles Treaty.
The evening before the final vote was to be taken,
the proponents and opponents had their last chance to try
to win the Senate over to their respective sides. Dr.
Nicholas Murray Butler delivered a very heated speech against
the opponents and said that their attitude was inexplicable
save on the ground that they had "neither ideas, principles,
courage, nor any concern for the highest interests of the
American people". That same evening, Father Coughlin
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urged his listeners over the radio to wire their senators
as a last chance to block adherence. He appealed to every
11
stolid" American, who loved democracy, to stand back of
the Senators in their honest fight to keep America safe
for Americans.
So strong was the final attack of the opponents,
that on one day only, 40,000 telegrams were delivered to
the Senate. It was the opinion of observers in Washington
that the onslaught of fire and criticism against the Court
had taken its toll in the ranks of the proponents, and would
be the deciding factor in the struggle. In any case the
vote on the following day was 52-36, just seven votes 'short
of the two-thirds vote necessary for ratification.
In the attempt to come to a conclusion as to why the
Senate failed to ratify adherence to the World Court after
it had been favored for so many years by successive presi-
dents, secretaries of state, and even by public opinion,
I have picked out three factors which I believe were
contributory. They are: (l) The failure of the Senate to
ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations, (2) The
carry-over of leadership of the opponents in the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate from the time of the
League to that of the Court, and (3) The failure of the
senators to carry out the wishes of their constituents
in their votes.
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failure of the Senate to ratify the Covenant
of the League provided the necessary background and setting
for the action on adherence to the Court. It not only
built up the prestige of the Senate's constitutional right
to give advice and consent to treaties with foreign coun-
tries
,
but also showed that a handful of senators with un-
usual powers of leadership and strategy could sway the vote
of the Senate to their side in spite of the wishes of the
administration. This factor, then, I believe was the first
cause for the failure of the Senate to ratify adherence.
The second cause for the defeat of adherence followed
naturally and opportunely upon the heels of the first. The
presence on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of
the two anti-League leaders, Lodge and Borah, and their
followers Senators Johnson and Reed, was a powerful aid to
the foes of adherence in the Senate. Although Lodge died
and his place as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee
was taken by Senator Borah, his successors were able to
apply his tactics with app arently the same success. As in
the case of the Covenant, the plan of the Committee in
dealing with the protocols seemed to have been the addition
of reservation after reservation for the specific
purpose of making the provisions unacceptable to the
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members of the Court or of stalling off a final vote until
the strategic time came. In any case, the campaign of the
opposition against adherence to the Court so nearly paral-
leled tnat of the anti-Leagua?s that I am of the opinion
thao the practical identity of leadership and principles
among the opponents was one of the most important factors
in the defeat of adherence to the Court.
Evidence to back up the statement that the public
was quite generally in favor of adherence was found in the
reports of the hearing held by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. There is no evidence, however, which would in-
dicate why the opinion of the public was not expressed in
the vote of the Senate. Therefore, the only conclusion
which can be arrived at is that the senators followed their
own opinions in the matter and ignored those of their con-
stituents.
These conclusions are those which seem most reason-
able in the face of the available evidence. Whether they
are the real ones or not, only time and the publication
of more evidence will tell.
The failure of the Senate to ratify adherence to the
V/orld Court in the face of the consistent and wholehearted
desire and approval of successive administrations, begin-
ning with the administration of President Harding and ending
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with that of Franklin D. Roosevelt, is one of the many
examples of the ascendency of the Senate in its consti-
tutional power in the treaty-making machinery of the United
States Government. It serves to indicate the important
position which the Senate can and may hold in future nego-
tiations of treaties with foreign nations.
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APPENDIX I
PROTOCOL FOR THE ACCESSION OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE
PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE OF DECEMBER 16, 1920. OPENED FOR
SIGNATURE AT GENEVA. SEPTEMBER 14. 1929.
The states , signatories of the Protocol of Signature
of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, dated December 16, 1920, and the United States
of America, through the undersigned duly authorized rep-
resentatives, have mutually agreed upon the following pro-
visions regarding the adherence of the United States of
America to the said Protocol subject to the five reser-
vations formulated by the United States in the resolution
adopted by the Senate on January 27, 1926.
Article I
The States, signatories to the said Protocol, ac-
cept the special conditions attached by the United States
in the five reservations mentioned above to its adherence
to the said Protocol upon the terms and conditions set out
in the following articles.
Article II
The United States shall be admitted to participate,
through representatives designated for the purpose and
upon an equality with the signatory States Members of the
League of Nations represented in the Council or in the
Assembly, in any and all proceedings of either the Council
or the Assembly for the election of judges or deputy-
judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
provided for in the Statute of the Court. The vote of the
United States shall be counted in determining the abso-
lute majority of votes required by the Statute.
Article III
No amendment of the Statute of the Court may be
made without the consent of all the contracting States.
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Article IV
The Court shall render advisory opinions in public
session after notice and opportunity for hearing substan-tially as provided in the now existing Articles 73 and 74
of the Rules of Court.
Article V
With view to ensuring that the Court shall not,
without the consent of the United States, entertain any re-
quest for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or
question in which the United States has or claims an in-
terest, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations
shall, through any channel designated for that purpose by
the United States, inform the United States of any pro-
posal before the Council or Assembly of the League for ob-
taining an advisory opinion from the Court, and thereupon,
if desired, an exchange of all views as to whether an in-
terest of the United States is affected shall proceed with
all convenient speed between the Council or Assembly of the
League and the United States.
Whenever a request for an advisory opinion comes to
the Court, the Registrar shall notify the United States
thereof, among other States mentioned in the now existing
Article 73 of the Rules of Court, stating a reasonable time
limit fixed by the President within which a written state-
ment by the United States concerning the request will be
received. If for any reason no sufficient opportunity for
an exchange of views upon such request should have been
afforded and the United States advises the Court that the
question upon which the opinion of the Court is asked is
one that affects the interests of the United States, pro-
ceedings shall be stayed for a period sufficient to enable
such an exchange of views between the Council or the
Assembly and the United States to take place.
With regard to requesting an advisory opinion of the
Court in any case covered by the preceding paragraphs,
there shall be attributed to an objection of the United
States the same force and effect as attaches to a vote
against asking for the opinion by a member of the League
of Nations in the Council or in the Assembly.
If, after the exchange of views provided for in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article, it shall appear that
no agreement can be reached and the United States is not
prepared to forego its objection, the exercise of the
powers of withdrawal provided in Article 8 hereof will
follow naturally without any imputation of unfriendli-
ness or unwillingness to co-operate generally for peace and
goodwill.
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^ a l be deposited in the archives of the Secretariat ofthe League of Nations.
__
, ,
The present Protocol shall come into force as soon
n™tate! w?ich have ratified the Protocol of December
ratifications
alS° tlie United States
» have deposited their
Article VIII
The United States may at any time notify the Secre-tary-Genera. 1 of the League of Nations that it withdraws its
adherence to the Protocol of December 16, 1920. The Secre-tary-General shall immediately communicate this notifica-tion to all the other States signatories of the Protocol.
In such case, the present Protocol shall cease tobe in force as from the receipt by the Secretary-General
of the notification by the United'' States
.
On their part, each of the other contracting States
may at any time notify the Secretary-General of the League
of Nations that it desires to withdraw its acceptance of
the special conditions attached by the United States to its
adherence to the Protocol of December 16, 1920, The Secre-
tary shall immediately give communication of this notifi-
cation to each of the States signatories of the present
Protocol. The present Protocol shall be considered as
ceasing to be in force if and when, within one year of the
date of receipt of the said notification, not less than two-
thirds of the contracting States other than the United States
shall have notified the Secretary-General of the League of
Nations that they desire to withdraw the above-mentioned
acceptance.
Done at Geneva, the fourteenth day of September,
nineteen hundred and twenty-nine, in a single copy, of
which the French and English texts shall be both authorized.
207 -
APPENDIX II
VOTE IN THE SENATE ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE COVENANT OF
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, INCLUDING THE FOURTEEN LODGE RESER-
VAT IONS AND THE IRISH SELF-DETERMINATION RESERVATION
.
MARCH 19, 1920. •
YEAS 49
Ashurst Gore Myers Spencer
Ball Hale New Sterling
Beckham Henderson Nugent Sutherland
Calder Jones ,Wash. Owen Trammell
Capper Kellogg Phelan Walsh, Mass.
Colt Kenyon Phipps Walsh,Momt.
Curtis Keyes Pittman Warren
Dllingham King Pomerene Watson
Edge Lenroot Ransdell Wolcott
Elkins Lodge Smith, Ga.
Fletcher McClean Smith, Md.
Frelinghuysen McNary Smoot
NAYS H
Borah Gronna McCormick Shields
Brandegee Harris McKellar Simmons
Comer Harrison Moses Smith, S.C,
Culberson Hitchcock Norris Stanley
Dial Johnson, Cal. Overman Swanson
Fernald Johnson, S. Dak .Reed Thomas
France Kirby Robinson Underwood
Cray Knox Sheppard Williams
G-lass LaFollette Sherman
NOT VOTING
Cummins Harding Nelson Poindexter
Fall Jones ,N.Mex. Newberry Smith, Ariz
Gerry McCumber Penrose Townsend
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APPENDIX III
VOTE IN THE SENATE ON THE PROTOCOLS TO THE STATUTE OF
ADHERENCE OF THE WORLD COURT JANUARY 27, 1926.
YEAS 76
Ashurst Ferris Lenroot Robinson
Bayard Fess McKellar Sackett
Bingham George McLean Shortridge
Bratton Gerry McMaster Simmons
Broussard Gillette McNary Smith
Bruce Glass Mayfield Smoot
Butler Goff Means Stanfield
Cameron Gooding Metcalf Stephens
Capper Hale Neely Swanson
Caraway Harris Norbeck Trammell
Copeland Harrison Norris Tyson
Couzens Heflin Oddie Underwood
Cummins Howell Overman Wadsworth
Curtis Jones, N.Hex . Pepper Walsh
Dale Jones
,
Wash . Phipps Warren
Denien Kendrick Pittman Weller
Edge Keyes Randsdell Wheeler
Edwards King Reed Willis
Ernst
NAYS 17
Blease Harreld Pine Watson
Borah Johnson Reed, Mo. Williams
Brookhart LaFollette Robinson, Ind.
Fernald Moses Schall
Frazier Nye Shipstead
NOT VOTING
Dill duPont Greene
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APPENDIX IV
VOTE IN THE SENATE ON THE PROTOCOLS TO THE STATUTE OF
ADHERENCE OF THE WORLD COURT JANUARY 29, 1935.
YEAS £2
Adams Byrd’ Glass Moore
Ashurst Byrnes Guffey Neely
Austin Capper Hale 0 'Mahoney
Bachman Caraway Harrison Pittman
Bankhead Clark Hatch Pope
Barbour Conally Hayden Radclif f
e
Barkley Costigan Keyes Robinson
Bilbo Couzens King Sheppard
Black Cutting Logan Thomas , Utah
Brown Dieterich Lonergan Truman
Bulk ley Duffy McNary Vandenberg
Burke Fletcher Maloney Van Nuys
George Minton Wagner
NAYS 36
Bone Gerry Metcalf Schwellenback
Borah Gore Murphy Shipstead
Bulow Hastings Norbeck Smith
Carey Johnson Norris Thomas ,0kla.
Coolidge LaFollette Nye Townsend
Davis Lewis Reyno Ids Trammell
Dickinson Long Russell Walsh
Donahey McCardan Schall Wheeler
Frazier McGill White
NOT VOTING
Copeland McAdoo Steiwer
Gibson Overton Tydings
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